Guerra.

After two seasons and 168 innings split between two-leagues in the Mets system, Deolis Guerra had compiled a decent peripheral set -  averaging  7.3 strikeouts per nine innings while walking 3.6 per nine.  Once with the Twins organization, the team assigned him to Fort Myers (HA) where, at 19 years old, Guerra was nearly three years younger than his competition last year.  In 2008, his third stint in the Florida State League, word trickled in that his fastball had lost a few MPHs and his control vanished.  In what was his worst month, Guerra threw 23 innings in August and issued 20 free passes.  Not surprisingly, his overall walk rate ballooned (4.9 BB/9) while his strikeout rate shrank (4.9).  Reports of Guerra's reduced velocity and sub-par peripheral numbers conjured up collective groans from Twins territory as the budding pitching prospect acquired for Johan Santana trade seemed like it it was heading for another prospect miss. 

 

However, beginning 2009 with his fourth tour of duty in the FSL, Guerra showed signs of progress.  His strikeout rate, albeit still below the FSL average of 7.3, was an improved 5.8 K/9.  Additionally he was able to shave off several walks, dropping his rate to 2.5.  This development earned him an advancement to AA New Britain on July 7th.  His relocation to the Eastern League brought out the best of the big righty.  In his July 23rd start against hte Portland Sea Dogs, Guerra struck out 12 in seven innings and earned the Eastern League's Pitcher of the Week award.  In his most recent start, Guerra flirted with a no-hitter, actually not allowing a hit to the Akron Aeros for six innings and striking out nine before being lifted for a relief pitcher.

 

Where did this monster come from?

 

Normally in order to figure out what has changed I'd pour over pitchf/x data or the Inside Edge database attempting to find some answers to Guerra's improvement.  Maybe he regained velocity, changed arm motion, mixed in more breaking balls, etc.  Unfortunately these methods are unavailable when looking to analyze minor league talent.   Instead I wander through the few available youtube clips of Guerra and tried to breakdown his mechanics between the two seasons.  Dissecting video contributed to the Internet by the now-defunct SaberScouting from 2008 of Guerra's performance in Fort Myers in comparison to Guerra's New Britain performance supplied by TwinsonTwins.blogspot.com we can identify several items that he has refined in his mechanics that has led to this improved execution. 

 

The first thing that should jump out to you about the two motions is how stable Guerra is in his 2009 mechanics (bottom-white-uni) comparative to 2008 (top-greys).  Guerra's movement appears more fluid and steady this season.  Last year's model on the other hand contains some heavy herky-jerky actions.  This stems from his days in the Mets' organization, when Guerra sped through both the system and his delivery; neither of which were very good for him as a young pitcher.  The Twins set out to regroup his delivery and get him back under control. 

 

One of the most identifiable differences in his two deliveries - or at least the one the eyes focuses on first - is his leg-kick.  In 2008, his leg-kick had more of a pronounced pendulum swing appearance about it before bringing the leg up to where the balance point should be.  Because he is not bringing up his leg in a controlled manner, the extra movement prevents him from getting to a collected balance point to drive off the rubber.  Due to this inertia in his lower-half, his upper-half must counter to achieve a state of equilibrium between his lower and upper extremities.  Guerra forced his top-half to do an over-exaggerated wrap - a process where his back rolls to the point where he is showing the hitter both digits on his uniform.  This contortion causes his shoulders to rotate off the second-home line and onto the east-west axis, where they are almost parallel with first-third (but more appropriately, the second baseman and third base line).  This season, Guerra has implemented a more 'contained' and deliberate leg-kick, the lift of which looks more intentional rather than a someone doing an impromptu Rockette's routine.  He still brings the front leg close to his chest to derive power from, only Guerra is in far better control of his actions, keeping his lower and upper portions in unison.   

 

Once he twists his upper body off of the driveline, Guerra would need to re-adjust his motion to direct his momentum to the batter.  This resulted in another problem in Guerra's 'long-arming' the ball:  

 

 

 

Although these two videos are shot at slightly different locations above the left-handed batter's box (and set at a slightly different pace), you can clearly see that Guerra's arm in the top clip reveals Guerra reaching back further - almost dipping his back shoulder - in last year's model prior to coming forward with his delivery.   In addition to that, Guerra's elbow is wandering in some fairly uncharted territories.  It takes a substantial amount of effort to get his pitching arm righted once it wanders off this far.  Furthermore, Guerra's 2008 arm action gives the hitter several more reference points to pick up the ball and time him better whereas this season Guerra seems to hide the ball a bit better (even though you can pick it up for a brief moment behind his back).

 

Guerra's newly stabilized mechanics undoubtedly play a significant role in both his increased velocity and command of the strike zone.  Because he is still just 20 years old and playing in a league that is nearly five years older on average, it would be best to see Guerra repeat AA New Britain in 2010 to ensure that his mechanics remain consistent and avoid regressing into bad habits before advancing to AAA Rochester.     

 

 

A special thanks to the guys at twinsontwins.blogspot.com who have been posting the New Britain footage on youtube.  I encourage you guys - as well as anyone else that has access to a camera and the farm system - to keep the clips coming onto youtube! 

OtB Twins Notes 08.17.09

Nick Blackburn had a deteriorating performance in the second-half of last season as his K/BB ratio dropping from 3.56 to 1.54 and his ERA swelling from 3.65 to 4.85.  The right-hander has experienced a similar fading in the beginning of the second-half of 2009 thus far.  Prior to his start against Cleveland on Sunday, Blackburn had witnessed his second-half ERA open at 8.87 as his slugging percentage against shift from .393 to .639.  Following Tuesday's 1 2/3 inning outing against Kansas City in which he surrendered four earned runs on six hits and two walks, the right-hander and pitching coach Rick Anderson reviewed video footage to identify any potential problem areas.  According to Joe Christensen, the pair noticed that Blackburn was not using his legs as much as he was in the beginning of the year and, after several bullpen sessions this week, they felt confident that they had corrected this problem.  Unfortunately, when implemented into practice, Blackburn was once again bombarded by opponents, allowing six runs on three home runs in a pathetic 2 1/3 inning showing on Sunday and raising his second-half ERA to 10.79. 

I had long suspected that because of his inability to strikeout batters regularly in addition to his high-contact rate that Blackburn would eventually regress this year.  This complete unraveling, however, was unexpected.  Interestingly enough, according to pitch f/x data Blackburn threw a total of three two-seamed fastballs (5.5 percent) on Sunday.  Comparatively, Blackburn threw this pitch 36 times in his start against the Detroit Tigers on July 5^th (33 percent).  This decrease indicates one of two things.  The first being a glitch in the system registering the pitch as a four-seamer due to little movement, the second being Blackburn’s lack of confidence in the pitch and thereby not throwing it. Either way, the side bullpen session was not enough to get the right-hander back on track or confidence in his abilities.

While Blackburn has had a rough second-half, Anthony Swarzak has too suffered dearly in August.  In his three starts this month, Swarzak is 0-3 with an 18.00 ERA and an opponent batting average of .543.  John Shipley notes that Ron Gardenhire is pondering whether to remove the rookie from the rotation. "Well, we'll decide that later," Gardenhire told reporters. "Let's let him rest on this and let everybody think about this and try to figure out where we go next. We'll get through this today and then make a decision in a few days."  One of the bigger differences between Swarzak’s July (2-1 record, 3.50 ERA, .239 BAA) and his horrendous August (0-3, 18.00 ERA, .543 BAA) is his ability to get ahead of the batter.  In his July starts, Swarzak got strike one in 56.0 percent of his match-ups.  This month the righty has managed to fall behind in 62 percent of his match-ups, putting the hitter in favorable counts.

Rochester Democrat & Chronicle’s Jim Mandelaro wrote that the recent promotion of Jeff Manship should be a message to Kevin Mulvey and Philip Humber. Paraphrasing Mandelaro’s opinion, the columnist feels that Manship is a good pitcher who probably isn’t quite ready for the big leagues.  Understandably, his 4-2 record and 3.22 ERA makes him appear to be a better option but in reality, he might be a slight degradation from Humber and certainly from Mulvey.  Following an eight-inning, five-hit outing Manship dropped his opponent batting average to .277, slightly lower than Mulvey (.278) and Humber (.280).  Conversely, Manship has sported a slightly worse K/BB ratio (1.76) than Mulvey (2.14) and Humber (2.00).

Reviewing Manship’s outing on Sunday at BrooksBaseball.net we find graphical evidence that he is an extreme over-the-top hurler (as opposed to three-quarters).  If you follow the link, you’ll see that Manship’s release point is in a direct line with home plate – most pitchers tend to be off to the side.  While those three-quarter pitchers get more horizontal movement on their fastballs, Manship’s offerings cut downward descending from a little over six feet to around two feet on average.   This has led to over 50 percent of his balls in play being put on the ground. 

At John Dewan’s Stat of the Week, Dewan ran down my favor unavailable stat: the first baseman scoops.  According to the Fielding Bible database, Twins first baseman Justin Morneau led the field in 2008 with 44 scoops.  This year, he is 12^th with 19 scoops.  This downturn is due to Joe Crede’s presence at third.  A year ago, the combination of Mike Lamb, Brendan Harris and Brian Buscher made 12 throwing errors.  That trio obvious lent itself to more errant throws in the dirt than with the addition of Crede who delivers nothing but chest-high strikes.  

Twins pitching prospect Jay Rainville announced with little fanfare that he was retiring last week telling hometown Pawtucket Times that he felt he could not “compete at the Double-A level”.  When the Twins nabbed Rainville in the supplemental round of the 2004 draft (39^th overall), the organization felt they had a major steal and signed him to an $875K bonus.  As a high school pitcher out of Rhode Island, Rainville already touched 95-mph, control and a desirable 6’2” and 220 pounds frame to mold into a power pitcher.  In his first two pro seasons, Rainville threw 176 innings between three levels and going 15-7 with a 3.06 ERA and a 4.16 K/BB ratio quickly becoming another touted arm in the system. Nerve damage in his throwing shoulder would erase the entire 2006 season for him and when he returned, Rainville’s velocity had dropped significantly. Post-surgery, Rainville had gone 22-24 with a 4.60 ERA and a 2.14 K/BB ratio.  His track record reiterates Baseball Prospectus’s Joe Sheenan’s prophetic acronym TINSTAPP (There Is No Such Thing as a Pitching Prospect) no matter how projectable they may be. 

Alan Schwarz at the NY Times examines why there has not been a left-handed catching catcher since Barry Distefano for the Pittsburgh Pirates in 1989.  Anyone know who the last left-handed fielding catcher in the Twins organization was?

Joel Millman at the Wall Street Journal details the influx of foreign talent within major league baseball’s minor league system. 

As we continue to watch futility personified in the second base position, a reminder that Milwaukee’s Felipe Lopez is now batting .333/.390/.438 (32-for-96) in 24 games since being acquired on July 19^th from Arizona. Internally, fielding-challenged Steven Tolleson is batting .311/.364/.426 in 61 at-bats in August.         

Gibson.

With three days remaining in the signing period for the amateur draft picks, the Twins are placing themselves in a position to lose their first number one pick since Travis Lee in 1996.  Kyle Gibson, the right-handed pitcher out of the University of Missouri, has requested a bonus of near $2.5 million – well above the MLB slot recommendation of $1.287 (a ten percent decrease from 2008) – based upon a outstanding college track record and a high Baseball America ranking.  The Twins’ offer is supposedly $1 million short of Gibson’s request as the organization has valid concerns regarding his injury history.  While Gibson certainly has talent, the Twins have what should be viewed as legitimate apprehension to schilling out that money.

 

In December 2008, well before the release of his injury, Driveline Mechanics deconstructed Gibson’s delivery.  Using this video segment of Gibson pitching in the Cape Cod League in 2007, Kyle Boddy of DM.com identified several problematic areas in his mechanics; the first of which is less troubling then the other two.  Because of Gibson’s tall, lanky frame, he’s got an enormous distance to cover in his stride – a step that takes just shy over an eternity.  Boddy focuses in on the leg-lift itself which, as he notes, is borderline worthless.  This has been echoed in several different scouting forums and it provides insight to Baseball America’s lone criticism of Gibson was that he was unable to generate more velocity during his three-year tenure in the Show-Me-State: he’s throwing all arm (a problem I’ll address in a minute).  From a developmental standpoint, it would seem that Gibson still has velocity yet to be milked out of him.  Gibson’s motion of raising his long leg in to a very solid balance point is good; however, instead of driving towards the plate, Gibson lowers his leg then starts his push towards home – minimizing hip force.  Why is that a problem?  It puts added exertion on his arm.  

 

The arm, of course, is a huge fixation when projecting Gibson.  Prior to June when it was made known of his forearm fracture, Gibson was touted as a top five and certainly a top ten pick in the 2009 draft.  The news of the arm injury naturally caused many teams to recoil in doubt.  Forearm stress fractures are typically results of repetitive flexion-extensions (flexing-straightening) of the elbow or pronation-supination (inner-outer movement) of the wrists.  Reviewing the footage of Gibson’s arm motion, Boddy finds that there is plenty of evidence of this.  Highlighting his loading process, Boddy notes that his elbow at this position comes to a point of near hyperabduction.  While his scapula loading (or “scap loading” which is the act of bringing your arm/elbow to shoulder height and then pulling the elbow back towards the shoulder) might not be as violent as say, Brandon McCarthy, this motion is a forced one – causing undue stress on the shoulder and elbow joints.  Although it might not be the source of his forearm stress fracture (I would suspect that might have to do with his plus-slider that he would have been throwing with his upper-body), Gibson’s mechanics will need some re-evaluation in the lower-levels unless the Twins want to flirt with more injuries.   

 

Oddly enough, Gibson told Alex Halsted in his recent interview that he is most like the Tigers’ Justin Verlander – who was a similarly tall, thin, hard-throwing, right-handed collegiate draft pick.  Unfortunately, that’s about where the similarities end.  Gibson claimed that he is like the Detroit pitcher in that he “allows his body to work with his arm.”  This may be a simple case of terrible self-awareness or an ingenious PR push at the signing deadline but my guess is that it is the former.  It is true that Verlander generates a substantial amount of velocity from a hip-heavy motion and while he shares a high leg kick with Gibson, Verlander uses this height to propel his body forward thus creating less effort on his arm.  Gibson certainly does not share this trait.  Furthermore, Joe Christensen’s blog re-posting of the quote only tossed more chum in the water for disgruntled Twins fans who subsequently littered the comments section with scathing words for the franchise that would choose to pass on the next Verlander.   

 

Yes, Gibson’s 6’6” frame allowed for unbelievable projectability and his lower portion of his body could probably be corrected in rookie ball but his right-handed delivery mechanism might already be beyond damaged coupled with the time commitment to overhaul his mechanics and it is decisively tougher to open the checkbook.  Spending what Christensen reported was a desired income of $2.5 million suddenly seems like a foolish investment.  The Twins scouting department gambled on Gibson’s projectability and wagered that he would be more accommodating to sign for the current MLB slot recommendation considering all of the factors which caused his stock to sink.  The organization probably figured they could outfit him with new mechanics and teach him to throw a change-up thereby transforming him into a top-of-the-rotation pitcher or, at minimum, a solid relief arm.  Meanwhile Gibson, like every other red-blooded American, believes he should be paid what he are worth – and Gibson had been told his value was of a top five pedigree. 

 

It is quite the contradiction, as Twins minor league prospect guru, Seth Stohs, noted in a recent conversation, the Twins spent time telling him how desirable he was to the organization then when it comes down to dollars and cents, they retract their message.  We like you, just not as much as you think you deserve.   It is a hard truth of the business on both sides. 

What Is Wrong With Perk?

Twice now in a little over two weeks, Glen Perkins’s shoulder is the subject of medical attention.  This time, the Twins lefty and his agent, John Courtright of SFX, took matters into their own hands and elected to seek out an MRI.  Judging by the organization’s mishandling of pitching injuries, I’d say their request is justified. 

Perkins cited his decrease in velocity (which declined from an average of 91-mph in April to 89-mph since July 22^nd) as Exhibit A and the inability to keep the ball down in the zone as Exhibit B.  The loss of velocity is often a symptom of shoulder ailments and sometimes a prelude to a torn labrum.  Using pitchf/x charts from brookbaseball.net, there is ample evidence that his release point has dropped in his more recent starts.   This is noteworthy because if you are unable to maintain the same height of your previous arm angle/motion because of shoulder irritation, your elbow will naturally lower along with the rest of your arm.  A lowered elbow translates into higher pitches.  This makes perfect sense when you consider that since his July 22^nd start, Perkins has allowed five home runs and an opponent slugging percentage of .694 in 13 innings.

There is a high probability that Perkins has ruptured a portion of his supraspinatus resulting in the inflammation of the shoulder (i.e., tendonitis).  This would explain the rather mild-sounding discomfort that Perkins complained of which “felt like I rolled out of bed and went out on the mound."  Perkins explained this sensation the same way every college student starts there day.  A torn labrum, on the other hand, is more frequently described as repeated muscle tearing from bone when the arm is lifted overhead -- hardly a pain experience that one would compare to rising in the morning from their Sleep Number.  The good news is that it is probably not a torn labrum.  While not completely a career-killer, labrum tears and the long road of rehabilitation post-surgery produce a small percentage of pitchers who return successfully.  Far too often pitchers return from the tear repairs to a noticeable decrease to their velocity or are forced to alter their mechanics which leads to a higher re-injury risk and/or less effectiveness (Jesse Crain comes to mind). 

Kelly Theiser highlighted Perkins’s diagnosis from Dr Lewis Yocum after a visit following his one-inning debacle in Oakland in which the specialist ruled it a case of tendonitis.  Dr Yocum, as you may have deduced, is, as it was so eloquently put in Anchorman when describing Ron Burgundy, the balls.  Aside from Perkins, Yocum has welcomed the Indians’ Jake Westbrook, the Mariners’ Erik Bedard, the Nationals’ Jordan Zimmermann, the Orioles’ Rich Hill, and the Angels’ Scot Shields since the beginning of the month.  His client list is nearly bottomless.  If you have arm troubles, you see Yocum.   So the verdict was that Perkins was suffering from “slight” tendonitis in his shoulder would appear to be an easily acceptable diagnosis and most likely be treated with rest and prescribed non-steroidal anti-inflammatory pills. 

Tendonitis, of course, is a byproduct of overuse.  The easiest fix for shoulder tendonitis would be rest, anti-inflammatory medication and monitoring of a pitcher’s workload once he bounces back.  Combine the fact that he had a history of overexertion (he threw 185 innings in 2008 after tossing just 28 in 2007), it would be reasonable expectation to throttle down on the lefty by skipping a start or two.  Unfortunately, starting pitchers in the midst of a pennant race do not have the luxury of using PTO and are often “cleared” to throw again and pushed back on to the mound.   So instead of withholding Perkins from his next scheduled start the Twins had him throw 102-pitches five days later against the visiting White Sox. 

This raises a whole other concern on a global-level for the organization and it is disturbing in its own right.  In addition to not skipping Perkins, manager Ron Gardenhire tossed out rather skeptical remarks regarding the MRI saying "I'm not going to question [the decision for the MRI]. If that's what they want to do, do it and then see where we're at. I'm all for it if they feel something might be wrong, to make sure it's not. To make sure he's OK and go from there."  Obviously without Kevin Slowey available and Francisco Liriano ineffective, the Twins and their manager were nervous about the possibility of using rookies Anthony Swarzak and Brian Duensing liberally without having to subtract Perkins.  Nevertheless, pushing him when his shoulder has injury potential is downright dangerous.

The Minnesota Twins have long been painted as a “cheap” and “frugal” organization, however, with the medical bills association with arm injuries to Francisco Liriano, Boof Bonser, Pat Neshek, Jesse Crain and now Perkins (among others within the system), it would seem that the team could save a few pennies each year by implementing further preventative practices. 

The Pavano Acquisition.

With some reason, there exists a chorus of local media wonks that believe that Carl Pavano was less than a resounding acquisition for the Twins.  They will say that securing another aging, control-wielding pitcher that was passed over by the larger market teams at the trade deadline reeked of a “typical Twins” maneuver.  On the airwaves, KFAN’s Paul Allen recited how uninspiring this move was to a choir of uninformed rubes.   Yes, those that worship at gospel of ERA will be less enthused by the Pavano trade; however, there are plenty of reasons why this acquisition should be met with the same victorious reception as if the Twins landed either Cliff Lee or Jarrod Washburn.  In fact, there could be MORE reasons to be excited about Pavano. 

 

Littered with a history of more injuries than Wile E. Coyote, Pavano figured out a way to extort $39.95 million from George Steinbrenner while working just 26 days out of four years.   (Good work if you can find it.)  Back when the Yankees signed the then 28-year-old Pavano in December of 2004, they figured they had acquired a potential 20-game winner that had World Series experience and would be another frontline component of a dominating rotation that already boasted Randy Johnson, Mike Mussina and Kevin Brown.  Little did the Yankees know he would pull an Ocean’s Eleven on Steinbrenner’s money.  Pavano would never give New York a full season of starts in his four years in the Bronx, rather he would cost the organization millions in medical expenses and headaches. 

Though he may not be able to find a cab in NYC any time soon, Pavano rebounded nicely in 2009, appearing to be fully recovered.  In January, the Indians inked the tall righty to a one-year incentive-laden deal that started with a $1.5 million base but could increase by another $5.3 million as various milestones are reached (starts and innings).  Finding themselves as an also-ran in the Central and staring a $16 million dollar operational deficit in the face, the Indians began to jettison anything that could float.  Gone were Lee, Victor Martinez, Mark DeRosa, Rafael Betancourt and Ben Francisco.  Oddly enough, Pavano remained.  As attractive as Roy Halladay, Lee and Washburn were made out to be at the trade deadline, rare were reports of how adding Pavano could upgrade a rotation.  Perhaps it was the gaudy ERA or the looming injury potential, but no deal involving Pavano was made by the July 31^st deadline, possibly to a great baseball injustice to the Indians organization and a huge coup for the Twins.   

For teams that evaluates players with advanced statistics (Boston, Tampa and Seattle come to mind), it would be hard to ignore that his xFIP of 4.16 – a stat that normalizes the home run rate along with the infusion of strikeout and walk rates – which was TENTH best in the AL among qualified starters.  Better than Sabathia.  Better than Buerhle, Shields, Washburn, Burnett.   Et cetera.  Et Cetera.   He was pitching better than all of those staff aces.  One xFIP point worse than Lee – one point! – and it took the Phillies four of their top ten prospects to nab Lee from the Indians.

From his perspective, Pavano did everything he could to limit the number of guys on the basepaths.  With 1.7 walks per nine innings, Pavano was second only to the highly-coveted Halladay in walks.  Similarly, Pavano’s 67 percent first-pitch strike trailed only the Blue Jays’ ace as well.  His ERA over-5.00 is reflective of a largely unlucky series of events and the results of what happens once the ball was in play, which was out of his control.  While Washburn’s peripheral numbers are nothing to write home about, the Mariners supplied the flyball-oriented pitcher with some of the best fly-catchers in the game today in the Safeco outfield.  As Washburn’s trade value with inflated by his surroundings and his ERA substantially lowered in 2009 by the aid of his defense, Pavano was wrongly demerited for the sins of his defense.  Over the course of his career Pavano’s use of speed change between his fastball and changeup (10-mph velocity difference) coupled with the downward action of his split-finger tended to incite a higher number of groundballs than average.  Because of the Indians foolish insistence on using Jhonny Peralta at shortstop, it wound up costing the Tribe and Pavano numerous outs – evident by the team’s fourth-worst .770 infield revised zone rating leading to a higher average on those groundballs in play (.275 versus the league average of .233).  A defensive infield unit closer to that of the league average RZR of .783 would have saved the righty a good deal of baserunners.  

Furthermore, Pavano maintained a DER (defensive efficiency ratio) of .673 – the third lowest amount of balls converted to outs among qualified starters.  Because of Cleveland’s inability to exchange balls in play for outs at the going rate of .695, Pavano was forced to throw more pitches, leading to more opportunities for the opposition to drive a pitch. 

This is hardly giving Pavano the tools to succeed.  Whereas Washburn’s defense provided him with additional outs and quicker exits to the inning, this prolonged time on the hill came at the expense of more baserunners crossing the plate.  Pavano’s extra exposure resulted in more runs trickling in as he exercised the AL lowest strand rate of 63.4 percent while the average starting pitcher was able to strand 71.4 percent of all runners.  Part of that low number has to do with who Indians manager Eric Wedge relays the ball to once Pavano is pulled.  With 41 percent of inherited runners scored, Cleveland’s bullpen is the second-worst in the AL.   This is a considerable amount of bad luck interjecting itself into an otherwise solid pitcher. 

But the simplest reason to get behind this transaction is the fact that Pavano has been dominant against the two AL Central teams competing with the Twins.  For seven innings on Saturday night, the right-hander demonstrated exactly why the Twins were interested in his services.  Holding the Tigers to no runs on five hits, Pavano improved his 2009 record against Detroit to 4-0 with a 1.48 ERA in 30.1 innings.  Make that now 6-1 against the Tigers and White Sox combined.  Considering that there are 13 more matches against these opponents, there will be a good chance that Pavano works three to four of those games.