Most Improved Prospects (Increased Strike Out Rate Edition)

We have all witnessed the rising cost of major league ready pitching talent. We have beared witness to Carlos Silva being awarded a 4-year, $44-million dollar contract. Kyle Lohse, a marginal starter at best, has recently said he is relinquishing his previous Gil Meche-type contract demands, is still in a market that will pay him well above his talent level. The Twins are not able to play this game. The internal pipeline of pitching prospects must always be full in order for the team to remain financially competitive against those that can spend far, far too much for your Silvas and Lohses.

As a rough guide: 13-15% is good/questionable (as you will see is case with Waldrop below), 16-18% is solid, 19-21% is great and 22%+ is phenomenal. Now these numbers carry different weight at different levels. Having a 24% strike out rate for the GCL Twins is completely different from having the same for the Rochester Red Wings. For example, Ryan Mullins spent 2006 with Beloit and finished with a 20.4% strike out rate. The following year the Twins moved him through high-A to triple-A in a single seasons where his strike out rate flattened to 10.1% of total batters faced. Typically, strike out totals tend to equalize as pitchers ascend in the system and encounter more polished competition. Therefore you will witness strikeout rates leveling out or even decreasing. As is the case with Yohan Pino. In 2006, Yohan Pino had a 26.3% strike out rate while in the Midwest League. In the following season split between high-A Ft Myers and double-A New Britain, Pino's strike out rate dropped to 22%. 22% is extremely studly so it goes to show that no matter how strong the prospect is, there still can be incremental drops.

There will undoubtedly be inherent flaws when judging prospects by one piece of the puzzle. This, however, highlights some aspects of one very necessary component of reaching the major league level: making bats miss.

This is not a complete assessment of the organization's pitching talent. Because of the minimum 200 batters faced, Jeff Manship, the pitcher who led the Twins minor leagues in strikeouts in 2007 (136), is excluded from this study (for reference, he had a 22.5% strike out rate). Additionally, a prospect whose strike out rate stays consistent throughout the minor league development is still a solid prospect so long as the strike out rate is about 17% or better as they progress.

Between 2006 and 2007, the Twins have had several of their prospects make significant inward adjustments in their mastery of the strike zone:

5) Kyle Waldrop - 13.1% in 2006/13.6% in 2007 - increase of 0.5%

Yes, it is a small incremental change but a positive change, nonetheless, and made in a season where he split two levels: high-A to double-A. Waldrop was drafted by the Twins in the 1st round (25th overall) out of Farragut High School In Knoxville, Tennessee. The Twins gave him a million dollar signing bonus to stay away from college.

“[T]hat definitely made me open up my eyes a little bit bigger,” Waldrop told his former high school's newspaper in 2004. “If they’re going to invest that much money in you, they’re going to give you every shot to make the major leagues. Being that twenty-fifth pick, they’re not going to give up on you as easily as they might if you’re a (30th)-round pick they give $5,000 to.”

In his first professional season at 18, Waldrop spent time in the Gulf Coast League and Elizabethon where he went 5-2 in 11 starts with a 2.14 era in addition to 55 strike outs in 62 innings. At the end of 2004, Baseball America had him ranked as the 6th overall prospect in the organization. The Twins moved him up to Beloit in the Midwest League in 2005 and he faltered as a 19-year-old, finishing 6-11 with a high 4.98 era. In 2006, he regain his prospect form as indicated by a 9-5 record with a 3.77 era shared between Beloit and Ft Myers. It was at those two stops that Waldrop struck out 13.1% (87 k's) of his total batters faced. Last season, Waldrop started the season 7-5 at Ft Myers in a performance that earned him a promotion to double-A New Britain where he finished 3-6 in 11 starts. While pitching at two higher levels, Waldrop improved his strike out rate to 13.6% (90 k's). In this August 2007 video of Kyle pitching against the Brevard County Manatees (Brewers), you will notice that Waldrop has a fairly short stride for his 6'5" frame. Still, you can't argue against results: he struck out 3 Manatees and allowed only 4 hits and 1 run in 7 innings of work.

His stock has slide greatly in the organization, from at one point being the 6th overall prospect in the BA rankings to not even being a blip on the top 20 for Sickel's list. Even though his 10-11 record in 2007 doesn't look great, he has proven that he has good control (90 strike outs to 43 walks), and if in 2008 he keeps the ball in the park (7.0% HR/FB at double-A) the Twins will still have a million reasons to keep moving him up in the organization.

4)Anthony Swarzak - 21.4% in 2006/22.3% in 2007 - increase of 0.9%

This image is from unknown origins but I think you can get that general idea: Swarzak is one hell of a power pitcher. He shows good balance and torque as he drive the his front hip towards home plate and swings that back leg hard. If you need further evidence, here is a youtube clip of him from May 26th, 2007. The Twins' second round pick in 2004, Swarzak began in the GCL where he struck out 42 in 48 innings of work. Like Waldrop, Swarzak was also ranked in the top ten following the 2004 (as the Twins 7th overall prospect, one behind Kyle). He was then elevated in the next season to Beloit (where he was a Midwest League all-star) and then to Ft Myers where he compiled a 12-9 record with a 3.89 era and 156 strike outs in 150.1 innings of work (24.2% k%). 2006 was more of the same dominance of the Florida State League. Swarzak struck out 21.4% of batters faced and finished 11-7 while leading the league in strike outs (131). In early 2007, Swarzak was cited for drug use (non-PED if that matters) by the league and was suspended for 50-games. Losing those two months might have been costly for some prospects. Swarzak had a shakey start to his introduction to double-A New Britain where in April he opened up with an 11.11 era. In June he was sent back to Ft Myers to work out a few kinks, probably attributed to his suspension. He finished strong in the waning months of the season as he was recalled to the Eastern League and finished with a 22.3% strike out rate shared between New Britain and Ft Myers.

The debate rages regarding Swarzak: John Sickels calls Swarzak the number 2 prospect for the Twins moving into 2008 (now Waldrop doesn't even crack the top 20), locally, a Twinkie Town survey declared him the top prospect in the system ahead of Tyler Robertson. It is almost a guarantee that Swarzak will get a crack at the rotation in 2009 if he starts out strong in 2008.

3) Tyler Robertson - 25.2% in 2006/29.2% in 2007 - increase of 4%

Robertson is the 20-year-old left-hander that John Sickels anointed as the club's number 1 prospect, to some chagrin. Sickels went so far as to write a diatribe defending his choice. Allegedly, the source of this malcontent is "the mixed scouting reports. Baseball America says his fastball was just 87-90 last year. He threw 90-92 in high school. Midwest League observers I spoke with say he was anywhere in the 88-92 range last year, which makes the BA numbers sound a bit pessimistic; I guess our sources are a bit different. He has good breaking stuff and throws strikes. The main bugaboo for scouts is his delivery, which is stiff, looks funny, and gives rise to fear about injuries. He's smoothed it out a bit, but given that he repeats it well, is his injury risk really any higher than it is for any other pitcher his age? I'm not convinced of that."

In the Gulf Coast League, Robertson torched batters at a 25.2% rate. His era was high (4.25) but in context to his FIP (2.81) you can obviously see he was pitching much better than that indicated. If there were any doubters, Robertson moved up to low-A Beloit and improved his strike out rate to 29.2%. Any way you slice it, 123 strike outs in 102.1 innings in the Midwest League is fantastic (even better for a 19-year-old).

I tend to believe that the reason most analysts are leary of giving him the number 1 status (as evidence by the Twinkie Town poll) is that he hasn't played at a higher level. It is easier to hedge your bet on a pitcher that has ascended through the ranks, performed at an elite level and remained injury-free. So far, that is all that Robertson has done, to the extent of what has been asked of him. It is not his fault that the scouting director has not asked him to throw innings at New Britain yet. But that day may come as soon as 2008.

2) Brian Duensing - 13.5% in 2006/17.9% in 2007 - increase of 4.4%

This former Cornhusker drafted by the Twins in the third round in 2005 has been been a rising stock in the organization. John Sickels had elected to name Duensing as the 7th best prospect in the Twins organization after a 2007 in which he led the organization innings pitched (167) and wins (15 - tied with Jeff Manship). Baseball America named him the 18th best overall player in the Eastern League. A lefty that had undergone Tommy John his sophomore year at the University of Nebraska, performed well in his first season at Elizabethton finishing with 2.32 era and a 25.5% strike out rate. His 2006 campaign was all about mobility. He was pushed through the Midwest League, Florida State League and finally the Eastern League. When all was said and done, Duensing had a 5-10 record, a 3.51 era and a 1.30 whip. Unfortunately, his strike outs took a sharp decline. He was only able to induce 13.5% of batters faced to strike out (mostly because of a 14.2% k% while in his first stint at double-A).

Upon return to New Britain to begin 2007, Duensing increased his strike out rate to 18.4% (up from 14.2%) and limited walks to 3.2% of plate appearances. This improvement got Duensing raised to Rochester where he struggled somewhat at first, but completed August (20.5% k%) and September (26.9% k%) strong. His 15 victories with New Britain and Rochester was good enough for tops in the Twins minor league system.

He may pitch himself into the rotation come 2008.

1) Brian Bass - 11.6% in 2006/18.9% in 2007 - increase of 7.3%

Back in December, I wrote:

Brian Bass was resigned after the Twins initially granted him free agency. Drafted by the Royals out of high school in Alabama, Bass made his debut in rookie ball as an 18-year-old. As a Royals prospect, Bass spent the next three season bouncing between A and high. In 2004, the then 22-year-old Bass got 9 starts in Double-A Whicita. His performance left something to be desired: facing 180 batters, Bass walked more than he struckout. The Royals were still high on him despite his nagging injuries and frequent dead-arm spells. After splitting time between Double-A Whicita and Triple-A Omaha with mixed results, the Twins picked up Bass with the intention of using him in the bullpen. In 37 games last year, Bass made 10 starts for the Red Wings. Against 424 batters faced, Bass struck out 18.9% of them and walked only 5.2%, a sharp contrast from his days within the Royals organization when he had the weapons but lacked the control. Even more impressive was his ability to produce groundballs (57% GB rate). Bass made 9 starts for the Tigres de Aragua and continued where his Rochester season left off by walking 2 of the 92 batters he faced (2.2%) and striking out 16 of the 92 (17.2%). Of the balls put in play, 68% of them were on the ground. Rotoworld's analysis is that Bass could made a good swingman out of the Twins bullpen and judging from his 2007 numbers, that might be a good fit.

I believe you will see Bass returned to Rochester once the 2008 commences, however, his improvement - coupled with the Royals neglect of a solid pitching prospect - leads me to believe there is a major league appearance in the near future for Bass. It may come out of the bullpen, but it is something. At 26, Bass is getting a little long in the tooth to be considered a prospect.

The Johan Santana Deluge (links edition).

None of this matters yet and we really won't know whether this was a good move or a bad move until several years from now. The sentiment is pretty consistent across the entire media galaxy - mainstream or other - the Twins got swindled. This to me seems like a knee-jerk analysis when it comes to this transaction because one club just traded away the best pitcher on the planet (ibid) for four prospects that weren't on your average fan's radar. What's more is that the reactions on Wednesday would have still been the same had the Twins swapped for Ellsbury, Hughes or Martinez. The fact of the matter is everyone will question if you got enough in return for the best pitcher on the planet (ibid).

Did Bill Smith stall too long, blink too quickly and fold? Here's what the others are saying:

• Keith Law is lauding Mets GM Omar Minaya for holding on to his two best prospects, Fernando Martinez and Mike Pelfrey. Bill Smith, however, took a bit of a lashing:

In the abstract, it's hard to accept dealing your marquee player and top trading asset without getting your partner's top young player in return, and that's what the Twins did. They did get back significant economic value in four young players, each of whom has under one year of big-league service and two of whom aren't even on the Mets' 40-man roster yet, so the Twins will have each of them under control for six full years of service. That return in exchange for just one year of Santana's services is reasonable. But premium players should fetch premium prices, because there's value to a club in having so much production coming from a single roster spot. And in this case, Minnesota GM Bill Smith did not get a premium prospect in return.

• Joe Posnanski details the nature of uncertainty regarding prospects and the inability, even for industry insiders, to agree on whether or not these are solid prospects.

But I think there’s something else — baseball is a brutally hard game to predict. And I think this trade proves it. Here you have a major trade involving five players, all with some sort of professional track record, and the opinions about it (again, just from the people I know) are all over the map. I would say there’s a bigger consensus among fans (and I include myself here) — most of think this was a pretty sorry trade for the Twins; based on reports, they might have gotten Jacoby Ellsbury or Joba Chamberlain or some other bigger name prospect. Of course, you never know about reports.

But here’s the thing: If Gomez develops as some think he will — Moises Alou — then he alone could make this a winning trade for the Twins. Remember, they only had one year of Santana left. If on top of that they get some help from those arms, if Guerra turns into a Francisco Liriano, if Mulvey or Humber win 15 in the next couple of years, then it could be a Twins steal, a franchise-making move. I don’t think that’s going to happen, but what do I know? What does anyone know? That’s why it’s a great game. Albert Pujols was drafted in the 13th round. Nobody knows nothing.

• Jim Callis at Baseball America is completely befuddled. It would seem that when it comes to these trade parameters, the Twins obtained no prospect that is even flirting with certainty.

Minnesota might be better off if those talks collapse, giving new Twins GM Bill Smith a chance to find a better return for Santana. While he’s going to command possibly the richest contract ever given to a pitcher, Santana is the best pitcher in the game. And Smith didn’t get enough for him.

Guerra (No. 2), Gomez (No. 3), Mulvey (No. 4) and Humber (No. 7) all ranked prominently on our Mets Top 10 Prospects list. But there’s simply too much risk involved in this deal for Minnesota.

• The Hardball Times contributors weighed in on the deal. The consensus seems to be that the Mets are the victors. Bryan Tsao is places the blame square on Billy Smith's shoulders, however Chris Constancio defended the choice by saying that the package of prospects will indeed pan out in the Twins's favor:

Bryan Tsao: I don't think you can let Twins general manager Bill Smith off the hook here. While it seems the Yankees and Red Sox weren't willing to deliver an acceptable package at this late date, I suspect that the Yankees' interest—and by extension Boston's—waned when potential replacement options in center field (guys like Torii Hunter or Mike Cameron) and in the back end of the rotation started to go off the market.

In the abstract it makes sense for a high payroll team like the Yankees to concentrate as much value as possible into as few roster spots as possible (roster spots being more scarce than money), in practice they would have needed to replace the rumored major league talent heading to the Twins for the move to make sense. Smith should have known that the deeper it got into the offseason, the less a deal would make sense to the Yankees.

The window to close a deal was clearly earlier in the offseason, and while Smith did a good job of drumming up interest, he didn't close. Instead, he clearly overplayed his hand here and got burned. He deserves some credit for cutting his losses and taking the best package possible, but his tenure as GM is not off to a promising start.

Chris Constancio: I actually think Humber and Mulvey are "sure things". They both have moderate upside, but both also have major league stuff (low 90s fastballs and at least one above-average breaking pitch), solid control, and are nearly ready for the major leagues. I don't see why one or both couldn't evolve into a useful middle-of-rotation arm in another year or two.

Deolis Guerra and Carlos Gomez are each less of a sure thing, but both are very young and both have very good upside. Gomez was aggressively promoted to Triple-A in 2007, and the toolsy centerfielder held his own at the plate and improved his plate discipline until a hamate bone injury ended his season. There's plenty to like about his skillset, and in many ways he's similar to the much more hyped Jacoby Ellsbury in the Boston organization.

Guerra was the youngest player in full-season baseball in 2006, and he followed that up with a solid showing against much older competition in the Florida State League last year. He improved his control while increasing velocity on his fastball in 2007, and he probably is the Twins best prospect now. They could send the 18-year-old (he doesn't turn 19 in April) to Double-A this year, but they might keep him at Class A and just try to keep him healthy for a full season.

• Last December STATS, Inc did a WHIFF profile breakdown of Johan's three main pitches (fastball, change-up and slider). In 2007, Johan's change-up had a WHIFF rating of .399. In other words, when he threw his change-up, Johan made batters swing-and-miss nearly 40% of the time. The league average on this pitch was .277. My impression is that it wasn't so much the pitches themselves as it was the sequencing of them. There were reports last year that said he was relying more heavily on his fastball then he had in previous seasons.

  Santana's fastball averages 91.9mph, which is very good for a left-handed starter but only a 70th percentile MLB velocity. Yet, the fear of his changeup drips off his fastball WHIFF (.192), which ranks in the 87th percentile. Santana has a deceptive delivery as well, hiding the ball very well as he chicken-wings and shot-puts the ball to home plate. You don't see too many deliveries like Santana's. Besides short arm action, it's not exactly smooth or clean, but there's nothing problematic about his health or performance.

• The same WHIFF profile said that his fastball was .192 - still better than the league average of .142 - but certainly not the dominatingly unhittable pitch as his change-up is. There is an old adage in baseball that says a good change-up adds 5 mph to your fastball. In a way this is true. Santana is having his best games when he is locating his fastball early in the count then peppering the batter with the change-up. Simply having the change-up in his arsenal can wreck havoc on a hitter. Look at this clip of Johan whiffing Jim Thome. It would appear that Thome is trying too hard to keep his wait back in anticipation of that change-up. Instead of the 82.6 mph change-up, Johan feeds him a 91.9 mph letter-high fastball to which Thome reacts tardy.

• Voros McCracken has made note of something that really hasn't been discussed. Pundits like to say that the Twins have been good at analyzing and acquiring prospect talent in the past, only that was Terry Ryan's team and not Bill Smith's team. How do we feel about Smith's judgement to date?

  Now normally I’d give the Twins a ton of leeway when it comes to their evaluation of young talent, as their record the last decade has been impeccable (including a master stroke in trading for Santana in the first place). But those were Terry Ryan’s Twins, and as much as many of the same people are in place, it’s difficult for me to give full credit for the work done under Ryan to the new guy Bill Smith. I don’t despise this trade from the Twins point of view, but I sure don’t like it a lot. One problem is that the Mets system really doesn’t have anything spectacular in terms of prospects and so the Twins got more or less what there was to get. Compared to what the A’s got for Haren and Swisher, this looks pretty skimpy.

• Bob Klapisch breaks down the anatomy of the deal. Sickeningly, he describes a scene during the trade negotiations that had Bill Smith operating "in a panic" and on Monday called the Yankees and told them Hughes was "no longer a prerequisite". And it gets worse. Like the scene in Jerry Maguire where Tom Cruise realizes that he has been ousted by Bob Sugar.

Actually, it was a perfect storm of good fortune for the Mets. Not only did they exploit Smith's weakened bargaining position, but they benefited from the Yankees and Red Sox' synchronized caution. Talk about long shots. Who would've thought the AL East's two powerhouses would become so rational at the same time? Major league executives say Smith will rue the day he chose not to jump on the Yankees' offer of Hughes, Cabrera, Class AA right-hander Jeff Marquez and a prospect of their choosing. That was Dec. 2 and all Smith had to do was say yes.

Incredibly, he waffled. Within 24 hours, Pettitte told the Yankees he intended to pitch again in 2008, prompting the team to reconsider the deal for Santana. Suddenly, Hank Steinbrenner started listening to his brother Hal and Cashman, both of whom pleaded their case for financial restraint. Little by little, Hank Steinbrenner's craving for Santana diminished; the longer Smith held out, trying to leverage the Yankees and Red Sox against each other, the closer he came to dooming the best deal he could've made for Santana.

What Was Your Favorite Johan Santana Moment?

As we sit on the cusp of what seems imminent within the next 72 hours, I can finally take a moment to gather my collective thoughts when it comes parting with Santana. I have avoided making any sort of judgments on the rumored deals because future speculation is for tabloids. Months of speculation from mainstream sources and endless refreshes of MLBtraderumors.com or Gleeman's posts of endless rumors during the Winter Meetings left me numb. In a way, this announcement feels like a non-event that we had been preparing for since the end of the 2007 season.

Don't get me wrong, this is the correct business move. Demonize Pohlad if you must, but in the end he is simply running a business. The Twins live and die in the mid-market and he is operating within those parameters. There are no benevolent owners in this world, no execptions. Santana's price became large market following several Cy Young awards. So is the nature of baseball. Joe Posnanski summarized the emotions of being a fan in the mid-to-small markets eloquently in his blog recently. Those of us that monitor these transactions as a passion (read: people who have read Moneyball and idolize Billy Beane) have known for quite some time that this was bound to happen. It made all the financial sense in the world to trade Johan off when he was able to provide the Twins with prospective value. And it is only fitting that Santana takes the same course as Frank Viola did to replenish the farm system by the New York Mets. We said thank you to the Mets for 1991 and hopefully we will be thanking them for 2009 or sooner.

Still, I can't help but miss the idea of Johan. Watching Johan in his full opulence is amazing. I will miss his absolute mastery when it comes to setting batters up, leaving them swinging at the change-up in a manner so comically, it is usually reserved for whiffle ball games. I will miss referring to every fifth day as "San-terror" day - in homage to how he must have made the opposing lineup feel. I will miss the fact that we are no longer privy to hearing how futile Cleveland's shortstop Jhonny Paralta is against Johan (Paralta had struck out in 22 out of 28 at-bats against Santana leading to a .107/.167/.143 batting line). It is hard to replace him and the way he worked his opponents. Francisco Liriano is a raw version of that (better if you used FIP as a gauge), but he simply is no replacement.

Part of me wants him to fail his physical under the premise of fallen arches or because the doctor doesn't like the sound of that cough. Something to keep him here for one last season - to couple with Liriano as the deadliest left-handed combination since Hamilton and Burr - for one last, sick dominating run at the AL Central. Let all those other clubs load up offensively. Try and deal with Santana and Liriano in a series.

When the next generation of analysts reflect back upon the early 2000s, they will notice that a Rule 5 draft pick from Houston (via the Florida Marlins) not only became one of the best pitchers in the game but also helped breathe new life into a franchise that could have just as easily wound up in this nation's capital. When the Twins were flirting with contraction, Johan emerged as a superstar. A genuine superstar (not the pseudo-Marty Cordova "burn-myself-in-a-tanning-bed" who made an appearance on SNL type of star). People made the point of watching Johan Santana, whether it be on TV or live at the Dome.

• You could say it started on July 28th, 2002. Until that date, Santana had made 8 starts in 2002 after playing part-time starter/part-time reliever/part-time roster spot in 2001 and 2000. A month prior on June 28th, Santana finished with 9 strikeouts and had dueled another up-and-coming prospect, Milwaukee's Ben Sheets for 8 innings where following a wild pitch from Santana to Alex Ochoa to move Richie Sexson to third, then giving up a Ochoa singled to center to score Sexson on his lone run (a game score of 79). Fast forward to July 23rd, where Santana could only last 3.2 innings against the Chicago White Sox while giving up 8 earned runs. It would appear that Santana might never solidify a spot in the rotation. On July 28th, however, you could have announced the arrival once and for all of Johan Santana. He finished 8 innings of shut out ball against the Toronto Blue Jays, 4 to 0. Over that time, Santana surrendered two hits, walked three, while striking out 13. The Twins completed the season as the front-runners of the AL Central with a 94-67 record. During the playoff series against Oakland and Anaheim, Santana made several appearances in relief as the Twins opted to stick with Rick Reed in spite of not make it out of the 6th inning in either starts during the playoffs (foreshadowed by not making it past the 5th inning in his last two starts of the regular season).

• In 2003 the Twins returned him back to the bullpen to begin the season. Although he was making spot starts, Santana garnered national attention when he did not lose in 11 starts from August 3rd on. He finished 12-3 on the season but ended 8-0 in the last two months of the year. One of his best games pitched during that period was a no-decision for him in front of 30,000 fans at the Metrodome against Cleveland. On August 13th, 2003, Santana dueled a cadre of Indians pitchers 8 innings of scoreless ball where he only rendered 4 hits and struck out 8 (finishing with a game score of 81). After being replaced with Latroy Hawkins in the 9th, Juan Rincon failed him by giving up 3 straight singles in the 14th inning and gave way for JC Romero to blow the game. Attempting to carry his success into the playoff against PED-fueled Yankees, Johan pitched well in game 1 but was a no-decision as Latroy Hawkins won that game. Santana was the pitcher of record in the loss in the deciding game 4 after giving up 6 runs in the 5th inning.

• 2004 was the Year of the Cy for Santana. On July 6th entering a game at the Dome against the non-factor 29-52 Kansas City Royals, Johan Santana, at 6-5, dominated the lowly Royals for 9 innings, giving up no runs on 3 hits with 13 strike outs (finishing with the highest game score yet in his career: 91). The Twins won 4-0 thanks to future Los Angeles Angel Torii Hunter's 11th home run of the season in the 2nd inning. From July 21st to September 24th, Santana rattled off 12 straight victories and finished 20-6 with a 2.61 era. In that season, Santana finished with 10 or more strike outs in a game 12 times. Santana was able to produce a victory in game 1 of the ALDS at Yankee Stadium but was failed by his bullpen in game 4 where Nathan and Rincon were unable to hold a 5 to 1 lead. Kyle Lohse ultimately lost the game in the 11th. (Note to RHP Pitching Seeking GMs: Don't sign KYLE LOHSE for this reason).

• 2005 was a continuation of his 2004 season. Santana began 5-2 in his first 10 starts on his way to finishing the season 16-7. Of those 7 defeats, Santana was subjected to 4 games in which he lost by one run - additional offensive and Santana might have been 20-3. The Twins finished 83-79, only good enough for 3rd in the AL Central, and missed the playoffs for the first time since 2001. Santana was second in the Cy Young voting despite pitching better than winner Bartolo Colon when comparing era+ and quality. Santana finished with 155 era+ while Colon finished at 122 era+. Want more evidence? Colon finished with 157 strike outs in 222.7 innings (0.70 k per inning), Santana finished with 238 in 231 innings (1.03 k's per inning). Instead of the peripheral numbers, the voters saw 5 more victories in Colon's favor for a team that ultimately had ten more victories.

• A changing of the guard happened in Minnesota in 2006. Long-time opening date starter Brad Radke finally gave way to the new staff ace Johan Santana after Radke had initiated the summer the previous five years. Most had already given Santana the ace title after his Cy Young award in 2004 but this was still ceremonious in many ways. Making his predecessor proud, Santana lost his first opening day start against Toronto at the Rogers Centre, then he subsequently drop his next three starts. Through May 28th, Santana was 4-4 but had thrown several good games and had struck out more than 10 in his four prior starts. Santana was accountable for 19.7% of the wins as the Twins finished 96-66 in what was considered an improbable year though he suffered a 3-2 defeat in his only playoff start agaist the Oakland A's. His 19-6 record coupled with a 2.77 era and 245 strike outs in 233 innings (1.05 k's per inning) led to his 2nd Cy Young award.

• Santana, like the Twins, was burdened a lot by unnecessary losses in the 2007 season. His 15-13 record does not reflect the 3 games he lost by 1 run and the 7 decisions he lost by 2 runs. A lot could be said about the 2007 team if they had offense at the right times. Santana was yet another victim of these run deficient circumstances. On Sunday, August 19th, completed what could be the best start of his career to date. I will remember it through the words of John Gordon and Dan Gladden on KSTP as I was driving home from a cabin in Emily, MN but somehow when you hear those words "SWWWWIIIIIIG...and a miss" from Gordo, it ingrains itself into yours psyche better than your eyes can. On that day, Gordon and Gladden reported that event 17 times (the most in San-terror's career) against the Rangers. Johan contributed to 18.9% of the 79 victories the Twins had accrued.

After the season end amid speculation that Santana had pitched his last in Minnesota pin stripes, we collectively recoiled. Again, those of us who are familiar with the works knew that it was true - that Santana was destined for a grander stage that the 2.4 million of us in the Twin Cities could not provide - so we held hope against all odds that the Twins ownership would come through with an offer.

Here is the hard truth: you will miss Johan too. You will miss the fact that during every Twins losing streak you at least had Santana to count on to extinguish it. You will grow tired of the nights this summer when he leads off 'Baseball Tonight', with clips of him striking out countless Phillies, Marlins, Pirates or Braves. You will anger over how Joe Buck fawns over him when he is selected to start for the National League All-Star team and references that, at the break, he is leading the NL in wins and that the Mets "only" had to give up four prospects with his smug, private-schooled, judgmental voice. You will HATE the umpteenth time Ken Rosenthal refers to Pedro Martinez and Johan Santana as the greatest living 1-2 starters since Drysdale and Koufax. Most of all, you will hate to see the reception he gets his first appearance at Shea because you are already starting to forget that feeling of having the most dominating lefty when he was in your own backyard.

One Special LOOGY, Coming Up.

As the modern baseball roster keeps evolving, we find a greater role for specialists. Managers frequently deploy left-handed pitchers for as little as one pitch to (hopefully) dispatch some of the game's more fearsome left-handed batters. These LOOGYs, once a rarity among the bullpen staff whose origins date back to the Kansas City A's, are now commonplace. While most do not adhere to the strict definition - 1) More than 20 appearances, 2) less than 1.20 innings per appearance and 3)fewer than 20% saves per appearance - all bullpens have a player that flirts with this measurement. And now, much like the "Closer Boom" of the turn-of-the-century, LOOGYs are cashing in on the free agent market. Does this seem reasonable economically? After all, these players are typically throwing in 40 to 60 games per year and are asked to obtain one out - which is usually a very favorable match-up (lefty on lefty). Yet general managers are throwing more cash at these guys as if they are vital to winning when obviously the limited usage makes these players appear to be better.

Consider J.C. Romero.

As the Twins began to embark on a new tradition of winning, the franchise found themselves with a solid nucleus of talent in the bullpen. In 2002, as a 26-year-old, Romero finished the season that brought the Twins back to the playoffs for the first time since 1991 with a 9-2 record and a extremely low 1.89 era (era+ 236). He averaged just 1 inning per appearance. In the next seasons Romero averaged 1.15, 0.99 and finally 1.15 innings per appearance between 2003 and 2005. Before 2005 started the Twins signed him to an ambitious 2-year/$3.7 million dollar contract (with a $2.75 option year). Pointing to both his erratic tendencies on the mound and thought to provide general clubhouse malaise, the Twins unloaded him to the Los Angeles Angels for Alexi Casilla. Once in the AL West, the Angels called upon him to throw more innings. His average went from 1.15 in 2005 to 1.31 in 2006 - a small change yet large enough to expose various susceptibility on the mound. His era rose from 3.47 to 6.70. The Angels declined his option year.

Theo Epstein and his cauldron of stat nerds in Boston recognized the value in having a LOOGY on staff and that using him in a certain capacity (say, averaging under 1.2 innings an appearance) they projected he could thrive. He was signed to a 1-year/$1.6 million dollar contract. Whether it was playing at Fenway with the looming Monster (7% hr/fb) or simply not finding his control (16.0% bb%), Romero compiled a 3.15 era (much better than his California stint) in 1.15 innings and still received his walking papers.

In the thick of a NL East pennant race, Pat Gillick and the Philadelphia Phillies took a flyer out on Romero and picked him up for a minor league contract. In the second half of the season, Romero dominated the left-handed batters and finished with a 1.24 era...while averaging 1.4 (!) innings per appearance. In the everlasting, infinite wisdom of the Phillies front office, they signed him to a large 3-year, $12-million dollar contract. As I had stated before, luck played a significant part in his second-half performance (.173 babip) and in no way did he "earn" a $12-million dollar contract. In total, Romero averaged 1.3 innings per appearance in 2007.

Cleveland touts a 25-year-old lefty Rafael Perez who has been deemed one of the better relief pitchers in the game after finishing 2007 with a 1.78 era while tossing less than an inning an appearance (0.78). Are these accolades thrown around due to his performance in what is essentially a bubble? In the next several seasons, if he is managed the same on the field and facing a diet of left-handed batters, his value will undoubtedly rise. Which is what happens when in your first full season Peter Gammons says that you "arguably the best left-handed reliever on the planet." After two more seasons, Mark Shapiro should trade him while his stock is high. Admittedly, Perez displays better stuff and could find himself working in different parameters but will not likely have the same success. There are plenty of gullible GMs looking to part with some prospects for a good LOOGY.

Another Twins example is Dennys Reyes. He's not a prototypical LOOGY, since over the course of the previous two seasons, Reyes made 121 appearances and accumulated 80 innings and, on average, the Twins used Reyes for approximately 1.5 innings per deployment. So he doesn't conform to the definition however, if Hafner, Thome or Ortiz were expected to have an at-bat in the 6th, 7th or 8th, you knew Dennys Reyes would be down in the bullpen. And the majority of the time you would want him in the game against those guys.

(Aside: I often wonder why he isn't on the DL more for neck problems because his jowls must weigh 80 lbs. Seriously. It looks like he is taking the mound with two medicine balls stuffed on either side of his cheeks. I don't know what gets closer to the ground: Neshek's knuckles or Reyes's face...)

In 2006 he made 66 appearances, finishing with a 0.89 era, and even though he proved effective enough to withstand both sides of the plate as he rendered bats useless with a .197/.259/.275 Gardenhire still only allowed him to average 1.3 innings per appearance slightly outside of the LOOGY definition. He contributed 9 win shares to the team for a bargain one-year/$550,000. The Twins resigned him to a 2-year/$2-million dollar contact.

My initial reaction what that the Twins had lightning strike with Reyes, it wouldn't likely strike twice or three times more, then again a million a season is practically chump-change in the relief market. 2007 may have had been more like 2006 for Reyes had our starting pitching been able to go deeper into games (Ponson and Ortiz struggled mightily early) and the bullpen hda key breakdowns such as injuries to Jesse Crain and finally Reyes himself who couldn't avoid the DL. That, in addition to his 2006 success, probably caused his usage to increase to 1.7 innings per appearance. Being exposed more to unfavorable match-ups led to Reyes being knocked around some. His era went up (mostly because at 0.89 up is about all it can go) and his location began to suffer (his walk rate climbed from 7.7% to 15.1%).

As pitchers and catcher prepare to report for camp, Reyes's role has not be defined. Rumors from the East Side Fishwrap indicated that the Twins had made an offer to Jeremy Affeldt for $1.5 million. One particular reason was that the lack of left-handed depth was noticable when Reyes was on the DL. Affeldt himself found success in that same role for the Colorado Rockies in 2007 as he finished with 3.51 era, no saves in 75 games and average 1.21 innings per appearance. Instead of signing with the Twins for a $250,000 raise, Affeldt took $3 million for one season with the Cinncinati Reds. As was the case with Reyes, I believe Affeldt will also be inflicted by the Reds with the burden on additional work based upon his successful 2007 campaign. Which is why if Reyes has a successful first half in 2008, Bill Smith should consider trading him to a team willing to relinquish a prospect or two. It is a seller's market for LOOGYs.

What can be determined out of this? Naturally, throwing less innings supplies a better chance of a serious implosion if you have one bad inning, however, if the match-ups are skewed towards the pitcher (lefty-on-lefty), the advantage goes to the hurler. One thing is for sure is that cheap retreads (Reyes, Affeldt) and minor league prospects (Perez) can thrive in this role if managed carefully.

Desparately Seeking Relief.

The recent signing by the White Sox of 34-year-old Octavio Dotel to a multi-year, $11-million dollar contract highlights once again an important facet that has allowed the Twins to remain a successful franchise in spite of the non-profit-like budget: Internal Relief Development. Because of Internal Relief Development, or I.R.D., the Twins have not had to invest valuable payroll towards what has become one of the most costly (and volatile) acquisitions on the free agent market.

"Relievers are like the stock market — you just hope you can hit on one," Colorado Rockies general manager Dan O'Dowd told USA Today. "Bullpens are almost impossible to build. There is supply and demand, inconsistency of performance. You never know what you are going to get in a part of the roster that's increasingly important."

And O'Dowd did well assembling one of the better bullpens in 2007 considering he sunk nearly 23% of his payroll ($12.636 million) in Brian Fuentes (era+ 155), Latroy Hawkins (era+ 140), Jeremy Affeldt (era+ 137), Jorge Julio (era+ 122), Manuel Corpas (era+ 231), and Matt Herges (era+ 162). As the season ended, two free agents were looking to cash in on their recent success. In a maneuver that echoed his belief in the quote above, O'Dowd chose to let Hawkins (who has since signed a 1-year, $3.75 million dollar contract with the Yankees) and Affeldt (who recently inked a 1-year, $3 million dollar deal with the Reds) go unabated to the free agent market. What could be said about those two is that they greatly out-performed any estimates based on their previous seasons and O'Dowd knew this. And with the defense built at Coors, O'Dowd is betting that his I.R.D. graduates (like Ryan Speier and Corpas) will provide similar results and for the same asking price per year as Hawkins, sign Luis Vizcaino, a more consistent performer, for two years.

Bottom-line is that pitching is expensive, starting or relief, to purchase on the open market. USA Today reported that as of two weeks ago, teams have spent a combined $122 million on bullpen help gearing up for 2008. Unfortunately, as you will see, it would appear that these franchises have allocated more money for what are sure to be disaster relief efforts than FEMA during hurricane season.

Even with that wisdom that O'Dowd expound, organizations across the league have invested far too much in set-ups and LOOGYs who have become nearly as expensive as their closer brethren:

• The Royals signed 37-year-old lefty Ron Mahay to a two-year, $8-million dollar contract. Mahay is cashing in on a season where he limited left-handed batters to a .189/.248/.292 split while with Texas and Atlanta. However, the two previous seasons Mahay's left-handed opponents hit .240/.336/.458 in 2006 and .302/.338/.571 in 2005. What's more is that there is no substantiating evidence to suggest that Mahay turned a corner last year. When analyzed, it would appear that Mahay was the recipient of good defense and luck as his batted balls in play was near .270 (his groundball rate has ranged from 43% to 52%). In the previous three-seasons combined (2005-2007) lefties batted .234/.302/.419 against him. In comparison, during that same period, lefties hit .203/.283/.256 against Dennys Reyes. The difference is that while the Twins will owe Reyes $1-million dollars next year, the Royals owe Mahay $3-million more.

• The Phillies re-signed J.C. Romero to a 3-year, $12-million dollar contract because of his low 1.24 era in 36.4 innings of work. This statistical sampling is by no means large enough to valuate one's performance. Romero, as Twins fans will remember, had erratic tendencies and 2007 was no different. His walk rate was 16.8%, nearly double the league average of 9.0%, with Boston and Philadelphia. Romero is expected to set-up for Brad Lidge although his stats really indicate that he would thrive better as a LOOGY. In the previous three seasons, Romero has had a much better split against left-handed batters (.202/.309/.292) then the right-handed counterparts (.279/.400/.445). The Phillies will discover this in 2008 when his lower than average babip (.173) corrects itself.

• The Brewers signed righty Eric Gagne to a one-year, $10-million dollar contract. It could be that the Doug Melvin did some online shopping at Baseball-Reference once they lost Francisco Cordero to the Reds and acquired his number one comparison. This acquisition was made under the guise of Gagne being a closer, still, he has been far from the once reliable closer he once was after spending significant time in and out of operating rooms (elbow and back), not to forgot being mentioned in a certain Mitchell Report. Gagne didn't have a terrible year last seasons split between the Rangers and the Red Sox - his era was a hefty 6.75 in 18 innings with Boston and he struck out 24.7% of batters faced while issuing walks to 10.1% of them. He converted 16 of 20 save opportunities (80% success rate) and maintained a era that was 121 points better than the league average. That being said, Gagne is a big gamble. In the previous three seasons he has thrown only 67 innings and 52 of those came last year.

Avoiding this cost by promoting from within has benefited the Twins not only by saving money but also by not partaken in these types of acquisitions, the Twins have managed to steer clear of large sums of money dedicated to bullpen calamities. Granted, there are some blemishes within the Twins pen, notably Juan Rincon and the lack of left-handed depth. A team that is rich in pitching resources can take the opportunity to make small-risk signings in the free agent market (like Dennys Reyes) and then sign premium pitchers to long-term contracts (like Joe Nathan, Jesse Crain and hopefully soon Pat Neshek).