Tuesday, April 05, 2011

Yankees work Delmon Young away

Delmon Young had one of those spring training that makes on-lookers’ eyes pop. In 48 Grapefruit League at-bats, Young tagged three home runs and hit three most doubles for good measure. At his Star Tribune blog this spring, LaVelle Neal raved about the laser show Young was producing in the Florida sunshine:
“Looks like Young has decided to pull the ball more this year. He's stronger from the waist up and look very confident after a good season in 2010. He's a litte bit of a Albert Belle look to him this year. That means baseballs could be in trouble”
A substantial portion of Young’s success last year came from being able to pull the ball with more authority. In fact, he had a 260-point increase over his two previous seasons when hitting the ball to left field. Part of that power boost was due to his improvement on handling pitches inside:


Well-Hit Average (Swing-Inside)
2008
.084
2009
.099
2010
.124
League Average
.078
(via MyInsideEdge.com)

Of course, looking to pull the ball when it is not thrown inside is counterintuitive.

Presumably, the New York Yankees likely have a well-funded advanced scouting department and have watched Young this past season and in spring as he continues to turn on inside pitches with authority. Naturally, in their first game with a young pitcher on the mound in Ivan Nova, the Yankees’ game plan was designed to attack Young outside.

In their first encounter in the second inning, Nova stayed away from the big right-hander and got Young to chase a pitch above the zone and pop it up to Nick Swisher in right:



In their second match-up, Nova, down 3-1 in the count, was forced to go back in the zone but still got Young to weakly tap the ball towards third base. Unfortunately for the Yankee pitcher, Young’s swunt (swinging bunt) was hit a tad too so for Alex Rodriguez to field:



In their final meeting, with the Twins down by a run but threatening to collect after Justin Morneau led off the top of the sixth with a single, Young was in position to do some damage. Nova managed to slip a fastball inside that Young fouled off. Wisely, the next pitch was a changeup just outside of the zone. Young, perhaps intent on pulling the ball, turned over on the off-speed and bounced it to Derek Jeter to start the six-four-three twin killing:



Because of his success last season on pitches inside in addition to his spring display of power, opposing teams’ scouting departments will likely use his asset against him. As long as Young remains pull-happy, pitchers will continue to feed him pitches on the outer-half of the zone until he proves that he is able to rope that ball into the opposite field.

While I am specifically singling out Young for falling into this trap, up-and-down the lineup, the Twins were victims to trying to turn on all of Nova’s pitches away. For example, during his epic 10-pitch at-bat in the fourth inning with Jim Thome acting as the potential tying run on second base, instead of changing his approach after watching Nova nine other pitches in the same location, Jason Kubel pulled a fastball down-and-away to second base. Mauer turned over three of Nova’s offerings that were low and away. For someone like Mauer who is used to going with the pitch, this may be an indication that he still is not close to his midseason form.

With short porches to the corners, the Yankees will always have a natural tendency to pitch opponents away. For the Twins’ offense in the rest of this series, the key will be to focus less on the proximity of those walls and to simply go with the pitch. 


****

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Sunday, April 03, 2011

Jays aggressive approach put Twins in an early hole


Over the weekend, the Jays did something they were notorious for doing a season ago: They swung early and often.

Last season, the Blue Jays lineup swung at a reported 34% of first pitches, a rate that was significantly higher rate than the rest of baseball (26% MLB average). Toronto’s quick-strike policy proved to be offensively successful as they hit .313/.323/.557 with 49 home runs (19% of their total) on the first pitch of an at-bat. Because Minnesota’s pitching staff paced baseball with the most first-pitch strikes at 62% the Twins’ style of attack played directly to the strength of Toronto’s offensive methodology. Given these tendencies, it’s not surprising that the Jays averaged a whopping 6.5 runs per game and taking six of nine from the eventual AL Central champions.

One of the more successful pitchers in this area was the Twins’ Opening Day starter Carl Pavano. A year ago, Pavano was second in baseball to Cliff Lee in first-pitch strikes with 68% and tied for third with 90% of one of his first two pitches to a hitter becoming a strike. Due to their propensity to get up to the plate swinging, the Jays owned Pavano in their three match-ups last year, smacking him for 14 extra base hits including five home runs while going 27-for-76 (.355). And of course, many of those hits came on Pavano’s initial offering.

For Pavano and the Jays lineup, the 2011 season started very much like it left off between the two entities last fall. More than half of the Jays at-bats finished within the first two pitches – mostly to their advantage. Toronto went 5-for-10 (.500) with two home runs and a double on Pavano’s first two offerings, accounting for seven of their runs.

The following afternoon, the Twins sent Francisco Liriano to the hill. Liriano, not necessarily known for his marksmanship, actually fared well last year in achieving strike one 62% of the time. Unlike Pavano the night before who lived in the strike zone, Liriano struggled to get his first-pitch over the plate. He threw in the zone 11 times in his 22 match-ups (50%). Ultimately, Liriano leaned too heavily on his fastball to start the count - throwing it 16 times on the first-pitch – and the Jays hit two of those out of the park while knocking a triple another time. Because the Jays waited out Liriano and forced him into throwing his fastball, a reduced velocity fastball at that, they were able to get good pitches to swing at.

Meanwhile on Sunday, Nick Blackburn managed to navigate through the free-swinging lineup without allowing a hit in his first-pitch. Blackburn regularly mixed in his curveball and changeup – throwing it 11 times to start the count - keeping his opponents from honing in on his fastball. This method of pitching backwards proved extremely fruitful for Blackburn. In fact, the Jays were able to put just three of Blackburn’s initial offerings into play – all of which were converted into outs. Because of his ability to keep the Jays hitters at bay through five innings, the Twins were able to conjure up enough offense of their own to gain their first victory of the season.

Pavano thrives against teams who try to remain patient and work the count. His ability to pound the zone to get ahead in the count allows him to mix up his pitches more frequently. Unfortunately, this strategy has shown it does not work against aggressive lineups like the Blue Jays who take aim on early strikes. While possibly slowed from not pitching winter ball this off-season (or potentially even the early signs of an injury considering his decreased velocity), Liriano was cornered into throwing his fastball far too frequently early in the count. Blackburn, on the other hand, cycled through his cache of pitches while keeping the ball down in the zone. When the Twins square off against the Jays again in May, the pitching staff should replicate Blackburn’s game plan.  

Friday, April 01, 2011

Gardy will split time with his closers


On the eve of the Twins’ opener in Canada, manager Ron Gardenhire resolved perhaps the biggest indecision of spring camp with his announcement that he will split time between Joe Nathan and Matt Capps in the closer role.
“We know our closer situation and how we’re going to handle that. We’ve talked to Joe and Capper about it. We know Joe can’t go three, four or five days in a row, or maybe even two, so we’ll protect him early. We have two pretty good ones.”
Even though he made significant strides in his first time back on the mound competitively, Nathan still was struggling with his slider and the fastball did not have the same pop as it did two years ago. Reaching this verdict to split time was likely even easier when comparing the two relievers’ spring results. While Capps finished the spring throwing 10 innings while whiffing nine and not allowing a walk, Nathan rarely missed bats as he walked four and striking out just three in his eight innings of work.
After a particularly rough outing against the Phillies in Florida, Nathan noted that his slider was not responding the way he wanted it to:
"I'm just fine-tuning my slider, which is a big pitch. It's one of those pitches that seems to come later in the spring for me. So it's something I'll have to touch up and stay on top of, because it's a big pitch for me."
Just how big of a pitch was Nathan’s slider when he was healthy?
According to Inside Edge's data, from 2007 to 2009, opponents managed to hit just .163/.205/.234 (AVG/OBP/SLG) off of his slider. Twins infielders would regularly get a quick breeze in their directions as opponents swung-and-missed a whopping 40.8 percent of the time when taking a cut. For Nathan, his slider was his go-to out-pitch racking up 122 of his 242 strikeouts on it. When hitters did make contact, the slider was typically kept on the ground – a stark contrast to his fastball which they tended to elevate.
Speaking of the fastball, as important as the slider is to his dominance, there is the growing concern that he has not yet regained the velocity necessary in order to set up the slider effectively.
After a month of being reminded constantly not to fret over his fastball’s velocity – that he ramps up towards the end of spring training - Nathan took the mound in Atlanta for the exhibition game on Wednesday for his final showing before the regular season. Deep in the dirty south, he was still chucking unleaded gas. Unlike his previous outings in the Grapefruit League, Turner Field provides us with access to his stuff through the pitch f/x system and allows for a strikingly accurate velocity reading.
The pitch f/x cameras registered Nathan’s fastball as reaching 90 miles an hour at its maximum speed, nearly four miles an hour slower than his seasonal average in ’09. In comparison to his first appearances in ’08 and ’09, Nathan’s fastball pales:
Joe Nathan’s early season velocity
 
Velocity (avg)
Velocity (max)
Time to Plate (sec)
2008 (3.31.08 vs LAA)
95.5
96.5
0.406
2009 (4.8.09 vs SEA)
93.3
95.0
0.404
2011 (3.29.11 vs ATL)
89.7
90.4
0.420
via BrooksBaseball.net
Is this something to be concerned over?
Over at Baseball Prospectus, Mike Fast’s research shows that most pitchers’ velocity has quite the bell-curve throughout the duration of the season. Many start at a lower level then peak as the temperature warms up before descending again in the fall. Like most of his hurling brethren, Nathan shares this trait. Dating back to 2005, Fangraphs.com data says Nathan enters the season’s opening month tossing up 94.4 mile per hour cheddar at hitters. This too has increased as the season progressed. So it’s entirely possible that he will ramp up his heat as the 2011 season ages but even still, a four mile per hour decrease is hard to recover over seven months.
Likewise, it should be emphasized that for most Tommy John veterans velocity does not levy nearly the same amount of focus as their control does. After all, an 87 miles per hour fastball can be just as effective as a 96 mile per hour one if spotted correctly. For the most part, the issue is that the elbow is an instrument of command (whereas the shoulder is the driving force) so as pitchers re-acclimate themselves to their newly repaired elbow it’s often the control that is the last facet of pitching to return. So if the velocity does not make an immediate return and pitches are left up in the zone, they have a nasty habit of getting lost in the bleachers.
In Nathan's case, hetypically liked locating his fastball up in the zone on hitters. With his hard velocity, it was often difficult for opponents to catch up to the pitch. Below are heat maps of Nathan's fastball found at Fangraphs.com. As you can see, against left-handers, Nathan typically spotted his fastball up-and-away. For righties, Nathan went middle-up:
 
This fastball location was particularly effective considering Nathan supplemented this with a slider thrown low in the zone. This combination would give hitters a large swath of the zone to patrol. However, at his current velocity levels, Nathan might experience more damage if he continues to throw his fastball at those areas. According to John Walsh's research at the Hardball Times, pitchers with velocity in the 88-to-91 mile per hour range gave up far more runs on pitches up in the zone versus those in the same speed range who kept the ball down. So if Nathan in unable to increase his velocity during the regular season when his adreneline is flowing, he will need to keep the pitch down in the zone.
Furthermore, consideration must be paid to the fact that Nathan is returning from a major surgical procedure and attempting to do so just 12 months after his date with the knife. When closer Billy Wagner returned to action just 11 months after his Tommy John surgery,multiple major-league sources warned him that the medical risk persists for a pitcher until he is at least 14 months removed from the procedure. For Nathan, that 14-month milestone comes at the end of May. To make matters worse, he will be asked to pitch in Minnesota when the chilly spring weather takes a toll on healthy arms, so it shouldn’t surprise anyone to see Nathan’s recovering elbow experience a setback or hear reports of tightness after some outings.
Given his early returns, the troubles finding his slider and the disconcerting drop in velocity on his fastball, it is not unreasonable to expect Nathan to encounter some rough outings in the early going. That said, the decision to split the end of the game between Nathan and Capps is a sound one. Not only does it give Nathan the time to refine his pitches both in game and in bullpen, it also gives him the necessary time between outings to recoup - especially when the elements are less than favorable in the spring. Regardless of whom Gardenhire ultimately selects to achieve the overhyped statistic of the save, having Nathan healthy and available throughout the season should improve the bullpen, even if he does not regain his pre-injury form. 

Sunday, March 27, 2011

Mechanical flaw responsible for Span's 2010 offensive woes?


There have been a lot of theories thrown around this off-season attempting to identify the reasons behind Denard Span’s 2010 regression:

He’s been hitting with two-strikes more frequently.

The transition to natural grass from turf has shaved points off his batting average.

He played too much and needed more rest.

While all of those were factors to some extent, more tangibly, Twins Hitting Coach Joe Vavra recently acknowledged a slight flaw in his mechanics last year that he believed contributed to his offensive woes.

In conversations with Vavra on the subject of Span, 1500ESPN’s Phil Mackey wrote that Vavra attributed the increase in grounders on the center fielder not keeping his head as still as he had in previous season:
"A little bit of a mechanical thing. He was raising up off the ball when the ball was coming in. Usually the head's really still, and with him he was raising up a little bit. So when he went to swing it, he wasn't seeing actually what he saw out of the (pitcher's) hand. He was kind of creating a little different up and down trajectory, or plane of the ball. So he was either on top of it or underneath it, but he wasn't squaring up as much as he had been. It was just hard for him to get rid of. He's much better now."
Reviewing video footage of Span’s swing dating back to 2008, there is ample visual evidence of additional bouncing this season. Comparative to his two prior years, Span’s 2010 mechanics demonstrate a wellspring of pre-swing movement:





Whereas in his first two seasons with the Twins Span remained relatively still prior to moving his front foot forward, he has since implemented a bit of a squat. What you will also notice is that Span’s top half loads up more, pulling his front shoulder inward towards the plate as he brings the bat back. Either of these variations could be causing his eye level to change planes as Vavra mentioned. And because of that, it would make complete sense that he would be striking the top half or lower half of the ball more frequently.

Clearly, the pre-swing movement needed to be ironed out and toned down if Span hopes to get back on track as one of the game’s best lead-off hitters and, judging from Vavra’s comments, it sounds like that was a big focus this spring. Yet, I’m not entirely convinced that the bouncing is the only influential factor for his regression.

Last May, after Span trudged into the first two months of the season with an absurdly high groundball rate, I noticed that he was positioning his hands slightly different than he had in the past. Because of Vavra’s comments, I went back to explore some of the footage.

As you can see from the side view, Span’s starting point with his hands has shifted noticeably since his rookie season:


In 2008, Span kept his hands fairly low, well below his front shoulder level while leaving his bat almost perpendicular to the ground. The following year, Span transitioned to holding the bat higher with his bottom hand parallel to his front shoulder. Additionally, he cocked the bat slightly at an angle towards his head. Meanwhile, this past season, while maintaining a similar level, Span wound the bat even further behind his head.


I’m not going to pretend to be Joe Vavra and say I know why Span made the adjustments. This progression could have been designed in order for Span to generate more power in the hopes of creating a whip effect in this swing. Likewise, the alteration may have been added to improve his zone coverage as raising his hands also gives him the ability to handle pitches up in the zone better. Then again, it could be that Span simply felt more comfortable at the plate that way.

Regardless of why, it makes me wonder if it increases the amount of time from the start of his swing to the point of contact. As he wraps the bat further back, the distance the bat needs to travel grows. Even if it elongates his swing a fraction of a fraction of a second, there are still ramifications. In addition to playing a role in his grounders, the shift may also play a part in his decrease in productivity on fastballs:

Denard Span’s production and power versus fastballs

Runs Above Average
Slugging Pct
2008
12.4
.467
2009
6.7
.377
2010
-9.5
.348
*via Fangraphs.com & MyInsideEdge.com

In 2008, his first season with the Twins, Span blasted away on heaters. In 280 plate appearances that ended on fastballs that season, the lefty hit .313/.425/.467. The following year, with almost double the amount of plate appearances, Span hit .303/.390/.377, a sizeable drop in power for sure. Certainly, the jump in sample size could have an effect on the overall numbers but in 2010, the returns on fastballs dropped once again for Span as he hit .272/.356/.348.
Could drawing his bat back further each year have led to this decrease?

I’m not trying to make any definitive connections, rather I’m simply suggesting where there is smoke, there’s fire. Because Span has experienced incremental decline in his power numbers the past two seasons – particularly against fastballs – one has to wonder if the slightly longer swing is, at the very least, partially responsible as well. To me, while Vavra is untangling one aspect of his swing in Florida, it appears that there is another element of his mechanics that may need some addressing too.

As the catalyst at the top of the order, the Twins need Span to get on base regularly throughout the season one way or another. Even though he has shown he is quite capable of doing so through the virtues of a walk, Span is also a high-contact hitter and requires a considerable amount of those to be turned into hits to buoy his elite on-base percentage. While the baseball gods may help elevate his depressed BABIP next season, refining his mechanics could go a long ways to ensure he doesn’t need the assistance of the diamond deities to guide ground balls away from infielder’s gloves. 

Friday, March 25, 2011

Unlucky Liriano?


If you had tuned in to Fox Sports North on Wednesday night, you were treated to a supernova-like outing from left-hander Francisco Liriano. The Twins starter blew through the Baltimore Orioles’ lineup, racking up a remarkable nine strikeouts, but managed to only last three innings as he burned out bright and quick.

I realize that striking out this bunch of Orioles is about as easy as getting accepted to St. Cloud State. For instance, the Birds’ sixth hitter, Mark Reynolds, has struck out in almost 40% of his plate appearances dating back to 2008. Likewise, Derrek Lee and Adam Jones both have k-rates above 20% in that same period of time. Ditto for outfielder Nolan Reimold. Vlad Guerrero – while not much of a strikeout candidate – swings at everything not tied down. Mix in a weak hitting Cesaer Izturis and back-up catcher Craig Tatum and Liriano’s ownership of this lineup, as impressive as nine outs all on strikeouts were, should not come at a complete surprise.

Had this been a game against a more historically patient team like the Yankees or Red Sox, Liriano may not have lasted even the full three innings. His fastball was constantly up in the zone and was frequently bailed out by his secondary offerings that hitters flailed at. His slider was solid while the velocity differential likely aided in keeping his changeup from being crunched as it routinely came in belt high. Nevertheless, because of the errant command, he continually found himself throwing four or more pitches per plate appearance, burning through more bullets than a Brian De Palma movie.

Not surprising, both the coaching staff and Liriano sounded less than satisfied by the gaudy strikeout totals. Said manager Ron Gardenhire on his 76-pitch performance:
"It was a little bit out there. But he got his work in and got to 70-plus pitches to build his arm strength up. But we were just hoping he'd get to five or six innings, not three. There were a lot of punchouts, but I'm sure Frankie was a little bit disappointed by the way he threw the ball tonight."
Liriano’s comments echoed his manager’s sentiments:
"I need to go deeper in the game and not try to strike everybody out. I wasn't really happy with how I pitched tonight."
There’s the rub for Liriano. In order to reduce the amount of strikeouts to lower his overall pitch count, he has to allow the hitters to put the ball in play more frequently. Of course, you will have to excuse him for not putting 100% of his faith in his defense to convert the out based on their track record in 2010.

Aside from Adam Jones’s at bat in the third inning in which he tried to put a hole in the sun with one of Liriano’s fastballs (not a bad location down-and-away), the Orioles managed to test the Twins defense just twice the rest of his outing. In the first inning, Jones fought off a pitch and gorked it on the other side of shortstop Alexi Casilla and in front of the suddenly beefy Delmon Young. One batter later, Guerrero bled another pitch through the infield between short and third.

Two weakly batted balls, two hits.

To me, this epitomized last year’s season for Liriano. Stop me if you’ve heard this before, but when it came to help from his defense, he was one of the most unlucky pitchers in the game. Aside from Tampa Bay’s James Shields, Liriano was the runner-up for recipient of the Least Fortunate Pitcher Award, posting the second-highest batting average on balls in play (BABIP). Essentially, despite wielding some dominating stuff – leading baseball in swinging strikes, posting below average line drive rates, walk rates and allowing just nine home runs – Liriano finished the year with having the second fewest amount of balls in play converted to outs behind him.

What it amounted to was a death by paper cuts. Death, in terms of his pitch count anyways.

Normally I come to the table bringing statistical analysis or other such evidence to back-up the majority of claims I make here. This time, I’m making a purely speculative statement. It seems to me that based upon my recollection of the hits Liriano’s allowed last year many of those were similar to Jones and Guerrero’s singles on Wednesday night. Again, nothing too dangerous: a simple bouncer past an outstretched infielder or a blooper that fell in front of a charging outfielder.

In the end, those of us that are sabermetrically inclined tend to attribute that to bad luck. But what if those results are more than just bad luck? What if there is a bigger root cause that we’re not able to measure at this point?

As we all know Liriano is a strikeout-oriented pitcher. Roughly a quarter of all of his match-ups have ended with the hitter grabbing some pine. I am certain his fielders are acutely aware of this fact too, possibly making them wonder just want they are doing out there and who is that cute girl three rows above the dugout? Perhaps lulled into a less attentive state by anticipating Liriano to single-handedly dismantle the opposing lineups, his fielders do not get the same jump as they would with someone like Nick Blackburn on the mound who they know a hitter is going to put a ball in to play (for better or worse). Suddenly, with Liriano on the mound, those borderline bouncers and dying quails are a step or two out of reach as the fielders are not nearly as vigilant as they otherwise would be with the high-contact pitchers out there.

Yes, you could try blowing this entire theory out of the water but simply invoking someone like the Tigers’ Justin Verlander. Verlander, who averages 4.03 pitches per plate appearance (more than Liriano), exhibits a lot of the same qualities as Liriano but managed to produce a significantly lower .283 BABIP. Why, you would then ask, would a pitcher who seems to labor more through each match-up receive better defense? To that point, I have no real answer. It could have something to do with the makeup of their respective rotations. Detroit’s brimming with pitchers who tend to amass large pitch counts whereas the Twins boast pitchers who own three of the four lowest pitches per plate appearances spots. Then I would add, stop being a jerk, I’m just sharing a theory.

Indeed, once the technology like FIELD f/x is finally released, we will have a better understanding if that is actually a factor. Through the FIELD f/x system, we will be able to say with some certainty that Shortstop X is able to get to more groundballs Y distance away when Pitchers 1 through 4 are on the mound but his range is reduced when Liriano is pitching. Until the day that we are able to quantify and measure it, this remains conjecture.

You can’t often get a zebra to change its stripes and Liriano has developed as a strikeout artist and remains one. That said he needs to attempt to make inroads towards lowering his pitch count in 2011. What I would like to see is a hybrid of the strikeout artist and one that can dial up a grounder on one pitch occasionally, if for no other reason, to keep his fielders on their toes. After all, strike outs a fascist and ground balls are democratic – or so the Crash Davis idiom goes.