2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Nick Blackburn

N. BLACKBURN (33 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.78	65th
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.303	+1.3%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	5.09	+9.43%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score 50 or Greater:	10-3	3-4
Game Score 49 or Lower:	1-8	1-3
Average Game Score Per Start:	49
Season High/Low:	72 (5/10, 6/18 & 7/5)	12 (5/5)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	3
Game Scores 60-69:	8
Game Scores Below 40:	9
Record of Opposing Batters:	.290/.324/.444 (768 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Jose Lopez

You can say this: With Nick Blackburn pitching, you know what you are going to get.

If he finished with a game score of 50 or higher, the Twins typically won (.650 winning pct).  Conversely, if he finished his outing with a game score of 49 or below, the team typically lost (.153 winning pct).  Also working to his advantage was that the offense provided him an above-league average amount of runs support, however, this fact did not help him swing any “lucky wins” (victories obtained when game score was below 50) when he did not perform up to snuff (the Twins won just two of his 13 starts that were 49 or below).

As a control pitcher, he had plenty of peaks and valleys throughout the season, depending on his defense and fastball’s movement.  He started the season very strong.  Through his first 17 starts Blackburn posted a 2.94 ERA and a low 1.27 WHIP.  In June, I noted that both his home run-to-fly ball ratio (5.9 HR/FB at the time) and BABIP on groundballs (.205) were bound to regress closer to the mean as the season progressed.  True enough, Blackburn suffered through a stretch of bad baseball.  In his next nine starts, Blackburn turned in a 7.74 ERA along with a swollen 1.88 WHIP thanks to an increased amount of fly balls ricocheting off of the seats (10 HR).  In this time he strained to work ahead of hitters and received little movement on his fastballs, resulting in far more elevation of his pitches.  Nevertheless, in his final start in August, he made some adjustments that improved his approach and managed to hold a 3.07 ERA, a 1.09 WHIP and, most impressively, a 10.0 K/BB ratio in his last seven starts of the year. 

One of the biggest areas of improvement in his sophomore season was his pitching away from the Dome.  In 2008, Blackburn was 3-8 with a 4.97 ERA while opponents .311 outside of the 612 area code.  This season, the record still feels the same (4-7) but he had a far better 3.89 road ERA (better than his home ERA of 4.18) and kept opponents to a .285 batting average.

Blackburn’s ability to match his previous season’s production is uncanny.  Consider these two season’s of stats side-by-side: 

	GS	W-L	IP	ERA	WHIP	BAA	HR/9	FIP
2008	33	11-11	193.1	4.05	1.36	.291	1.07	4.40
2009	33	11-11	205.2	4.03	1.37	.293	1.09	4.37

This mirrored effect is downright scary but there is something that is uneasy about it as well.  It is as if there is this weird, perfectly balanced state that if anything in his environment changes, all hell could break loose.  It seems that the Twins have provided him with enough defense to keep every in this state.  If the Twins subtract some defense in 2010 in place of offense, particularly at the infield positions, Blackburn could see these numbers start to head north if fewer balls are converted to outs.  However, if the team opts to add defensive stalwarts at short, second or third, the combination of all of his starts on grass in Target Field with rangy infielders supporting him could push him to a 15-win pitcher. 

Essentially, he’s the pitching equivalent of Cub Foods.  There’s nothing flashy about him, but he’ll give you innings in bulk and is inexpensive.  

Planning for Next Year

In the midst of his capital improvement plan for the 2010 season, Star Tribune columnist Patrick Reusse submitted some very bold and very blunt proposal for the offseason.  The veteran scribe prods the Twins organization to making several transactions this winter – including sending Carlos Gomez to Rochester in 2010, presumably for horse tranquilizer to slow him down on the basepaths, trading closer Joe Nathan to save cash ($22.5 million to be exact) and playing Delmon Young everyday.  The problem, however, with being blunt is that it comes off as rash rather than calculated. 

 

While I am not going to expound too deep on the merits of the other items since I’ve outlined my 2010 blueprint in the Offseason GM Handbook, I will submit the abridged version on my reactions to several of Mr. Reusse’s statements: 

1.) Gomez to Rochester.

    Disagree.  Wholeheartedly. 

    Admittedly, the standard numbers (BA/OBP/SLG) definitely went in the wrong direction for Gomez in 2009 but when you evaluate him through other methods, you start to see how small steps were taken in the right direction.  The simplest is that his walk rate went up, while his strike out rate decreased.  He significantly reduced the number of bad pitches chases (from 37% in ’08 to 30% in ’09).  Also, when he did put the ball in play, he was behind the curve in obtaining base hits.  Considering how he was putting the ball in play (20% LD, 45% GB) in comparison to his batting average on balls in play .288, you realize that Gomez was slighted several hits over the course of the season.

    Above all, his defensive value alone supersedes his offensive malfeasances resulting in 0.6 WAR center fielder in 86 games played in 2009.  With flyball pitchers in Scott Baker, Kevin Slowey and Francisco Liriano on the staff, Gomez (partnered with Denard Span) creates the best defenders and will aid their ERA and you cannot allow your staff to suffer while one of the league’s best outfielder languishes in Rochester. 

2.) Trading Joe Nathan.

    Agree…to a certain extent.   

    On the surface, this appears to be a knee-jerk response to Alex Rodriguez’s disembowelment Nathan in the playoffs but in reality, this is should be considered.  Seriously.  At 35 years of age in 2010, there is no telling how long Nathan has remaining as a premium closer.  The Mariano Riveras and Trevor Hoffmans are exceptions rather than the rules when it comes to aging and coming off a season in which he held 0.93 WHIP and 11.67 K/9, Nathan’s value might not get any better. 

    In the past several years, Nathan has lost confidence in his fastball (one that has dropped from 94.8-mph to 93.6-mph in velocity) and as such, he’s thrown it far less frequently (58% in ’09 compared to 61% in ’08 and 65% in ’07).  Since 2006, Nathan has had more issues with his favorite secondary pitch – the slider.  That season, it was his best pitch (4.09 wSL/c) but since then it has seen a steady decline in effectiveness (2.52 to 2.03 to 1.36 this year).  In September, I documented some of the problems he was having staying on top of his release which was causing the slider to have more horizontal break as opposed to vertical break.  This lateral movement is far easily to hit when it stays on the same plane.  With a increased insecurity regarding his fastball and a higher dosage of breaking pitches, it is no small wonder that Nathan’s zone presence was the lowest in years (44% of pitches in zone). 

    Sure Nathan could provide above-average service as a closer in the next two years however the Twins should try to find out what the return on investment could be in the trade market.  As a student of Eric Walker’s (who had a great write-up at Deadspin, by the way) philosophy, the organization should consider trading all players by the age of 29 (or at least in the very early 30s).  This is when they have burned through prime playing years and still have maximum value.  At 35, Nathan probably does not have many dominate seasons left.  Furthermore, short of Danny Valencia, there are no major-league ready prospects within the system so a trade of Nathan, similar to the one that brought him to Minnesota, should be explored.  At the same time, if no team (like the Cubs) is willing to part with three major-league ready prospects, the Twins do not need to move Nathan.  In summary, it would be wise for the Twins to attempt to leverage Nathan but if the trade market is low, remember that you still have an elite closer at market-rate.

3.) Make Young an everyday player - cut him if he does not hit 25 HRs or 85 RBIs.

    Mixed emotions…but disagree.  The problem I have most with Reusse’s presentation, is his stipulation that Young has to drive in 85 runs or the Twins should outright cut him.  This again perpetuates the notion that the RBI is a controllable statistic.  RBIs, like robbery, is more about opportunity than anything else.  There have been terrible hitters than have achieved 100 RBIs only because they had been positioned well within a lineup of on-base men who may or may not run the bases particularly well.  This year alone, the Phillies Pedro Feliz drove in 82 men but held an unsightly 694 OPS.  In the AL, Aubrey Huff somehow finagled 85 ribbies while presenting a 690 OPS.  This is hardly the gold standard by which to judge talent.

    After getting past his all-hail-RBI screed, I set out to write a Pros list to figure out what value Young might present this team in 2010: 

• He should be reasonably priced in arbitration ($2M-ish). 
• He is a right-handed (quasi) power bat. 
• He is almost to the point where you can say he is a better option against lefties (88 OPS point difference LHP^RHP). 
• He has not yet entered his prime years. 
• Hit .340/.364/.544 with 12 extra base hits from September 1^st on. 

     Those are the only positive attributes I can come up.  Everything else you can use to evaluate a player’s progress is putrid for a professional.  His ability to work himself into favorable counts rescinded in 2009.  Strikeouts went up, walks went down.  His defense sucks.  His plate discipline sucks harder.  Overall, he was a -1.3 WAR player this year. 

    People will most likely reference that last bulletpoint – his final month’s performance – as the reason he should start and play everyday.  To this I direct everyone back a year, where in 2008, Young hit .330/.368/.455 and thought he would have a breakout season in 2009.  Young might simply be a warhead that never explodes. 

    Then again, I circle back to the two critical elements regarding Delmon which is that he is A) relatively cheap and B) young (literally).  As a right-handed stick, Young could alleviate Jason Kubel at DH when the Twins face a particularly nasty left-hander.  The words “everyday player” just does not fit Young’s current skill set. 

    Building a ballclub is like skinning a cat - there’s more than one way and it’s very satisfying.  That is, unless you are a Royals fan or a cat, I suppose.  Either way, these topics are some of many that we exhausted in the now available TwinsCentric Offseason GM Handbook, providing you with talking points to last all winter so - CLICK HERE FOR YOUR FREE SAMPLE.

The Bitter End.

 

    Viewers of the ALDS Game 3 watching from home were subjected to a bombardment of ads for the new TNT show Men of a Certain Age.  The comedy’s premise involves men in their forties coping with the realities (ear hair? Viagra? “going” problems?) of middle age.  Undoubtedly, this title could apply to Mariano Rivera as well.  Rivera, who is credited with being 39 years of age with the big birthday in November, apparently never got the message that life and your body is supposed to slow down as four decades tick away.  Since turning 35, Rivera had worked 361.2 innings, struck out 358 and posted an ERA of 1.89 while saving 190 games. 

Yet, there he was, bags accumulating under his eyes like Yankee championships he had helped cultivate in his 15 seasons in pinstripes, ready to terminate the Minnesota Twins 2009 season and with it, the lights of the Metrodome that glow upon the baseball field, once and for all. 

    But let’s come to one consensus about this: Mariano Rivera was not supposed to be here.  No, he was supposed to be pitching in Angel Stadium or Comerica Park.  Not the Metrodome.  He was mentally prepared to face the Angels or the Tigers and ready to spend some quality October time in Southern California or Detroit.  He certainly did not expect to be in Minneapolis, having the sub-40 degree wind slap him on the face on his way from MSP into the downtown luxury hotel.  Nobody expected him to be here.

    If we are being honest, let us admit that around September 6^th, when the Twins were seven games behind in the AL Central with 26 to go, we all decided they were done.  The local beat writers had already inked their offseason piece on how the team should approach Joe Mauer’s contract extension and called it a year.  Columnists had transfixed their gaze on Brett Favre who galloped into town and mesmerized the media like a Tiger Beat heartthrob.   For all intents and purposes, the team was declared dead.

    You know that seen in Monty Python’s Holy Grail when the peasant attempts to pass off what he insists is a dead body to the body collector who ambles through a plague-stricken village calls for the remains of all the deceased?  The peasant carts up a mangy looking excuse for a human being and demands that the body collector takes the pile on his cart.  A voice cries from in the cart stating that he, the mangy pile, is in fact not dead.  That he is very much alive and happy.  And also wants to go for a walk.  But for all of his persistence to the contrary, the peasant refused to accept the fact that the man was still alive.  That was the Twins in 2009.  Everybody assumed they were dead.  The Twins, meanwhile, insistent that they weren’t.            

    From September 7^th forward, the Twins had a creampuff schedule.  With multiple series against the lowly Indians and even lowlier Royals on the horizon, followed by games against the pace car that has suddenly sputtered to a crawl, the Detroit Tigers, where the Twins could directly influence their situation.  Which is precisely what they did: they won 18 of 26 games.  The offense hit .297 with 26 home runs and averaged 5.73 runs per game.  The pitching held a 3.90 ERA and limited opponents to 4.07 runs per game.   This was not a terminal team, but a team on the brink of surging.   Because of the mad dash to the finish line, it was the second time in as many years, an additional game to determine the winner of the AL Central would be needed.  In game 163, the Twins and Tigers turned in an epic battle that was equal parts gut-wretchingly bad and good.  Unbelievably, the team that was lacking 3/5^th of their original starting rotation (Slowey, Perkins, Liriano), their All-Star first baseman (Morneau) and starting third baseman (Crede), had somehow captured the division.

    Rested with as many hours of sleep as people have fingers on their hands (if you exclude the index, ring finger and thumb) – the Twins were tasked with the responsibility to topple a 103-win New York Yankees team.   As the Yankees trotted out 19-game winner and former Cy Young winner in CC Sabathia, the Twins countered with Brian Duesning – a fresh-faced kid from Marysville, Kansas that had not pitched in double-decker stadiums prior to this year nor even stepped foot in the city of New York.  Even before the first pitch the Twins’ starters’ neck was already sore from craning up to see the tall buildings.  Not surprising, Sabathia systematically dismantled the drowsy Twins lineup that flailed at his slider and retreated to the dugout to catch some winks prior to the next half inning.  Duesing last two innings before hitting the wall himself, allowing a Derek Jeter shot to tie the game at 2-2 before the billion dollar lineup rattled off five more unanswered runs. 

    By game two, the Twins had caught up on sleep.  Even though Nick Blackburn’s mound opponent, AJ Burnett, was making $16 million more in 2009, he provided an identical performance, matching one-run ball with Blackburn for 5-plus innings.  Burnett, however, would be rescued by a baserunning gaff by Carlos Gomez would ran past second to overzealously, fired two double-barrel shots into his foot and provided yet another example for the announcers to remind America how great Derek Jeter is when he called for the ball to tag out the tangled up Gomez before Delmon Young could cross the plate.  As Burnett would be picked up by his teammates Blackburn, on the other hand, would be let down by closer Joe Nathan who failed to maintain the Twins’ two-run lead.  Many will use umpire Phil Cuzzi’s miss call on Joe Mauer’s 10^th inning ground-rule double as a scapegoat, but the Twins would leave 17 runners on base while cleanup hitter, Jason Kubel, would whiff four times in six at-bats. 

    Back on Sunday night, on the mound stood the slight, yet imposing, Rivera.   In the eighth, Yankees manager Joe Girardi would summon Rivera to the mound to dispose of Joe Mauer, possibly the best the Twins had to offer.   Rivera has cold, dead eyes that seem to capture the souls of all of his past victims.  Since 1995, Rivera had collected a regular Hall of Fame list in the postseason alone – Ken Griffey Jr, Chipper Jones, Mike Piazza, Jason Giambi and so on.  It seems to keep him young.  After getting Mauer to spray the first offering, Jorge Posada set up low-and-inside, well off the plate, and called for another cut fastball that barrels into a left-handed hitter.  Rivera eviscerated the batting champ’s lumber, sending sawmill shards every which direction and the ball dribbling up the line to the awaiting Mark Teixeira at first for the final out of the inning. 

    If nothing else, that moment alone symbolized everything that transpired between the two teams in the post-season: their best simply overpowered our best.  

Down Two Games.

I know. Carlos Gomez shouldn't have taken such an overzealous turn at second. Jason Kubel should not have turned into Delmong Young (1-for-10, 6 K's). Delmon Young should not have been Delmon Young (0-for-8, 4 K's). Joe Nathan should not have thrown a 3-0 hanging fastball down the heart of the plate to A-Rod (Nick Blackburn owes Nathan a good solid cock-punch for spoiling that outing). But dammit all, it feels good to blame outside forces, don't it?

The Inning.

    Ron Gardenhire had run through relievers like a cold victim runs through Kleenex.  A comparison fitting in the context of the dreary exterior weather.  Inside the bubble, Twins fans were hoarse, jittery and alternating between waves of ecstasy and anxiety.  

    Either way, they were on their feet for a third extra inning of tiebreaking baseball.  The Twins manager used three pitchers to deliver a 1-2-3 inning in the 11^th, the first of such since the Twins went down in order in the eighth.  Some might argue over-management, but with Tigers center fielder Curtis Granderson scheduled to hit second – a man that had hit 86 of his career 102 home runs off of right-handed pitching while striking out in a quarter of his plate appearances against left-handed pitching  – it was a sage decision to remove Jesse Crain for LOOGY Ron Mahay. 

    In many ways, Mahay is Granderson’s pitching counterpart.  Just as Granderson is only useful against righties, Mahay preferred to victimize his left-handed comrades.  While in Kansas City, Mahay demonstrated that coaxing outs from right-handed batters wasn’t one of his stronger skills.  In fact, as a demographic, those righties had slugged .608 off of him.  Lefties meanwhile were stifled by his fastball-slider combo, striking out in 20 percent of all match-ups.  Like many specialist pitchers, you have to employ their use carefully.  The Royals, an organization that has made heaps of bad decisions, frequently used Mahay against righties – nearly 60 percent of batters he faced where of the right-handed variety.  The Twins, on the other hand, recognized the value of his platoon advantaged and squared him off against lefties in 27 of the 39 batters faced since being acquired.  Not surprisingly, his batting average allowed dropped from .313 while toiling away in Missouri to .206 while in Minnesota.  As if it were already preordained simply by the percentages, Mahay struck out Granderson thus concluding his job for the night. 

    Gardenhire trotted out quickly to the mound to remove Mahay and signaled for his eighth reliever of the night.  Gardy called upon his last right-handed reliever, Bobby Keppel, who disposed of Placido Polanco on a 1-2 pitch that he laced to the waiting Nick Punto on a line.  The game stayed knotted at five as the Twins followed suit by going down in order during their home-half hacks. 

    As the game bled into its fourth hour of play, fans were continually re-energized by potential Twins rallies and squelched Tigers opportunities.  High-fives were exchanged over several rows to random strangers bonded together by unfolding events. Hankies whipped around causing blizzard conditions in the stands.  Bathroom runs were made out of kidney-saving necessity (although the numerous pitching changes provided ample cushion to relieve one’s self as well).  If the Dome’s 54,000 patrons had anything to do about it, the Tigers were not going to march out of here with a victory.     

    All that was left was Bobby Keppel.  The game hinged on Bobby Freakin Keppel.  The same Bobby Keppel who had allowed 5 runs on 12 hits in his past six outings.  The same Bobby Keppel who had not sniffed a high leverage situation since September 9^th in Toronto.  That Bobby Keppel.  Bobby FREAKING Keppel.  He was the Twins’ Coast Guard, the last line of defense in the 2009 season, and like the Coast Guard, you certainly did not want him to be facing the heavy artillery.  Every one with access to a scorecard knew the task at hand.  Two late inning replacements sandwiching the powerful Miguel Cabrera.

    In the bottom of the 11^th, Tigers’ manager Jim Leyland removed Magglio Ordonez, who had been hitting .439/.486/.571 the final two months of the season and had punctuated this resurgence by slamming a go-ahead home run off of Matt Guerrier several innings prior, from right field.  In his place, Leyland dispatched Clete Thomas as a defensive replacement to help the Tigers retain the one-run lead.  Thomas was certifiably better with the glove than Ordonez but hollowed at the plate by comparison.  Obviously Leyland did not anticipate a scenario where left fielder Ryan Raburn would misplay Michael Cuddyer’s single into a triple, one more assistance from the Dome Gods.  "Typical Metrodome ball," Raburn would later comment. "I was right on it until it went in the lights. I just kept hoping it'd come out, and it never did.”

    Nor did Leyland expect that Matt Tolbert’s bounding groundball – one that would have made a nice tailor-made doubleplay had it been several millimeters to the right – slip through the middle infield.  Had he had any intuition that the Tigers would forfeit the lead for the second time he would have left Ordonez in.  Instead, it would be Thomas to open up the 12^th inning against Keppel.  Thomas sent a rocket out on a line to Carlos Gomez, another defensive replacement for a superior hitter, that Gomez snared.  One out. 

     In the midst of the Tigers’ epic collapse, Miguel Cabrera had turned in what could be construed as his worst month of the year, acting as the rallying point for all of Motown’s woes.  His 865 OPS in September/October was his lowest to date in spite of negotiating 22 walks (seven of which were intentional) and he was on a 0-for-14 streak prior to Tuesday’s game.  While the rest of the AL pitched to the big righty gingerly or not at all, the Twins game plan was to face him head-on.  That decision received mixed results.  In his first at-bat, he laced a double to left-center.  With a showering chant of “AL-CO-HOL-IC” filling the Dome in the top of the 3^rd, Cabrera had sent a moon shot to the left of the baggy to put the Tigers up three-nothing.  In his next couple of at-bats, Cabrera hit sharp groundballs that were turned over for outs.  Keppel, however, worked too delicately to Cabrera and allowed him a free pass of first base. 

    The ubiquitously named Don Kelly, perhaps more suitable for a used tire salesman rather than a baseball hero, drove Keppel’s third pitch into the left center field area where Delmon Young cut it off.  Cabrera boisterously took towards third base and drew the throw from Young.  As the throw overshot Orlando Cabrera manning the cut off, Kelly alertly advanced to second.  With the potent bat of Ryan Raburn (.378 wOBA) due up looking to atone for his 10^th inning defensive sins, the Twins opted to put him on first to fill the bases to face Brandon Inge instead. 

    True, Inge’s season was derailed by injuries and had hit just .188/.250/.299 since August 6^th, but it was also Inge who had pissed on a Jesse Crain offering into the left field corner to score the pinch running Don Kelly two innings prior.  Now he had the opportunity to regain the lead with the bases loaded and just one out.  Inge and his floppy jersey took a Keppel pitch inside, one that he insists and TV replays showed, grazed his jersey.  Rather than push Cabrera home with the go-ahead run, umpire Randy Marsh said it got past Inge without making contact. “It definitely hit my jersey,” Inge said after the game, “It’s human error.  Everyone makes mistakes.”

    That human error resulted in Inge several pitches later bounding a ball towards the middle of the infield – certainly not hit hard enough to inspire confidence that the Twins could turn two.  Twins’ fans favorite pariah, Nick Punto, fielded the ball cleanly and spun a throw towards home for the force.  If the throw were a little up the line, in the dirt or over Joe Mauer’s head, the score might have changed.  If Cabrera were Kelly or Raburn or Granderson or anyone else with an ounce of speed, the score might have changed.  Punto bullet was true and nestled into the catcher’s glove ahead of Cabrera to get the inning’s second out.  The crowd let out shrieks of excitement.  The roar increased.  Fans ignored their seats and stood at attention all the way around the stadium.  One more.

    Keppel had to navigate around catcher Gerald Laird.  As a hitter, Laird was anemic (.287 wOBA) and like all of his other teammates, Laird was putrid in the season’s last month, hitting .227/.310/.273.  Keppel started him with a slider for a ball, the spotted him a second ball with a sinker in the dirt.  At 2-0, Keppel fired a 92-mph called strike but then came back with a third ball that was well off the plate.  The Metrodome crowd pleaded for Marsh to open up his strike zone however Keppel’s command did little push the official in his favor has he was all around the strike zone.  At 3-1, with no where to put Laird, Keppel got Laird to foul of a pitch to bring it to a full count.  On the payoff pitch, Keppel released a 94-mph sinker that darted quickly below the strike zone, if Laird had the wherewithal/cojones to hold his swing, it would be ball four and Laird would be on first.  Laird could not.  As he swung over the sixth pitch, the Dome erupted.  The Twins had somehow wiggled out of a no-out, runners on second and third proposition unscathed.