A painful lesson to learn

In just over a week of regular season games, it became clear that Tsuyoshi Nishioka had a slow learning curve when it came to the nuances of baseball on this side of the Pacific.

Coming over from Chiba Lotte Marines, Nishioka was lauded for his eye at the plate, racking up numerous walks and an impressive on-base percentage to go along with it. Yet, we had not been privy to this discerning eye rather one that does not seem quite calibrated. After all, in 26 plate appearance he has struck out eight times - going down looking whopping six. Most fans knee-jerkingly want to deem Nishioka overmatched by Major League Baseball’s superior firepower without considering that Japan’s strike zone, while vertically larger, is typically narrower than the one we have over here.

Although he had the ability to hash out the details of the stateside strike zone without the threat of bodily injury, he was not afforded the same luxury when discovering the realities of the American basepaths.

This past winter, when asked if he had any advice for his incoming countryman based on his experience assimilating to the American game, Kaz Matsui offered some words of wisdom for Nishioka including:

“Be careful about getting spiked during double plays”

With just a handful of middle infielders making the conversion from Nippon Professional Baseball to the major leagues, it has been a slow process for those players to embrace the type of play necessary to compete with the vigorous effort shared by their major league counterparts around second base.

At TheBaseballCodes.com, a website dedicated to many spoken and unspoken rules of the game, the authors discussed the differences of the style between the two countries on the basepaths. Former major leaguer and ex-Yakult Swallow second baseman, Rex Hudler, said of his tenure in Japan’s Central League in 1993 that:

“They didn’t come after me on double plays. They didn’t like to break up double plays. They weren’t real physical in their game. I was a physical guy, I liked contact. I had to ask the Americans on the other teams to come get me. I said, ‘come on, let’s make it fun, let’s make it exciting.’ ”

To be sure, this non-aggressive behavior has been practiced for generations in Japan. It had been an element missing from their game for so long that, back in 1987, the Tokyo Giants sent a handful of their prized prospects to workout with the then-low A Miami Marlins in order to indoctrinate them in the ways of “hard-nosed” baseball. More specifically, they were sent to learn how to go into second base with their “spikes” up. Seeing has the “hard-nosed” movement just began to take roots in the early 1990s in Japan, it is easy to see why, as middle infielders began to transition from the Far East to the United States, most were not adequately prepared for the intensity that is shown on this side of the globe.

In another instance cited at TheBaseballCodes.com, according to Rod Allen*, the color commentator for the Tigers at Fox Sports Detroit, referenced another second baseman that came over to the White Sox in 2005:

“(Japanese infielder) Tad Iguchi’s first couple of months here he just about got killed because he didn’t know that the American players came in that hard at second base.”

*Allen, who also played in Japan himself, is remembered for one of the more bizarre incidents when charging the mound, another practice not observed overseas.

While Iguchi never suffered a serious injury like Nishioka’s, he was sent sprawling several times including one that resulted in a deep knee bruise courtesy of Oakland’s Scott Hatteberg in 2005. However, another celebrated Japanese infielder, Akinori Iwamura, a third baseman for most of his career with the Yakult Swallows, was badly injured in a brush up at second.

Unlike Iguchi or Matsui, Iwamura’s initial introduction allowed him to maintain his original position of third base in 2007 but was soon pressed off of the hot corner when prospect Evan Longoria was deemed ready. The Rays moved Iwamura around the diamond to second where, with the exception of a dust-up with the Yankees’ Shelley Duncan in spring training, he handled himself quite well. In 2009 however, Iwamura would suffer a very similar injury to Nishioka in the very same manner.

While playing a series against the cross-Everglades Marlins, in the bottom of the eighth inning Florida’s Wes Helms bounced a check-swing double-play ball to Rays pitcher Dan Wheeler. Wheeler fielded the ball and spun to second to feed the covering Iwamura. Iwamura received the throw on the base but then planted his front foot out in front of the bag to make the relay throw to first. Instead of completing the throw, the Marlins’ Chris Coghlan came in hard to the exposed Iwamura and wiped the infield dirt with him.

The play resulted in a torn knee ligament for Iwamura and he was sidelined for the majority of the 2009 season. The following year, Iwamura never really regained his pre-injury abilities and wound up hitting just .173/.285/.250 in 229 plate appearances split between Pittsburgh and Oakland. Because of his unfamiliarity for needing to bail out quickly when turning the double play, Iwamura likely accelerated his way out of major league baseball.

In addition to not only lacking the awareness to have a quick release, there is another element contributing to Nishioka’s unfortunate injury at second.

As a shortstop, Nishioka was in the process of transition back to a position he had not played since 2005. This was a similar plight shared by his predecessor Kaz Matsui. When the Mets decided that Matsui’s defense at short was not up to snuff for the major league level, they switch him over to second base. Of course, while some might think that simply moving 50 paces to your left is an easy task, Matsui had some issues:

“Matsui said … that his biggest challenge remained becoming proficient on double plays, in large part because he cannot see the runner coming toward him the way he could while playing shortstop.”

That description sounds awfully familiar to what transpired in the Bronx on Thursday afternoon.

In revisiting the clip, the footage clearly shows that Nishioka’s focus is on the baseball and not the whereabouts of the incoming Swisher:

So for Nishioka, in just his sixth game at second base in seven years, he had to relearn the situational awareness that comes with the territory. Whereas when he was playing shortstop, the play happened before his eyes. Similar to a quarterback being rushed by a blind-side blitz, here we see a prime example of someone who is not entirely cognizant of the unfolding events.

With these cases in mind, it can easily be concluded that because Japanese players do not grow up in a baseball culture that is taught to be vigilant of some two-hundred and ten pound individual bearing down on you, they seem to have a harder time adapting to the position – particularly the middle infield. This is exacerbated when accounting for the fact that they receive little on-the-job training at the minor league level.

As much as it was likely stressed in Florida to Nishioka regarding the league’s ability to go gung-ho into the keystone, there really is no way of conveying this message (even more so when considering the language barrier) until a player is actually experiencing it. And for a player like Nishioka, he had to learn the lesson the hard way. 

Yankees work Delmon Young away

Delmon Young had one of those spring training that makes on-lookers’ eyes pop. In 48 Grapefruit League at-bats, Young tagged three home runs and hit three most doubles for good measure. At his Star Tribune blog this spring, LaVelle Neal raved about the laser show Young was producing in the Florida sunshine:

“Looks like Young has decided to pull the ball more this year. He's stronger from the waist up and look very confident after a good season in 2010. He's a litte bit of a Albert Belle look to him this year. That means baseballs could be in trouble”

A substantial portion of Young’s success last year came from being able to pull the ball with more authority. In fact, he had a 260-point increase over his two previous seasons when hitting the ball to left field. Part of that power boost was due to his improvement on handling pitches inside:

	Well-Hit Average (Swing-Inside)
2008	.084
2009	.099
2010	.124
League Average	.078

(via MyInsideEdge.com)

Of course, looking to pull the ball when it is not thrown inside is counterintuitive.

Presumably, the New York Yankees likely have a well-funded advanced scouting department and have watched Young this past season and in spring as he continues to turn on inside pitches with authority. Naturally, in their first game with a young pitcher on the mound in Ivan Nova, the Yankees’ game plan was designed to attack Young outside.

In their first encounter in the second inning, Nova stayed away from the big right-hander and got Young to chase a pitch above the zone and pop it up to Nick Swisher in right:

In their second match-up, Nova, down 3-1 in the count, was forced to go back in the zone but still got Young to weakly tap the ball towards third base. Unfortunately for the Yankee pitcher, Young’s swunt (swinging bunt) was hit a tad too so for Alex Rodriguez to field:

In their final meeting, with the Twins down by a run but threatening to collect after Justin Morneau led off the top of the sixth with a single, Young was in position to do some damage. Nova managed to slip a fastball inside that Young fouled off. Wisely, the next pitch was a changeup just outside of the zone. Young, perhaps intent on pulling the ball, turned over on the off-speed and bounced it to Derek Jeter to start the six-four-three twin killing:

Because of his success last season on pitches inside in addition to his spring display of power, opposing teams’ scouting departments will likely use his asset against him. As long as Young remains pull-happy, pitchers will continue to feed him pitches on the outer-half of the zone until he proves that he is able to rope that ball into the opposite field.

While I am specifically singling out Young for falling into this trap, up-and-down the lineup, the Twins were victims to trying to turn on all of Nova’s pitches away. For example, during his epic 10-pitch at-bat in the fourth inning with Jim Thome acting as the potential tying run on second base, instead of changing his approach after watching Nova nine other pitches in the same location, Jason Kubel pulled a fastball down-and-away to second base. Mauer turned over three of Nova’s offerings that were low and away. For someone like Mauer who is used to going with the pitch, this may be an indication that he still is not close to his midseason form.

With short porches to the corners, the Yankees will always have a natural tendency to pitch opponents away. For the Twins’ offense in the rest of this series, the key will be to focus less on the proximity of those walls and to simply go with the pitch. 

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Jays aggressive approach put Twins in an early hole

Over the weekend, the Jays did something they were notorious for doing a season ago: They swung early and often.

Last season, the Blue Jays lineup swung at a reported 34% of first pitches, a rate that was significantly higher rate than the rest of baseball (26% MLB average). Toronto’s quick-strike policy proved to be offensively successful as they hit .313/.323/.557 with 49 home runs (19% of their total) on the first pitch of an at-bat. Because Minnesota’s pitching staff paced baseball with the most first-pitch strikes at 62% the Twins’ style of attack played directly to the strength of Toronto’s offensive methodology. Given these tendencies, it’s not surprising that the Jays averaged a whopping 6.5 runs per game and taking six of nine from the eventual AL Central champions.

One of the more successful pitchers in this area was the Twins’ Opening Day starter Carl Pavano. A year ago, Pavano was second in baseball to Cliff Lee in first-pitch strikes with 68% and tied for third with 90% of one of his first two pitches to a hitter becoming a strike. Due to their propensity to get up to the plate swinging, the Jays owned Pavano in their three match-ups last year, smacking him for 14 extra base hits including five home runs while going 27-for-76 (.355). And of course, many of those hits came on Pavano’s initial offering.

For Pavano and the Jays lineup, the 2011 season started very much like it left off between the two entities last fall. More than half of the Jays at-bats finished within the first two pitches – mostly to their advantage. Toronto went 5-for-10 (.500) with two home runs and a double on Pavano’s first two offerings, accounting for seven of their runs.

The following afternoon, the Twins sent Francisco Liriano to the hill. Liriano, not necessarily known for his marksmanship, actually fared well last year in achieving strike one 62% of the time. Unlike Pavano the night before who lived in the strike zone, Liriano struggled to get his first-pitch over the plate. He threw in the zone 11 times in his 22 match-ups (50%). Ultimately, Liriano leaned too heavily on his fastball to start the count - throwing it 16 times on the first-pitch – and the Jays hit two of those out of the park while knocking a triple another time. Because the Jays waited out Liriano and forced him into throwing his fastball, a reduced velocity fastball at that, they were able to get good pitches to swing at.

Meanwhile on Sunday, Nick Blackburn managed to navigate through the free-swinging lineup without allowing a hit in his first-pitch. Blackburn regularly mixed in his curveball and changeup – throwing it 11 times to start the count - keeping his opponents from honing in on his fastball. This method of pitching backwards proved extremely fruitful for Blackburn. In fact, the Jays were able to put just three of Blackburn’s initial offerings into play – all of which were converted into outs. Because of his ability to keep the Jays hitters at bay through five innings, the Twins were able to conjure up enough offense of their own to gain their first victory of the season.

Pavano thrives against teams who try to remain patient and work the count. His ability to pound the zone to get ahead in the count allows him to mix up his pitches more frequently. Unfortunately, this strategy has shown it does not work against aggressive lineups like the Blue Jays who take aim on early strikes. While possibly slowed from not pitching winter ball this off-season (or potentially even the early signs of an injury considering his decreased velocity), Liriano was cornered into throwing his fastball far too frequently early in the count. Blackburn, on the other hand, cycled through his cache of pitches while keeping the ball down in the zone. When the Twins square off against the Jays again in May, the pitching staff should replicate Blackburn’s game plan.  

Gardy will split time with his closers

On the eve of the Twins’ opener in Canada, manager Ron Gardenhire resolved perhaps the biggest indecision of spring camp with his announcement that he will split time between Joe Nathan and Matt Capps in the closer role.

Gardenhire explained to reporters:

“We know our closer situation and how we’re going to handle that. We’ve talked to Joe and Capper about it. We know Joe can’t go three, four or five days in a row, or maybe even two, so we’ll protect him early. We have two pretty good ones.”

Even though he made significant strides in his first time back on the mound competitively, Nathan still was struggling with his slider and the fastball did not have the same pop as it did two years ago. Reaching this verdict to split time was likely even easier when comparing the two relievers’ spring results. While Capps finished the spring throwing 10 innings while whiffing nine and not allowing a walk, Nathan rarely missed bats as he walked four and striking out just three in his eight innings of work.

After a particularly rough outing against the Phillies in Florida, Nathan noted that his slider was not responding the way he wanted it to:

"I'm just fine-tuning my slider, which is a big pitch. It's one of those pitches that seems to come later in the spring for me. So it's something I'll have to touch up and stay on top of, because it's a big pitch for me."

Just how big of a pitch was Nathan’s slider when he was healthy?

According to Inside Edge's data, from 2007 to 2009, opponents managed to hit just .163/.205/.234 (AVG/OBP/SLG) off of his slider. Twins infielders would regularly get a quick breeze in their directions as opponents swung-and-missed a whopping 40.8 percent of the time when taking a cut. For Nathan, his slider was his go-to out-pitch racking up 122 of his 242 strikeouts on it. When hitters did make contact, the slider was typically kept on the ground – a stark contrast to his fastball which they tended to elevate.

Speaking of the fastball, as important as the slider is to his dominance, there is the growing concern that he has not yet regained the velocity necessary in order to set up the slider effectively.

After a month of being reminded constantly not to fret over his fastball’s velocity – that he ramps up towards the end of spring training - Nathan took the mound in Atlanta for the exhibition game on Wednesday for his final showing before the regular season. Deep in the dirty south, he was still chucking unleaded gas. Unlike his previous outings in the Grapefruit League, Turner Field provides us with access to his stuff through the pitch f/x system and allows for a strikingly accurate velocity reading.

The pitch f/x cameras registered Nathan’s fastball as reaching 90 miles an hour at its maximum speed, nearly four miles an hour slower than his seasonal average in ’09. In comparison to his first appearances in ’08 and ’09, Nathan’s fastball pales:

Joe Nathan’s early season velocity
	Velocity (avg)	Velocity (max)	Time to Plate (sec)
2008 (3.31.08 vs LAA)	95.5	96.5	0.406
2009 (4.8.09 vs SEA)	93.3	95.0	0.404
2011 (3.29.11 vs ATL)	89.7	90.4	0.420

via BrooksBaseball.net

Is this something to be concerned over?

Over at Baseball Prospectus, Mike Fast’s research shows that most pitchers’ velocity has quite the bell-curve throughout the duration of the season. Many start at a lower level then peak as the temperature warms up before descending again in the fall. Like most of his hurling brethren, Nathan shares this trait. Dating back to 2005, Fangraphs.com data says Nathan enters the season’s opening month tossing up 94.4 mile per hour cheddar at hitters. This too has increased as the season progressed. So it’s entirely possible that he will ramp up his heat as the 2011 season ages but even still, a four mile per hour decrease is hard to recover over seven months.

Likewise, it should be emphasized that for most Tommy John veterans velocity does not levy nearly the same amount of focus as their control does. After all, an 87 miles per hour fastball can be just as effective as a 96 mile per hour one if spotted correctly. For the most part, the issue is that the elbow is an instrument of command (whereas the shoulder is the driving force) so as pitchers re-acclimate themselves to their newly repaired elbow it’s often the control that is the last facet of pitching to return. So if the velocity does not make an immediate return and pitches are left up in the zone, they have a nasty habit of getting lost in the bleachers.

In Nathan's case, hetypically liked locating his fastball up in the zone on hitters. With his hard velocity, it was often difficult for opponents to catch up to the pitch. Below are heat maps of Nathan's fastball found at Fangraphs.com. As you can see, against left-handers, Nathan typically spotted his fastball up-and-away. For righties, Nathan went middle-up:

 

This fastball location was particularly effective considering Nathan supplemented this with a slider thrown low in the zone. This combination would give hitters a large swath of the zone to patrol. However, at his current velocity levels, Nathan might experience more damage if he continues to throw his fastball at those areas. According to John Walsh's research at the Hardball Times, pitchers with velocity in the 88-to-91 mile per hour range gave up far more runs on pitches up in the zone versus those in the same speed range who kept the ball down. So if Nathan in unable to increase his velocity during the regular season when his adreneline is flowing, he will need to keep the pitch down in the zone.

Furthermore, consideration must be paid to the fact that Nathan is returning from a major surgical procedure and attempting to do so just 12 months after his date with the knife. When closer Billy Wagner returned to action just 11 months after his Tommy John surgery,multiple major-league sources warned him that the medical risk persists for a pitcher until he is at least 14 months removed from the procedure. For Nathan, that 14-month milestone comes at the end of May. To make matters worse, he will be asked to pitch in Minnesota when the chilly spring weather takes a toll on healthy arms, so it shouldn’t surprise anyone to see Nathan’s recovering elbow experience a setback or hear reports of tightness after some outings.

Given his early returns, the troubles finding his slider and the disconcerting drop in velocity on his fastball, it is not unreasonable to expect Nathan to encounter some rough outings in the early going. That said, the decision to split the end of the game between Nathan and Capps is a sound one. Not only does it give Nathan the time to refine his pitches both in game and in bullpen, it also gives him the necessary time between outings to recoup - especially when the elements are less than favorable in the spring. Regardless of whom Gardenhire ultimately selects to achieve the overhyped statistic of the save, having Nathan healthy and available throughout the season should improve the bullpen, even if he does not regain his pre-injury form. 

Mechanical flaw responsible for Span's 2010 offensive woes?

There have been a lot of theories thrown around this off-season attempting to identify the reasons behind Denard Span’s 2010 regression:

He’s been hitting with two-strikes more frequently.

The transition to natural grass from turf has shaved points off his batting average.

He played too much and needed more rest.

While all of those were factors to some extent, more tangibly, Twins Hitting Coach Joe Vavra recently acknowledged a slight flaw in his mechanics last year that he believed contributed to his offensive woes.

In conversations with Vavra on the subject of Span, 1500ESPN’s Phil Mackey wrote that Vavra attributed the increase in grounders on the center fielder not keeping his head as still as he had in previous season:

"A little bit of a mechanical thing. He was raising up off the ball when the ball was coming in. Usually the head's really still, and with him he was raising up a little bit. So when he went to swing it, he wasn't seeing actually what he saw out of the (pitcher's) hand. He was kind of creating a little different up and down trajectory, or plane of the ball. So he was either on top of it or underneath it, but he wasn't squaring up as much as he had been. It was just hard for him to get rid of. He's much better now."

Reviewing video footage of Span’s swing dating back to 2008, there is ample visual evidence of additional bouncing this season. Comparative to his two prior years, Span’s 2010 mechanics demonstrate a wellspring of pre-swing movement:

Whereas in his first two seasons with the Twins Span remained relatively still prior to moving his front foot forward, he has since implemented a bit of a squat. What you will also notice is that Span’s top half loads up more, pulling his front shoulder inward towards the plate as he brings the bat back. Either of these variations could be causing his eye level to change planes as Vavra mentioned. And because of that, it would make complete sense that he would be striking the top half or lower half of the ball more frequently.

Clearly, the pre-swing movement needed to be ironed out and toned down if Span hopes to get back on track as one of the game’s best lead-off hitters and, judging from Vavra’s comments, it sounds like that was a big focus this spring. Yet, I’m not entirely convinced that the bouncing is the only influential factor for his regression.

Last May, after Span trudged into the first two months of the season with an absurdly high groundball rate, I noticed that he was positioning his hands slightly different than he had in the past. Because of Vavra’s comments, I went back to explore some of the footage.

As you can see from the side view, Span’s starting point with his hands has shifted noticeably since his rookie season:

In 2008, Span kept his hands fairly low, well below his front shoulder level while leaving his bat almost perpendicular to the ground. The following year, Span transitioned to holding the bat higher with his bottom hand parallel to his front shoulder. Additionally, he cocked the bat slightly at an angle towards his head. Meanwhile, this past season, while maintaining a similar level, Span wound the bat even further behind his head.

I’m not going to pretend to be Joe Vavra and say I know why Span made the adjustments. This progression could have been designed in order for Span to generate more power in the hopes of creating a whip effect in this swing. Likewise, the alteration may have been added to improve his zone coverage as raising his hands also gives him the ability to handle pitches up in the zone better. Then again, it could be that Span simply felt more comfortable at the plate that way.

Regardless of why, it makes me wonder if it increases the amount of time from the start of his swing to the point of contact. As he wraps the bat further back, the distance the bat needs to travel grows. Even if it elongates his swing a fraction of a fraction of a second, there are still ramifications. In addition to playing a role in his grounders, the shift may also play a part in his decrease in productivity on fastballs:

Denard Span’s production and power versus fastballs
	Runs Above Average	Slugging Pct
2008	12.4	.467
2009	6.7	.377
2010	-9.5	.348

*via Fangraphs.com & MyInsideEdge.com

In 2008, his first season with the Twins, Span blasted away on heaters. In 280 plate appearances that ended on fastballs that season, the lefty hit .313/.425/.467. The following year, with almost double the amount of plate appearances, Span hit .303/.390/.377, a sizeable drop in power for sure. Certainly, the jump in sample size could have an effect on the overall numbers but in 2010, the returns on fastballs dropped once again for Span as he hit .272/.356/.348.

Could drawing his bat back further each year have led to this decrease?

I’m not trying to make any definitive connections, rather I’m simply suggesting where there is smoke, there’s fire. Because Span has experienced incremental decline in his power numbers the past two seasons – particularly against fastballs – one has to wonder if the slightly longer swing is, at the very least, partially responsible as well. To me, while Vavra is untangling one aspect of his swing in Florida, it appears that there is another element of his mechanics that may need some addressing too.

As the catalyst at the top of the order, the Twins need Span to get on base regularly throughout the season one way or another. Even though he has shown he is quite capable of doing so through the virtues of a walk, Span is also a high-contact hitter and requires a considerable amount of those to be turned into hits to buoy his elite on-base percentage. While the baseball gods may help elevate his depressed BABIP next season, refining his mechanics could go a long ways to ensure he doesn’t need the assistance of the diamond deities to guide ground balls away from infielder’s gloves.