What's Wrong with Boof?

Not too long ago, Bonser was one of the pitching crown jewels of the Twins organization, blasting through double-A and triple-A ball after being acquired in the AJ Pierzynski trade with San Francisco. In 2005 with the Rochester Red Wings, Bonser racked up 168 strike outs in 160.1 innings (24.5% k%) finishing 11-9 with a 3.99 era. The following season, Bonser began back in triple-A and was producing similarly - 83 strikeouts in 86 innings pitched (22.9%) – when in late May the Twins desperately needed his help. In his debut in Milwaukee gave Twins fans a glimpse of the last of the Pierzynski dividends as Bonser finished six innings while striking out 8 and surrendering just the one run. His subsequent starts were less successful as in his next six starts Bonser tossed 29.2 innings only to have a 6.07 era in that duration with opponents hitting .299/.354/.556 off of him. From August on, Bonser pitched significantly better, starting 11 games and throwing 64.2 innings with a 3.62 era. This end of the year performance earned him the Game 2 start in the ALDS against the Oakland Athletics. Esteban Loaiza and Bonser matched each other with two runs a piece. The Twins bullpen conceded three more runs after Bonser left the game and the offense could generate anything against the Oakland relievers.

As Twins long-time rotation fixture Brad Radke retired after the 2006 season, a lot of attention was placed on Bonser hoping that he could stabilize the Twins rotation with his 19 starts of experience. With high hopes in 2007, Bonser failed to live up to vaunted expectations, finishing the season with 8-12 in 30 starts with a 5.10 era (4.98 fip) and an eventual demotion to the bullpen. The had gone 14 and 17 in his starts a big disappointment from management and the front office who were hoping that Bonser would improve on his 10-8 appearance record in 2006. This performance set off a whirlwind offseason in which Bonser was determined to loss weight, attributing the disappointing season to being overweight. "I know last year was a wake up call for him," Gardenhire

said this past spring. "We took him out of the rotation, and I think he was pretty disappointed. I expected that and hoped for that. I think it kind of lit a fire under him, hopefully."

In his first six starts of the 2008 season, Bonser performed much better than his 2-4 record reflects. In 36 innings Bonser struck out 22 and walked just 9. Opponents were hitting just .250/.293/.379 off of him. In his final six starts of the season (so far) Bonser had tossed 30.1 innings and had struck out 20 and walked 11. Opponents increased their batting line to .286/.340/.459 in that time capping it off with an 8.60 era. "I want to be in the starting rotation,'' Bonser told the press after getting shellacked by the New York Yankees on May 30th, on what would be his last start to date, "I know guys are pitching better than me. Whatever their decision is, is their decision. It's just unfortunate that I had such a bad month. I would like to say that, hopefully, this [outing] would be a game to turn me around and get things rolling. It just stinks to be at this point and not getting production I know I can do.''

For the record, Bonser had not been all bad. His 4.09 fip is an indication that he is throwing much better than his 6.48 era would suggest. This is his lowest FIP to date at the major league level. As a starter he was only being supported with 3.65 runs per start. Since his second demotion to the bullpen in as many seasons, Bonser has made six appearances and has given up runs in all but one of those outings. As a reliever, Bonser has contributed an 10.38 era as opponents were smashing him with a .452/.489/.571 batting line. "I was throwing strikes; that's what's weird," Bonser told the Pioneer Press after the May 24th outing in Detroit in which he gave up 8 earned runs in 3 innings of work and allowed Magglio Ordonez to crush a home run that cleared the Tigers bullpen. "I was throwing off-speed pitches, and they weren't getting fooled."

2007	Usage%	Speed	WHIFF	BABIP		2008	Usage%	Speed	WHIFF	BABIP
Fastball	54%	91.9	.071	.408		Fastball	58%	90.7	.118	.289
Curve	19%	79.5	.247	.389		Curve	15%	79.1	.323	.353
Slider	20%	85.6	.204	.324		Slider	17%	85.9	.172	.356
Change	6%	82.2	.068	.294		Change	6%	82.7	.194	.429

The first reason for Bonser’s 2008 decline is his self-diagnosed off-speed pitches: batters are just not getting fooled as he mentioned in May. According to pitch f/x data supplied by Josh Kalk seminal website From Small Ball to the Long Ball, we can analyze and visually see in the chart above that Bonser is indeed having some issues with his breaking stuff. In 2007, Bonser alternated between his curveball, which he preferred for left-handed batters (23% of the time), and slider, his right-handed batter’s weapon of choice (31% of the time), to off-set his fastball. His 91.9-mph average fastball, one that sinks (~90) and one that was straight (~93), was hit hard. Opponents swung and missed on the fastball just 7.1% of the time (as indicated by his .071 WHIFF average) and had a hefty .408 average on balls in play. His curveball proved to be the most effective pitch in his repertoire as it had a .247 WHIFF average. The slider wasn’t far behind with a .204 WHIFF average. Both the curveball and the slider, two pitches very capable of inducing a strikeout, also had high averages when put into play.

Lefties absolutely mashed Bonser in 2007. In 411 plate appearances, left-handed opponents hit .349/.407/.563 though he struck out his fair share of them as well (17.7% k% vs lhb) more so than right-handed batters (17.4% k%). This is evident because Bonser relied strictly on his fastball (58%) and curveball (23%) two pitches that were extremely hittable (the fastball more so) but he also was able to strike out that many because his curveball had the highest WHIFF average AND called strike average (32%). The righties, however, had a more difficult time scratching out hits off of Bonser. In 361 plate appearances the right-side opponents managed just a .214/.285/.360 batting line. Bonser had been feeding them steady diets of fastballs (49%) and sliders (31%) with greater results than the left-handed counterparts, mostly because his slider was less likely to succumb to a base hit when put into play.

His approach to hitters shifted somewhat in 2008 in terms of pitch distribution. Left-handed batters are now seeing more fastballs (64%) while Bonser hasn't used one particular offspeed pitch to the group. Seeing as that his swing-and-miss rate had improved on his fastball (.118 vs. .071) and that the contact made was creating more outs (.289 vs .408) the reliance on the fastball was the reason left-handed opponent average declined to .297/.322/.441. Right-handed batters on the other hand still saw the same dosage of fastballs (53%) and sliders (23%) only now Bonser has begun tossing the curve at them as well (17%). This has resulted in an increased opponents batting line from the low .214/.285/.360 in 2007 to a hefty .288/.322/.441 in 2008. One possible explanation for this is that his slider has flattened out. What was his second most dominating pitch last year is now arguably his least successful one. The WHIFF average has decreased to .172 and opponents are hitting .356 when they put the ball in play.

The second reason is due to one of Bonser’s 2008 resolutions. The first of which we have all seen was him shedding 25 pounds to increase the yet-to-be-seen endurance. The other, more subtle resolution was to use his change-up more frequently. "Last year, I threw like maybe one or two a game,'' Bonser said discussing his 2007 usage of the change, "and that was amazing." So far Bonser has interspersed his change-up along with his other off-speed weapons into the game with as much frequency as he did last year (6%) only this time the results are significantly different. Last season Bonser had fewer swings-and-misses with his change-up (.068 WHIFF) than his fastball (.070 WHIFF) but saw the pitch be the hardest pitch to reach base with (.294 babip). This season he has been able to get more bats to miss (.194 WHIFF) with the pitch but only to find it very hittable (.429 babip).

What is reassuring is that Bonser's fastball is solid. Not only because of the velocity and the lack of hits produced by it, but also Bonser's control of the pitch. Last season Bonser threw his fastball in the zone 63% of the time and this year he has been around the plate 70% of the time. Like Scott Baker, Boof Bonser should take a lesson and rely on his two best pitches and disperse a third to change a hitter's eye line. Baker is a two trick pony using the fastball liberally (63%) and following that with his slider (21%). On occasion, Baker tosses in a good curve (10%). Bonser, as he is trying to regain his form in the bullpen, should begin by eliminating the change for the time being. True Bonser has only thrown it approximately once an inning, but when you consider that this pitch is detrimental when put into play, the idea of forcing it in for having a "fourth pitch" is not helping. Even throwing this pitch once an inning creates the possibility of continuation of said inning, more so than any other of his pitches. 42% of the time a batter makes contact with it that batter reaches base safely, prolonging the inning. In 16 different innings this year Bonser has thrown 20 or more pitches. Furthermore, his change's rate of speed (82.7) only varies it from his slider by 3 miles per hour on average - the pitch must appear to be a hanging slider to the batter - Bonser could easily obtain the same effect with his curveball which has a 6.8 mile per hour difference plus has a greater WHIFF average. The second measure he should take is to downshift the usage of the slider. I am not suggesting the pitch be discarded but rather take a back seat to his existing fastball (sinker/two seamer) and curveball. Instead of combating right-handed batters with a pitch that has been hit far too often, Bonser needs to concentrate once again on throwing his curveball, one that has a .323 WHIFF average.

Notebook Dump (6.18.08)

Game: Twinks 2, Nats 1

Box Score

Record: 35-36, 2^nd place, 4.5 games back

Streak: 1 win

The Quote: “I don’t think that’s where that guy wanted to throw that ball.” - Ron Gardenhire

The Inning: The 23-year-old John Lannan has been a lightening rod for bad luck. In his past three starts his offense has generated one run per game. The three before that, they scored two-runs per game. That’s a measly 1.5 runs of support in those games (a number that is qualifying of a "Deadbeat Dad" offense). Lannan, meanwhile, was allowing just 2.0 runs per game in those previous six outings. Somehow, he managed to win one. The Nats are 4-10 in his starts providing the young left-hander with 2.49 runs per start so far this season. He has lost games with game scores amounting to 53, 73, 56, 52, 53 and as of last night, 60. For five innings the sophomore pitcher cruised against the Twins, relinquishing just the one hit – a double to Joe Mauer that could have just as well been caught by left fielder Kory Casto - there were essentially no well hit balls by the Twins line-up.

Lannan entered the bottom of the sixth inning with just three runners reaching base. With the top of the Twins order coming up, Nationals manager Manny Acta was expecting his young hurler to pacify the Twins for as long as he could fully aware that the Nationals had a bullpen with a combined 4.19 era. Lannan began the inning by getting Carlos Gomez to pop weakly to second and then followed with a groundout by right-handed batting Alexi Casilla. Throughout the game, Lannan had induced groundballs nearly 70% of the time keeping his infielders busy. On the season, Lannan had been an extreme groundball pitcher, getting batters to hit gounders 57% of the balls put in play. This is significantly higher than the National League average of 44%. "His ball kind of gets on you,” said Joe Mauer, “I don't know if it's something with his delivery. He had a good angle on his pitches. He had some good stuff working tonight." Fortunately for the Twins, Joe Mauer has proven success against groundball-type pitchers. In 127 plate appearances against groundball pitchers, Mauer is hitting .336/.394/.425. Mauer then proceeded to fend off one of Lannan’s good pitches following Casilla’s ground out and almost Charlie Browned Lannan with a grounder back through the box.

By keeping the inning alive, Mauer’s single brought Justin Morneau to the plate. For 16 games Morneau’s bat had not created a home run. Lannan had all the intention in the world of keeping it that way when he released the curveball. "I figured if I threw the same kind of pitch..." Lannan began reminiscing about his first inning double-play inducing curveball, "I shouldn't have thrown that pitch in that same situation. It was a mistake." The mistake pitch, clocked at 72-mph by pitch f/x data, left Morneau’s bat at 107-mph landing over the baggy and 10 rows deep. Hittrackeronline.com categorized Morneau’s 403-foot true distance home run (the Dome estimator says 421) as a No-Doubter, clearing any stadium in professional baseball. "I was looking for something offspeed, he threw it over and I wasn't trying to hit a home run, but I'll take it," the Canadian said.

Some will credit Livan Hernandez for matching Lannan (for the most part) frame by frame, only giving up the double to Paul LoDuca and the subsequent infield hit to Cristian Guzman for the solitary Nationals run. "He's always amazing," Lannan said. "He just throws strikes, and he mixes it up well. He's not overpowering, but he knows how to pitch, and he always has known how to pitch. You always learn something when you watch a guy like that." True, it was a good outing that only required 77 pitches to obtain a victory with a game score of 63, but credit is also deserving of the anemic National offense which is last in the National League with 3.71 runs per game.

The (2007) ‘Pen is Mightier

In 2007 manager Ron Gardenhire leaned on his bullpen to pitch 32.6% of the team's total innings. This was below the American League average of 34%. Limiting the use of the bullpen was critical with injuries to Dennys Reyes and Jesse Crain. The 2007 starting rotation provided the Twins with an ample 5.9 innings per start allowing much needed rest to the bullpen. The relievers, in response, provided 469.1 solid innings holding opponents to a .255/.325/.403 batting line as the starters were getting pummeled at a .276/.324/.445 clip. With only 18 of the team’s 83 losses attributed to the second fiddlers, the 2007 relief staff was effective in the later innings in both maintaining leads and the wherewithal to earn 20 victories as well. Below is the bullpen sorted by the percentage of relief innings provided.

2007	inning%	K%	bb%	avg	obp	slg	fip
Guerrier	18%	19.3%	5.9%	.220	.276	.342	3.98
Nathan	15%	27.3%	6.7%	.209	.264	.310	2.73
Neshek	14%	26.6%	9.7%	.183	.266	.325	n/a
Rincon	12%	18.0%	10.3%	.273	.356	.437	5.19
Reyes	6%	15.1%	15.1%	.309	.419	.391	4.68
Crain	3%	14.1%	5.6%	.292	.338	.536	6.19
Twins Relief Avg:	x	19.1%	8.5%	.255	.325	.403	x
League Relief Avg:	x	18.5%	9.9%	.257	.336	.398	x

As you can see, the Twins relief support was across the board slightly better than league average in all categories except slugging. This is attributed to the use of Juan Rincon who Gardenhire used in 12% of the relief innings, only to be torched for a slugging percentage of .437. The top three of the heaviest utilized pitchers, Guerrier, Nathan and Neshek, comprised of 47% of the relief innings and provided much better innings that your average reliever. When those three were on last year, it was like watching an Olympic relay team handing off a baton at a full sprint. Seventh inning Guerrier. Eighth inning Neshek. Nathan in the ninth. They inspired confidence.

The current year has been a different story altogether. The confidence that Twins fans felt with Nathan anchoring the back-end, Neshek in the 8th and a combination of Guerrier and Reyes in the 7th would give the Twins the best chance to win snapped when Neshek's arm did and the bullpen shuffle began. The starting rotation has only been able to supply an average of 5.7 innings per start in the first 66 games of the season. Because of this, Gardenhire has increased the relief staff usage to 36% (214.2) of the total innings (591) which is a sharp contrast to the 33% American League average. This increased reliance on the bullpen exacerbates the existing condition that the staff is depleted. To date, the bullpen has been responsible for nine losses. "We were complaining about having 13 pitchers right now," Gardenhire said, "but we've needed every single one of them."

2008	inning%	K%	bb%	avg	obp	slg	fip
Bass	19%	9.6%	7.5%	.312	.369	.547	6.18
Guerrier	16%	15.1%	10.1%	.262	.342	.383	4.54
Rincon	13%	15.0%	12.0%	.292	.389	.478	5.85
Nathan	12%	26.2%	4.9%	.250	.264	.316	2.54
Crain	12%	16.1%	10.2%	.267	.339	.448	4.84
Reyes	9%	13.9%	7.6%	.268	.333	.380	3.65
Neshek	6%	26.7%	7.1%	.240	.291	.460	n/a
Twins Relief Avg:	x	16.3%	8.8%	.273	.343	.471	x
League Relief Avg:	x	18.8%	10.3%	.249	.331	.383	x

The pitchers that are now compiling 48% of the relief innings (Bass, Guerrier and Rincon) are substantially worse than your league average reliever. Brian Bass’s long relief duties have been riddled with offensive explosions (5.05 era) as he has been summoned to the mound with 31 inherited runs, seven of which have scored (23% IRA%). Bass has progressed since his May 24th Detroit debacle, only allowing three runs in almost ten innings of relief while stranding all nine inherited runners in that time. Unfortunately Bass had been tagged for three extra base hits including two home runs in those ten innings as well an indication that he is not . Juan Rincon’s demise has been well-documented as of late. The Twins blogosphere seems to be echoing the same three letters: DFA. According to Joe Christensen, the Twins have outrighted Rincon to Rochester (SENTIMENTALITY ALERT: with the release of Rincon, it effectively terminates any connection to the 2002 American League Central Champion Twins. Cuddyer, who played 41 games in 2002 in addition to 8 play-off games, is the last refuge). I suggested recently that Rincon should begin to work his slider more frequently now that the velocity on his fastball is decreasing. Instead, Rincon had increasingly thrown the fastball at a great frequency resulting in his .478 slugging percentage. Rincon will undoubtedly opt for free agency instead of accepting the minor league assignment which will allow any team to sign him (and his baggage). Any team that is desperate enough for a right-handed arm should consider getting Rincon to focus on the off-speed pitch.

Of the three, Matt Guerrier has been the most disappointing. Guerrier’s innings volume in 2007 is derivative of his use as a long-reliever in the beginning months of the seasons. He was so successful in that role that he was the natural choice to graduate to a 7th inning man. In April 2007, Guerrier was averaging 1.5 innings per outing. By the end of the season Guerrier was averaging about one inning per outing as his role was changed to short right-handed relief when Jesse Crain was disabled for the season and Neshek was shut down in September. What helped Guerrier were his breaking balls that were set up by a very good 92 mph fastball. Both his curveball (80 mph) and slider (86 mph) had high-rates of swing and misses (.348 and .364 WHIFF rates, respectively) and therefore led to his best strikeout rate of his career (19.3%). Guerrier’s emergence brought fortitude to an otherwise unstable bullpen. This season in his set-up role, Guerrier has accumulated seven holds but has been hit harder and has let more base runners on (10.0% bb%, .342 obp) then he had in his previous season. These erratic tendencies has made Guerrier less than the sure-thing set-up man that made Pat Neshek so valuable. The only difference in Guerrier’s pitch selection is that he is leaning slightly more on his fastball (58% vs. 55%) this season at the expense of his curveball (13% vs. 17%). This is notable because Guerrier's curve is much more likely to obtain a miss (nearly 35% of the time) than his fastball (18%).

Assuming that Boof Bonser, Brian Bass and Craig Breslow will shoulder some of the innings that were left for Rincon, the Twins will now be using a mixture of Reyes, Crain and Guerrier to bridge the starts from their 5.7 innings to Joe Nathan in the ninth. Things could be far worse. Dennys Reyes will continued to be asked to retire the left-handed slugger like Texas's Josh Hamilton or Cleveland's Grady Sizemore in late inning situations. As was the case last night when Reyes elevated a slider to Sizemore who redirected the pitch to the right field bleachers, the results may vary. So far this season, Reyes has inherited 26 runners allowing eight of them to score (30% IRA%). Reyes's numbers from his 2006 season when he posted a 0.89 era (2.92 fip) have changed in the past two seasons. In that season, Reyes essentially threw two pitches, a fastball (58%, 90.1 mph) and a slider (35%, 84.8 mph). This not only rendered left-handed hitters grossly ineffective (.148/.219/.205) but also the right-handed counterparts (.244/.299/.344) those two pitches helped Reyes get groundballs on nearly 73% of balls in play. This season, Reyes has been the same two pitch pitcher but has increased the amount of use of his slider from the 35% in 2006 to 47% of the time in 2008. Although left-handed opponents are still finding Reyes difficult to solve (.200/.250/.289) but right-handed hitters are crushing him (.385/.467/.538). In 2006, Reyes used the fastball exclusively against the right-handers (66% of the time). This season, right-handers are getting far fewer fastballs (43%) and are evidently hitting the off-speed offerings more. The 2008 version of Reyes isn't nearly as satisfying as the 2006 edition. "He's got more stuff that I don't know about. He changes arm angles, maybe spins it a little more, things like that. He's using a split-finger as a changeup a little bit this year," pitching coach Rick Anderson said. "He sees the same guys, so he's always adding things."

Crain is the question mark. His fastball, one that was reaching 94.3 on average prior to the surgery, is still effective at 93.7. The curveball, when thrown (only 12% of his total), has a big break with a decent change in speed (77 mph) to keep hitters off-balance. Though his month of May was littered with walks (12.3% bb%), his month of June so far has seen a much more controlled Crain (7.6% bb%). In 2006 the Twins assumed that Crain was going to be a solid sixth/seventh inning set-up man interchangeable with the fading Juan Rincon but after last year's shoulder surgery it was a mystery as to what Crain would be able to provide. The Twins management obvious have confidence in him. When asked his preference to replace the injured Neshek Ron Gardenhire said "I think Crain is my first choice. We'll go with match-ups, where we're at and what guys have done against other teams. I think we'll go Crain and Matt Guerrier, and then we'll probably use [left-hander Dennys] Reyes to get some of those lefties out in those innings. I think that with his stuff, he can absolutely handle it. Using that breaking ball like you saw last night -- that curveball, that back-door breaking ball -- his fastball is good enough, obviously. He's throwing it well."

Notebook Dump (6.11.08)

Game: Indians 1, Twinks 0

Box Score

Record: 31-34, 2^nd, 6.5 back

Streak: Lost six

* Two days after I highlighted the fact that the Twins had been their own worst enemies on the basepaths, Carlos Gomez and Matt Macri made two fatal base-running gaffs. Macri was caught stealing in a pick-off by Sabathia after leading off the third with a bunt single thus thwarting any attempt at the rally. However, Gomez's fubar was possible more of a problem for the Twins considering the implications of Gomez on base without any outs. In the first, Gomez singled on a grounder through the third base/shortstop hole and Alexi Casilla followed that with a perfectly executed bunt single past the girthy CC Sabathia and slow-footed Ryan Garko at first. According to BillJamesOnline.net, Gomez is currently ninth in the majors with 66 runs scored when leading off the inning. When he reaches base leading off an inning, the Twins score approximately 1.69 runs that inning.

With the two speedsters on base with no outs, the Twins seemed to be guaranteed at least that amount. Another reason to anticipate runs was that Joe Mauer has been just as effective against left-handed pitchers as he had against the right. For the season, Mauer has been hitting .364/.394/.485 against lefties in 71 plate appearances. Sabathia, meanwhile, has been hit fairly well by his left-handed batting counterparts, being hit at a .255/.305/.459 clip. Mauer took three pitches, leading to a 1-2 count and sized up the fourth (a 93.7 mph fastball) that was thrown low and on the outer-half of the plate. The ball projected off of Mauer’s bat on a line that was consistent with the positioning of Indians left fielder Ben Francisco. On FSN, Bert Blyleven began to rant about Joe has failed to “pull” that pitch to successfully advance the runners. Reviewing the swing on TiVo and judging from the pitch f/x data from GameDay, it would seem that there was nothing that Joe could have done with the pitch aside from a) letting it be called strike three, b) fouling it off or c) attempting to pull the ball that would have been a turned over for a grounder to second and a possible double-play ball. But, as sharply hit as it was, Mauer failed to move the runners up and in the process became the first of twenty-seven precious outs.

This brought up Justin Morneau. For his career, Morneau had been ineffective against Sabathia. In 46 plate appearances against the Cleveland hurler from Vallejo, California the Canadian masher had accumulated just six hits (2 of which were doubles) and produced a small .167/.279/.306 batting line. Sabathia approached Morneau the same way as he did Mauer. He busted him away with fastballs and sliders. On the 1-2 pitch, Sabathia released a 94 mph fastball that was a tad up in the zone and covered more plate than he would have liked. Morneau drove the pitch towards the left-center gap at Progressive Field. Replays would show Gomez dancing off second trying to visualize where the Morneau shot would land. Gomez’s instincts must have told him that the ball was destined for sod because after the momentary pause he was off like a blaze and had already rounded third when the ball came to rest in the fleet-footed Ben Francisco’s glove. The problem, of course, was the Gomez failed to recognize that even if he stood perfectly still at second, he still had enough speed to score had the ball found grass. In 12 opportunities this year to go from 2^nd to home, Gomez had done so 10 times. All he had to do was wait to see it bounce.

"He thought for sure it was in the gap and he put his head down," Gardenhire said. "But you've got to watch the ball. Obviously, he got too excited there. You have to slow the game down a bit. But it's a young man mistake."

"I saw the outfielders play deep, and I thought the ball is going down hard," Gomez said. "He hit it low, and ... I looked at the ball -- I didn't think [Francisco] had a chance."

Unfortunately for Gomez, that one run was the difference. After that inning, Sabathia cruised, shutting down the Twins for the duration of the game.

"They put the bat on the ball pretty good early and then they made a base-running mistake," said Sabathia, "From there, I tried to attack them. I didn't think about the score. I just wanted to keep it close, whatever that means, and give us a chance to win."

Stealer's Wheels (Offensive Edition)

In Dayn Perry's exploratory book "Winners: How Good Baseball Teams Become Great Ones", Perry attempts to quantify and explain what elements playoff teams in the modern era all shared in common. The chapters are divided into areas such as "the Slugger", "the Ace", "the Middle Reliever" and so on. In chapter six Perry tackles the value of having a base stealer on the roster. Baseball researchers dating back to George Lindsey to Pete Palmer to John Thorn have applied the run value of the stolen base and also the runs lost when a would-be stealer is thrown out. At Tangotiger.net, the researchers there have updated the formula and released their findings that a stolen base results in 0.185 runs. Conversely, being caught stealing costs the team 0.46 runs as the out recorded is much worse than the added base. In order to reap dividends, a player or team needs to have a success rate of greater than 72% in order to have a gain in runs, anything less than 72% is detrimental to a team. Likewise, a catcher (and the pitching staff as well) needs to be successful 29% of the time in throwing runners out to avoid having opponents score additional runs.

Based on that model, Perry identified the top ten all-time teams based on their net runs via stolen bases. The 1985 St Louis Cardinals, who had Vince Coleman (110), Willie McGee (56), Andy Van Slyke (34), Ozzie Smith (31) and Tommy Herr (31) had what is regarded as one of the speediest teams on the basepaths. Thanks to the quick astroturf at the old Busch Stadium, the Cardinals were able to swipe 314 bases and being caught just 96 times leading to 17.8 net runs. The 1985 Cardinals finished 101-61, just three games ahead of the New York Mets. Those 17.8 runs could have meant the difference of three games to the Cardinals resulting in clinching the NL East championship title. Oddly enough, the Cardinals who had used their speed to project themselves into the playoffs, only attempted to steal just five times in the seven game World Series against cross-state rival Kansas City. Royals catcher Jim Sundberg threw out two Cardinals as well. (During the regular season, Sandberg had thrown out 29.2% of potential base runners - a significant deduction from his 1984 season with the Texas Rangers when he threw out 50% of would-be stealers). The 2002 Minnesota Twins, on the other hand, were the second worst base-stealers ever. The team that led the organization back into the playoffs for the first time since 1991 were not particularly adept at pilfering the extra base. Torii Hunter led the team with 23 steals (8 times caught) while Cristian Guzman, Corey Koskie and Jacque Jones were all thrown out more times than they were successful. In total, the team stole 79 bases and were caught 62 times costing them 14.7 runs. Since the Twins won the Central by 13 games, the net loss was moot.

This is all relevant to the 2008 Twins because one of the team's biggest attributes, speed, has also been to this point, a hindrance. In 2007 during his short tenure with the New York Mets Carlos Gomez stole 12 bases in 15 attempts (an 80% success rate). This 90-foot gamble netted Gomez and the Mets an additional 0.84 runs. In the offseason when the Twins targeted the speedy outfielder there were optimistic estimates that Gomez could steal 50-75 bases as soon as this year - a threshold that hasn't been crossed since former Twins Chuck Knoblauch stole 62 bases in 1997. Those 62 bases were a Twins record (fourth best in the franchise dating back to Washington). Knoblauch, who would go on to steal 407 career bases (a 77% success rate), gave the Twins an additional 6.87 runs that season. To be sure, stealing 62 bases added just 7 runs. Through his first 57 games in 1997, Knoblauch had obtained 27 bases by means of thievery while being erased just twice (93% success rate). Gomez hasn't been nearly as fortunate. In his first 57 games over a decade later, Gomez has swiped just 17 bases and has been thrown out seven times (70% success rate). While Gomez still have over 100 games to steal 45 more bases, the rate of which he is being caught is alarming. Over the past 15 games, Gomez has been successful once in his five attempts. At times it doesn't appear that Gomez is analyzing his opportunity at all. Nevertheless, his 17 total bases stolen places him in the top ten of base stealers:

Player	Team	SB	CS	SB%
Ellsbury	BOS	28	3	90.3%
Suzuki	SEA	26	2	92.9%
Upton	TB	20	6	76.9%
Roberts	BAL	18	5	78.3%
Gomez	MIN	17	7	70.8%
Kinsler	TEX	17	0	100%
Crawford	TB	16	4	80.0%
Gathright	KC	16	2	88.9%
Sizemore	CLE	15	2	88.2%
Rios	TOR	14	4	77.8%

However, if we were to rank the players on the runs which the stolen bases/caught stealing led to we see a different picture all together:

Player	Team	SB	CS	SB%	Runs +/-
Suzuki	SEA	26	2	92.9%	3.9
Ellsbury	BOS	28	3	90.3%	3.8
Kinsler	TEX	17	0	100%	3.1
Gathright	KC	16	2	88.9%	2.1
Sizemore	CLE	15	2	88.2%	1.9
Crawford	TB	16	4	80.0%	1.2
Roberts	BAL	18	5	78.3%	1.0
Upton	TB	20	6	76.9%	0.9
Rios	TOR	14	4	88.2%	0.8
Gomez	MIN	17	7	70.8%	-0.1

Gomez, thanks to his league leading seven caught stealing, has actually costing the Twins (even the same fraction that it is) runs. When we look further into the numbers, is evident that the Dome's surface aids Gomez. Part of Gomez's problem is his inability to accept that he is not a good of a base stealer on grass as he is on turf. While playing at the Dome, Gomez had stole 11 bases in 13 attempts, a 84% success rate. On the road, Gomez has been successful only five times out of ten attempts, a 50% success rate. This is a stark contrast to the remainder of the team. At home the Twins have stolen 25 bases and have been caught 10 times (71% success rate). On the road, the Twins have 20 stolen bases and been caught stealing eight times (71% success rate). As a whole, the Twins are currently ranked fourth among the American League franchises with 45 stolen bases:

Team	SB	CS	SB%
TB	69	23	75%
BOS	58	12	82%
LAA	49	17	74%
MIN	45	18	71%
SEA	44	11	80%
BAL	43	20	68%
TOR	43	21	67%
KC	36	20	64%
CLE	33	10	76%
TEX	33	8	80%

Like the analysis above, the application of the stolen base formula shows a different picture. The efficient and sabermetrically influenced Boston Red Sox have used their speed at the appropriate times resulting in a 82% success rate. This basepath prowess has provided the Red Sox with 5.2 additional runs (a drop in the bucket considering their 332 runs scored). Seattle, which is having a hard time finding runs with an average of 4.03 per game (second lowest in the AL), has benefited from running at opportune moments adding 3.0 runs. Tampa Bay, who were originally topping the list with 69 stolen bases, have added runs (2.1) through the sheer volume of attempts, stealing at 75% success rate while running 92 times, but fell to fourth on the list. The Twins have dropped from fourth to seventh as their 71% stolen base rate has led to zero runs.

Team	SB	CS	SB%	Runs +/-
BOS	58	12	82%	5.2
SEA	44	11	80%	3.0
TEX	33	8	80%	2.4
TB	69	23	75%	2.1
CLE	33	10	76%	1.5
LAA	49	17	74%	1.3
MIN	45	18	71%	0.0
BAL	43	20	68%	-1.2
TOR	43	21	67%	-1.2
KC	36	20	64%	-2.5

As this bizarre American League Central season wears on, it is apparent that the Twins are going to need to retain every run that they could possibly obtain. Like the 1985 Cardinals who had overcome the powerful New York Mets by three games in the NL East, the Twins may be in a dogfight with the White Sox come fall. It is one thing to have the necessary components such as speed, but it is another thing to use it in a way that hurts the bottom-line. The White Sox, by the way, are debted -1.2 runs due to their basepath adventures. Limiting Gomez on the basepaths to unleash his speed more frequently at home rather than on the road would provide a positive net runs gained.