Wednesday, October 28, 2009

2009 Pitching Appraisal: Kevin Slowey

 

K. SLOWEY (16 Starts)

xFIP | MLB Rank

4.46

DNQ

BABIP | +/- MLB Avg

.349

+16.3%

Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg

5.69

+18.1%

GAME SCORES

Decisions

No-Decisions

Game Score Greater Than 50:

8-0

0-1

Game Score Less

Than 50:

2-3

0-2

 

Average Game Score Per Start:

48

Season High/Low:

69 (4/25)

23 (4/13)

 

Game Scores over 90:

0

Game Scores 80-89:

0

Game Scores 70-79:

0

Game Scores 60-69:

5

Game Scores Below 40:

7

 

Record of Opposing Batters:

.309/.340/.503 (843 OPS)

Offensive Equivalent:

Matt Kemp

 
Even while pitching with bone spurs in his throwing wrist since the previous September, Slowey still managed to demonstrate why he will be a front-of-the-rotation starter with college-level velocity (88.9-mph fastball in ’09): his outright ownership of the strike zone. 
 
Prior to landing on the DL in July, Slowey was leading the league in first pitch strikes and overall zone presence.  This dominance of the space that resides from knees to letters and 17 inches across allowed the Twins righty to keep pace with some of the league’s already elite pitchers.  Among those that worked a minimum of 80 innings, Slowey’s 5.00 K/BB ratio was fourth behind Roy Halladay, Dan Haren and Javier Vazquez.  The man trailing him is the presumed AL Cy Young in Zack Greinke.  Slowey’s rise to the top of that list includes a solid 7.44 K/9 but is magnified by his ultra-stingy issuance of base on balls.  Only Joel Pineiro (1.14 BB/9) and Halladay (1.32 BB/9) relinquished fewer free passes than Slowey. 
 
In addition to his command, Slowey refined the use of his changeup in 2009.  The results showed more aptitude to getting empty swings – a long-standing criticism of his pitching style:  

CHG

Pct Thrown

Vel

WHIFF

Avg

2008

7.8

82.8

.190

2009

9.2

82.7

.270

It was this improvement that provided Slowey with a much needed “out pitch”.  On the other hand, Slowey had multiple problems with his slider.  The wrist injury may have contributed to the evaporation of his vertical break and the elongation of the horizontal break rendering the pitch much more hittable:  

SLD

hBreak

vBreak

WHIFF Avg

2008

1.8

6.1

.227

2009

3.0

4.3

.160

 
If there are supporters in the clubhouse for keeping a Gomez/Span outfield in 2010, Slowey should be one of the most vocal.  As a largely contact-oriented pitcher, nearly 50 percent of balls in play were of the fly ball variety.  The rangier outfield would help ensure several more balls find leather rather than turf. 
 
The most important thing to take away from Slowey’s 2009 season is to disregard the 10-wins in 16 starts - it boils down to a product of his ridiculous amount of runs support (5.69 runs per start).  Do not attempt to extrapolate that winning percentage over 33 starts in 2010.  That would be just wishful thinking.  Nevertheless, he is one of the top three starters in the rotation when healthy and could make a run at a 15-win season provided the right mix of defense.       

Tuesday, October 27, 2009

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Glen Perkins

G. PERKINS (17 Starts)

xFIP | MLB Rank

5.07

DNQ

BABIP | +/- MLB Avg

.321

+7.0%

Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg

4.40

-4.7%

GAME SCORES

Decisions

No-Decisions

Game Score Greater Than 50:

5-1

1-0

Game Score Less

Than 50:

1-6

1-2

 

Average Game Score Per Start:

43

Season High/Low:

73 (4/9)

5 (8/2)

 

Game Scores over 90:

0

Game Scores 80-89:

0

Game Scores 70-79:

2

Game Scores 60-69:

2

Game Scores Below 40:

7

 

Record of Opposing Batters:

.304/.341/.463 (803 OPS)

Offensive Equivalent:

Shane Victorino


Glen Perkins’s 2009 season peaked on April 19th following his third start of the year.  Accounting for the fact that MLB’s schedule runs through October, this story does not have a happy ending.  Up until that point the lefty had tossed 24 innings, allowing only four runs on 16 hits and maintaining a tidy .188 batting average against.  Then everything he threw was sprayed all over the field.  Post-April 20th Perkins worked 71.1 innings in 15 games, allowing 60 runs on 103 hits (13 of which were home runs), and went on to finish the season buried in Rochester on a rehab assignment.


His 6-7 record in 2009 should not surprise anyone when you note that Perkins was coming off a 12-win 2008 season that was inflated by an astronomical amount of runs scored on his behalf.  Perkins went 4-4 in starts where his Game Score was less than 50 but finished 1-6 in 2009 under the same circumstances. When the cavalry supplied less than league average support in 2009, it was apparent that his low Game Scores would not continue to provide him with victories.


Are there any takeaways that suggest Perkins can rebound from an ugly season in 2010?  Certainly.  Look at his batting average in play on groundballs.  It reads .327.  Meanwhile, the league average in this area was .240.  It stands to reason that approximately 10 of Perkins’s 55 hits on the ground bleed through or found unguarded seams.  These sorts of results do not last forever; eventually they find a fielder’s glove.  Because his balls-in-play tendencies shifted from an aerial pitcher to chiefly a groundball pitcher (from 38% in ’08 to 47% in ‘09), Perkins could be inline for a Plexiglas effect in 2010, if this trend continues.   That isn’t to say his overall woes won’t continue.  Outside of just three other starters with a minimum of 90 innings pitched, Perkins held the lowest K/9 (4.20) while not figuring out a way to subdue left-handed opponents (.878 OPS) and getting lit up while pitching from the stretch (.962 OPS men on vs. .687 OPS empty).  Without solving these three issues it is hard to believe shaving off 10 groundball hits a year will Cy Young-ify him.


Then there were the issues with management.


Including not revealing an injury which repositioned him in the manager’s doghouse and sparking some internal controversy when Perkins’ agent filed a grievance with the players’ association stating the Twins intentionally held him in the minor leagues to avoid increasing his service time, there is plenty of speculation circulating that Perkins’ name could be on the forefront of any potential trades this offseason.  Then again, Perkins’ stock is not high enough to wrangle in anything of substantial value without including at least one prospect.  

 

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Francisco Liriano

 

 

 

F. LIRIANO (24 Starts)

xFIP | MLB Rank

4.78

DNQ

BABIP | +/- MLB Avg

.323

+7.4%

Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg

3.82

-20.6%

GAME SCORES

Decisions

No-Decisions

Game Score Greater Than 50:

3-3

4-2

Game Score Less

Than 50:

2-10

None

 

Average Game Score Per Start:

45

Season High/Low:

74 (8/12)

13 (8/17)

 

Game Scores over 90:

0

Game Scores 80-89:

0

Game Scores 70-79:

1

Game Scores 60-69:

5

Game Scores Below 40:

11

 

Record of Opposing Batters:

.279/.361/.469 (830 OPS)

Offensive Equivalent:

Carlos Lee

 

It is hard to harp on a thing like “run support” (which was 20 percent lower than the league average) when he served up more runs than most South of the Border eateries, but even so, Liriano was hosed out of four wins in 2009.  He could have been 9-13.  There.  That’s the end of the positivity for now.

 

In just under half of his 24 starts (11), Liriano made a huge-antic (a combination of huge and gigantic) mess out of the game, seemingly putting the Twins further in debt every time he chucked the ball towards home plate.  What gives?   Like the pitching version of Jason Lewis, righties simply loved him.  In his return to the mound in 2008, right-handed batters demonstrated little advantage over him (745 OPS).  One year later, the right-handed nation was launching moonshots off him, responsible for 20 of his 21 HR allowed and raising their OPS to 899.  


Back in June, I noted that he was pitching differently to hitters depending on which batter’s box they were in. The Twins' lefty slides down the rubber towards the third base line when facing right-handed batters in efforts to run the fastball inside, however, he releases it with less of a more vertical of an arm angle which results in a flatter pitch often finishing in the fat part of the zone, above the waist.  With the decrease in velocity from 2006 (from 94.6-mph down to 91-mph) Liriano's location combined with lack of movement (not to mention the regularity of being behind in the count) led to some hard hit balls off for right-handed bats. 

 
In general, his slider still had bite.  Over 40 percent of swings in '09 resulted in a miss (just down from 48 percent in '06) indicating that the is enough break to incite plenty of awkward swings - even after the Tommy John surgery.  However, like the fastball, it was thrown at a reduced velocity from his breakout year in '06.  Also like the fastball, Liriano demonstrated that he had trouble placing it within the strike zone this past season.  As opposed to '06 where he threw the slider in the zone almost half of the time, Liriano threw the slider in the zone less than 40 percent of the time, eroding the effectiveness of the break.  Hitters, particularly right-handed ones, eventually figured out he was unable to throw the slider for a strike and held back waiting for the fastball (NOW WITH 5% LESS HEAT!). 
 
The haphazard command led to better counts for opponents or a walk.  His control problems led to the AL's second highest walk rate (4.28 BB/9) trailing only the Yankees Joba Camberlain with pitchers who had thrown a minimum of 130 innings.  Even so, and this might be a hard pill to swallow in context to his 5-13 record, the heaping ton of walks and a 5.80 ERA but setting aside those facts, Liriano had a decent season when it comes to projecting talent:  
 
  • Liriano's strikeout rate (8.03 K/9) was good enough for eighth in the AL - this is an unsurprising revelation given that his 20 percent swinging strike total was the highest in the league. 
  • His .324 batting average on balls in play was the seventh highest in the AL and well above the league average of .300.  Where he suffered the most was on groundballs.  As the rest of the league's pitchers held Defensive Efficiency Ratio of .760 on grounders, Liriano was given a DER of .694 - meaning more bouncers slipped through the infield than the norm. 
  • His 66.3 percent left-on-base rate was the well-below the average of 71.0 percent and sixth-highest in the AL.  As this equalizes next season, the ERA will drop with it.   
 
The injuries and slow-to-return control (always the last thing pitcher's regain after undergoing TJ) helped make an unfortunate season his worst, yet, there is plenty of evidence Liriano could be a boon to the rotation in 2010. 

Monday, October 19, 2009

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Scott Baker

S. BAKER (33 Starts)

xFIP | MLB Rank

4.46

49th

BABIP | +/- MLB Avg

.277

-7.4%

Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg

5.62

+17.9%

GAME SCORES

Decisions

No-Decisions

Game Score Greater Than 50:

12-2

2-2

Game Score Less

Than 50:

3-6

3-3

 

Average Game Score Per Start:

52

Season High/Low:

88 (8/14)

21 (4/22)

 

Game Scores over 90:

0

Game Scores 80-89:

1

Game Scores 70-79:

3

Game Scores 60-69:

7

Game Scores Below 40:

6

 

Record of Opposing Batters:

.247/.293/.416 (709 OPS)

Offensive Equivalent:

Garret Anderson


Back in May I wrote, “The season did not start out the way Baker and the Twins envisioned after signing him to a long-term contract this past offseason.  Shoulder problems delayed the beginning of his 2009 season and when he returned, he began by allowing home runs at an absurd pace - in his first three starts he surrendered a home run every 10 plate appearances - while his 16 earned runs in just 14 innings of work resulted in a 9.82 ERA and a myriad of questions regarding his health and effectiveness.”  A dissection in his pitches showed that Baker struggled at gaining movement with his pitches, frequently leaving very hittable balls middle-up in the zone.  Things turned around quickly for the Twins’ veteran right-hander as his fifth season in Minnesota wore on.  In April and May, Baker went 2-6 allowing 14 home runs in his nine games resulting in a 6.32 ERA but from June until the end of the season, he went 13-3 with a 3.67 ERA in 24 games helping propel the Twins towards the division-leading Tigers.

According to his game scores, Baker, perhaps more than any other pitcher on the staff, gave the Twins the best opportunity to win games.  His 52 average in addition to 11 starts in which he held game scores of 60 or higher, supplying more than enough pitching to yield victories - especially given his 5.62 average run support. There is little evidence that suggests Baker's 15 victories were anything but earned, however, he did manage to come away with three wins that would otherwise have been losses had the offense not scored a high runs total.  Still, there are plenty of Twins followers that would hesitate to call Baker an "ace".  This came up with the TwinsCentric group as well.  While writing the Offseason GM Handbook 2009-2010, I was tasked with creating report cards.  At the time, I wagged the grades at the beginning September and Seth Stohs, Nick Nelson, John Bonnes and I opened those up for discussion.  A debated sparked regarding what I submitted on Baker and Nick Blackburn.  In my evaluation, I had Baker graded better (albeit slightly) than Blackburn.  In my own assessment, I noted that Baker's peripherals were better all-around while Blackburn was allowing more hits than Google.  It was by the grace of the baseball gods that Blackburn managed to keep such a tidy ERA.  This was not a knock on Blackburn, it was just that Baker had a better year.  After an extensive dialogue on what exactly what the grading scale should reflect, we ultimately decided to ordain them the exact same grade, much to my chagrin.  

This is not to say that I felt Blackburn deserved a bad grade, per se.  After all, his performance, while not dominating, resulted in a very good 4.03 ERA.  Of course, to most baseball analysts, ERA and victories do little to inform on the actual performance of a pitcher.  In the areas like K/9, WHIP, batting average allowed, Baker was a far superior pitcher. Outward demeanor could also be influencing the decision.  Whereas Blackburn gets credit for appearing confident in big starts, Baker seems to project this opposite.  Baker's mound demeanor could be what is most unnerving and less than inspirational.  Following periods of unbridled bashing from opponents, Baker assumes the deer-in-headlights look and appears to have a rapport of that of a father chewing out his son whenever pitching coach Rick Anderson trots out to the infield bump. 

While the rancid numbers from April and May are influencing people's decisions on Baker's overall performance, we should consider a few other factors:
  • His 1.19 WHIP and his 3.38 K/BB was good enough for seventh in the American League.  These have much better predicative values than citing his 4.36 ERA (which was still several points better than the AL average of 4.46) that inflated from sub-4.00 a year ago.   
  • His fastball was one of the best in the league as well.  At 1.03 wFB/C, his heater was behind that of the Royals' Zack Greinke in runs above average in the AL.  
  • 31 percent of his plate appearance were of the 0-2 variety.  Only Detroit's Justin Verlander held a higher percentage of 0-2 counts.  This fact is huge considering MLB players managed to hit just .461 OPS once falling into an 0-2 deficit.  
These statistics puts Baker in an elite category that is share by Cy Young contenders.  Had he been able to erase his first nine starts where he was re-acclimating himself to pitching again after his shoulder problems, Baker may have encroached on 20 wins rather than his 15.  Signed through 2012 (but with a club option in 2013), the 27-year-old Baker will be just entering his 30's so the organization has bought out his prime years for a very reasonable $14.5 million.  What the Twins will receive in return is a starter capable of consuming 200 innings and providing Cy Young-caliber outings so long as those long fly balls stay within the field of play.   


Thursday, October 15, 2009

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Nick Blackburn

N. BLACKBURN (33 Starts)

xFIP | MLB Rank

4.78

65th

BABIP | +/- MLB Avg

.303

+1.3%

Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg

5.09

+9.43%

GAME SCORES

Decisions

No-Decisions

Game Score 50 or Greater:

10-3

3-4

Game Score 49 or Lower:

1-8

1-3

 

Average Game Score Per Start:

49

Season High/Low:

72 (5/10, 6/18 & 7/5)

12 (5/5)

 

Game Scores over 90:

0

Game Scores 80-89:

0

Game Scores 70-79:

3

Game Scores 60-69:

8

Game Scores Below 40:

9

 

Record of Opposing Batters:

.290/.324/.444 (768 OPS)

Offensive Equivalent:

Jose Lopez

You can say this: With Nick Blackburn pitching, you know what you are going to get.

If he finished with a game score of 50 or higher, the Twins typically won (.650 winning pct).  Conversely, if he finished his outing with a game score of 49 or below, the team typically lost (.153 winning pct).  Also working to his advantage was that the offense provided him an above-league average amount of runs support, however, this fact did not help him swing any “lucky wins” (victories obtained when game score was below 50) when he did not perform up to snuff (the Twins won just two of his 13 starts that were 49 or below).

As a control pitcher, he had plenty of peaks and valleys throughout the season, depending on his defense and fastball’s movement.  He started the season very strong.  Through his first 17 starts Blackburn posted a 2.94 ERA and a low 1.27 WHIP.  In June, I noted that both his home run-to-fly ball ratio (5.9 HR/FB at the time) and BABIP on groundballs (.205) were bound to regress closer to the mean as the season progressed.  True enough, Blackburn suffered through a stretch of bad baseball.  In his next nine starts, Blackburn turned in a 7.74 ERA along with a swollen 1.88 WHIP thanks to an increased amount of fly balls ricocheting off of the seats (10 HR).  In this time he strained to work ahead of hitters and received little movement on his fastballs, resulting in far more elevation of his pitches.  Nevertheless, in his final start in August, he made some adjustments that improved his approach and managed to hold a 3.07 ERA, a 1.09 WHIP and, most impressively, a 10.0 K/BB ratio in his last seven starts of the year. 

One of the biggest areas of improvement in his sophomore season was his pitching away from the Dome.  In 2008, Blackburn was 3-8 with a 4.97 ERA while opponents .311 outside of the 612 area code.  This season, the record still feels the same (4-7) but he had a far better 3.89 road ERA (better than his home ERA of 4.18) and kept opponents to a .285 batting average.

Blackburn’s ability to match his previous season’s production is uncanny.  Consider these two season’s of stats side-by-side: 

 

GS

W-L

IP

ERA

WHIP

BAA

HR/9

FIP

2008

33

11-11

193.1

4.05

1.36

.291

1.07

4.40

2009

33

11-11

205.2

4.03

1.37

.293

1.09

4.37


This mirrored effect is downright scary but there is something that is uneasy about it as well.  It is as if there is this weird, perfectly balanced state that if anything in his environment changes, all hell could break loose.  It seems that the Twins have provided him with enough defense to keep every in this state.  If the Twins subtract some defense in 2010 in place of offense, particularly at the infield positions, Blackburn could see these numbers start to head north if fewer balls are converted to outs.  However, if the team opts to add defensive stalwarts at short, second or third, the combination of all of his starts on grass in Target Field with rangy infielders supporting him could push him to a 15-win pitcher. 

Essentially, he’s the pitching equivalent of Cub Foods.  There’s nothing flashy about him, but he’ll give you innings in bulk and is inexpensive.  


Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Planning for Next Year

In the midst of his capital improvement plan for the 2010 season, Star Tribune columnist Patrick Reusse submitted some very bold and very blunt proposal for the offseason.  The veteran scribe prods the Twins organization to making several transactions this winter – including sending Carlos Gomez to Rochester in 2010, presumably for horse tranquilizer to slow him down on the basepaths, trading closer Joe Nathan to save cash ($22.5 million to be exact) and playing Delmon Young everyday.  The problem, however, with being blunt is that it comes off as rash rather than calculated. 

 

While I am not going to expound too deep on the merits of the other items since I’ve outlined my 2010 blueprint in the Offseason GM Handbook, I will submit the abridged version on my reactions to several of Mr. Reusse’s statements: 


1.) Gomez to Rochester.

    Disagree.  Wholeheartedly. 

    Admittedly, the standard numbers (BA/OBP/SLG) definitely went in the wrong direction for Gomez in 2009 but when you evaluate him through other methods, you start to see how small steps were taken in the right direction.  The simplest is that his walk rate went up, while his strike out rate decreased.  He significantly reduced the number of bad pitches chases (from 37% in ’08 to 30% in ’09).  Also, when he did put the ball in play, he was behind the curve in obtaining base hits.  Considering how he was putting the ball in play (20% LD, 45% GB) in comparison to his batting average on balls in play .288, you realize that Gomez was slighted several hits over the course of the season.

    Above all, his defensive value alone supersedes his offensive malfeasances resulting in 0.6 WAR center fielder in 86 games played in 2009.  With flyball pitchers in Scott Baker, Kevin Slowey and Francisco Liriano on the staff, Gomez (partnered with Denard Span) creates the best defenders and will aid their ERA and you cannot allow your staff to suffer while one of the league’s best outfielder languishes in Rochester. 


2.) Trading Joe Nathan.

    Agree…to a certain extent.   

    On the surface, this appears to be a knee-jerk response to Alex Rodriguez’s disembowelment Nathan in the playoffs but in reality, this is should be considered.  Seriously.  At 35 years of age in 2010, there is no telling how long Nathan has remaining as a premium closer.  The Mariano Riveras and Trevor Hoffmans are exceptions rather than the rules when it comes to aging and coming off a season in which he held 0.93 WHIP and 11.67 K/9, Nathan’s value might not get any better. 

    In the past several years, Nathan has lost confidence in his fastball (one that has dropped from 94.8-mph to 93.6-mph in velocity) and as such, he’s thrown it far less frequently (58% in ’09 compared to 61% in ’08 and 65% in ’07).  Since 2006, Nathan has had more issues with his favorite secondary pitch – the slider.  That season, it was his best pitch (4.09 wSL/c) but since then it has seen a steady decline in effectiveness (2.52 to 2.03 to 1.36 this year).  In September, I documented some of the problems he was having staying on top of his release which was causing the slider to have more horizontal break as opposed to vertical break.  This lateral movement is far easily to hit when it stays on the same plane.  With a increased insecurity regarding his fastball and a higher dosage of breaking pitches, it is no small wonder that Nathan’s zone presence was the lowest in years (44% of pitches in zone). 

    Sure Nathan could provide above-average service as a closer in the next two years however the Twins should try to find out what the return on investment could be in the trade market.  As a student of Eric Walker’s (who had a great write-up at Deadspin, by the way) philosophy, the organization should consider trading all players by the age of 29 (or at least in the very early 30s).  This is when they have burned through prime playing years and still have maximum value.  At 35, Nathan probably does not have many dominate seasons left.  Furthermore, short of Danny Valencia, there are no major-league ready prospects within the system so a trade of Nathan, similar to the one that brought him to Minnesota, should be explored.  At the same time, if no team (like the Cubs) is willing to part with three major-league ready prospects, the Twins do not need to move Nathan.  In summary, it would be wise for the Twins to attempt to leverage Nathan but if the trade market is low, remember that you still have an elite closer at market-rate.


3.) Make Young an everyday player - cut him if he does not hit 25 HRs or 85 RBIs.

    Mixed emotions…but disagree.  The problem I have most with Reusse’s presentation, is his stipulation that Young has to drive in 85 runs or the Twins should outright cut him.  This again perpetuates the notion that the RBI is a controllable statistic.  RBIs, like robbery, is more about opportunity than anything else.  There have been terrible hitters than have achieved 100 RBIs only because they had been positioned well within a lineup of on-base men who may or may not run the bases particularly well.  This year alone, the Phillies Pedro Feliz drove in 82 men but held an unsightly 694 OPS.  In the AL, Aubrey Huff somehow finagled 85 ribbies while presenting a 690 OPS.  This is hardly the gold standard by which to judge talent.

    After getting past his all-hail-RBI screed, I set out to write a Pros list to figure out what value Young might present this team in 2010: 

  • He should be reasonably priced in arbitration ($2M-ish). 
  • He is a right-handed (quasi) power bat. 
  • He is almost to the point where you can say he is a better option against lefties (88 OPS point difference LHP^RHP). 
  • He has not yet entered his prime years. 
  • Hit .340/.364/.544 with 12 extra base hits from September 1st on. 

     Those are the only positive attributes I can come up.  Everything else you can use to evaluate a player’s progress is putrid for a professional.  His ability to work himself into favorable counts rescinded in 2009.  Strikeouts went up, walks went down.  His defense sucks.  His plate discipline sucks harder.  Overall, he was a -1.3 WAR player this year. 

    People will most likely reference that last bulletpoint – his final month’s performance – as the reason he should start and play everyday.  To this I direct everyone back a year, where in 2008, Young hit .330/.368/.455 and thought he would have a breakout season in 2009.  Young might simply be a warhead that never explodes. 

    Then again, I circle back to the two critical elements regarding Delmon which is that he is A) relatively cheap and B) young (literally).  As a right-handed stick, Young could alleviate Jason Kubel at DH when the Twins face a particularly nasty left-hander.  The words “everyday player” just does not fit Young’s current skill set. 



    Building a ballclub is like skinning a cat - there’s more than one way and it’s very satisfying.  That is, unless you are a Royals fan or a cat, I suppose.  Either way, these topics are some of many that we exhausted in the now available TwinsCentric Offseason GM Handbook, providing you with talking points to last all winter so - CLICK HERE FOR YOUR FREE SAMPLE.