Cross Him Off Then (Iwamura Edition).

The first of several second base options is now off the market.

 

The embers of Pittsburgh’s 2008-2009 fire sale were still smoldering when on Tuesday, a day before Game 6 of the World Series, Pirates GM Neal Huntington poured out the last of his Busch Light on the pile and acquired the 30-year-old Akinori Iwamura in a deal with the Tampa Bay Rays.

 

The 2009 season splintered for Iwamura when the Marlins’ Chris Coghlan barreled into his planted foot at second base, resulting in a left knee injury that required surgery to repair.  Prior to a dust-up at second base Iwamura was hitting a robust .310/.377/.406 with 14 extra base hits in 176 PA.   Upon his return to the lineup in late August, Iwamura hit just .250/.310/.355 with 5 extra base hits in his final 84 PA as a Ray.  His keen zone judgment (17.2 career out-of-zone swing percent) and line drive tendencies led to his use as the Rays’ leadoff hitter (that, and lack of other candidates) to which Iwamura produced a slightly below league average 733 OPS in his 1,203 PA in three years.

 

Much like the use of defensive stats in general, Iwamura’s value at second can be contested.

 

Fangraphs.com’s UZR system suggests that he was the 13^th best second baseman in ’08 while Dewan’s Plus/Minus system places him several points lower at 19^th.  Meanwhile, human analysis over at the Fans Scouting Report generously placed him as the 8^th-highest ranked second baseman.   In truth, he falls somewhere in between those rankings – still a feat for someone who was adjusting to a new position on the opposite end of the defensive spectrum from where an aging player should be shifted.   At his natural position, third base, Iwamura impressed fans enough in 2007 to rank him ahead of Joe Crede and Nick Punto, two players who scored much better according to UZR and Plus/Minus.  For the Twins, having a guy that has the versatility to transition between positions would have been beneficial, particularly when injuries and ineffectiveness takes their toll.

 

While Iwamura easily embodies one of the top three second baseman available this offseason, Pittsburgh’s involvement is a curiosity.  As a team that is all but shackled to the cellar of the NL Central, unable to procure a winning record since 1992, the Pirates ventured into a rebuild mode that has outlasted three general managers (Ted Simmons 1992-1993, Cam Bonifay 1994-2001 and Dave Littlefield 2002-2007) and has been handed over to Huntington who has gone nuclear with the club.  Admittedly, Huntington’s vision for the future of the organization is solid.  By building a strong scouting department and acquiring prospect talent to replenish the bone dry system, Huntington is focused on the sustainable longevity rather than the immediate results – a boondoggle of a mistake many GMs find themselves in when trying to make a quick turnaround of a franchise.   Instead of overpaying for marginal veterans on the free market or swapping for the quick-fix trade (a la the Royals); Huntington has turned his attention on the foundation.

 

Which is why I do not understand obtaining Iwamura if you are helming the Pirate ship.

 

Iwamura’s one-year contract worth $4.50 million provides Pittsburgh with a stop-gap function in the infield.  Suddenly, Iwamura will be accounting for 10 percent of the Pirates payroll. At best, his addition will provide the Pirates with approximately 2 victories, raising their record from the futile 62-wins to 64.  In addition to absorbing the added payroll (which isn’t necessarily a problem since they have been under $50 million since 2004), they shipped a young relief arm in Jesse Chavez.   The 25-year-old Chavez’s fires a solid 94-mph fastball that was tattooed on occasion (9 of 11 HRs allowed) and has two very good out-pitches in his slider (35.9 chase pct, .333 WHIFF Avg) and changeup (27.1 chase, .264 WHIFF Avg).  With a lively arm, getting him to mix his pitches better seems to be his only impediment from being a stalwart contribution to a bullpen.  Is this the best allocation of resources?  Sending a good, young arm and adding 10 percent to your total payroll for a one-year player?

 

On the other hand for the Twins, this move would have made sense.  Iwamura’s 2 wins would help advance the Twins from an 87-win team to an 89-win team, his line drive ability projects well and his zone discipline would fit in nicely among the free-swingers’ club.  However, when you examine it more closely, would Iwamura’s acquisition really make that big of a difference?  On the roster, the Twins currently have Nick Punto who shares a myriad of commonalities with Iwamura despite being a year-and-a-half Iwamura’s senior.  They both are due $4.5 million in 2010, they have a very low chase percentage (Iwamura’s 17.2 versus 19.1), high line drive rates (20.2 for Iwamura, 20.4 for Punto) and both supplied roughly 2 WAR.  Iwamura holds an advantage in the power department but Punto’s defense is far superior.  If the Twins were to have made this move, it would have come at the expense of a B-quality prospect and the upgrade would have been minor. 

Ignoring Iwamura does not mean that the Twins have to stand pat either.

If you follow along Offseason GM Handbook, you’ll note that we highlighted plenty of viable options at second base.  Nick Nelson noted that it is an area of depth, more so than any other infield position.  Nelson encouraged the acquisition of Placido Polanco which would be a far better maneuver that trading for Iwamura.  In addition to providing the intangible “veteran” that is often cited as missing in the Twins organization, Polanco has provided Detroit with 3 or more WAR since 2007.  Likewise, in my blueprint, I encouraged the acquisition of Rickie Weeks, a young second baseman who had developed into a top-of-the-order threat in Milwaukee before a wrist injury ended his season.  Weeks is poised to return to a 3+ WAR player who is just entering their prime, but would necessitate a trade.

With Iwamura’s quasi-marquee name off the list this offseason the Twins probably avoided a lateral move, paying for the security of Iwamura’s track record rather then the unknown of Punto.  Nevertheless there are better ways to improve this team. 

2009 Pitching Appraisal: Carl Pavano

  

C. Pavano (33 Starts)
FIP | MLB Rank	4.00*	40th*
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.330	+10.0%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	6.13	+27.1%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score 50 or Greater:	11-3	3-1
Game Score 49 or Lower:	3-9	2-1
Average Game Score Per Start:	47
Season High/Low:	85 (6/5)	3 (4/9)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	1
Game Scores 70-79:	1
Game Scores 60-69:	7
Game Scores Below 40:	9
Record of Opposing Batters:	.294/.329/.466 (795 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Miguel Tejada

*NOTE: FIP not xFIP

 

Back when the Twins first acquired Carl Pavano, I detailed why this move was actually much better than it looked on the surface.  Pavano was a victim of a bad defense and a high portion of balls falling in uncovered areas of the field.  At the same time, he demonstrated the ability to throw consistently in the zone and miss bats.  Still, his arrival was met with skepticism due to a hefty home run allowed (1.36 HR/9 comparative to the average of 1.05) and bloated ERA (5.37).    

 

After relocating to the 612, Pavano finished the year 5-4 with a 4.44 ERA and an improved 7.21 K/9 in 12 starts.  In spite of converting fewer batted balls into outs in Minnesota (a .668 DER versus .673 in Cleveland), Pavano managed to pitch better (3.50 FIP versus 4.28 FIP in Cleveland).

 

Pavano made strides to improve his efforts against right-handed hitters – an inexplicable split mystery.  After beginning the year in upper Ohio being splattered by same-sided opponents, allowing 13 of his 19 home runs along with an eye-popping .547 slugging percentage against to righties, Pavano avoided major damage with the Twins.  One of his biggest overall differences upon the migration was his increased use of his slider to righties: 

 

Vs RHB	Slider Pct	Slider WHIFF Avg	Overall K%	Overall Slugging Pct
Cleveland	17	.320	12.1	.547
Minnesota	30	.315	15.3	.432

 

Whether this was a self-imposed correction or something Rick Anderson picked up, Pavano’s final months against righties were drastically better than his first few.

 

At 33 years old, Pavano’s stuff was not exactly electric – he was bringing the fastball at a pedestrian 90.4 miles per hour – but he worked ahead of hitters (his 67.7 percent first pitch strike led all of baseball) which provided the luxury of turning to his nasty breaking stuff in his slider, curve and splitter (those three had a combined WHIFF average of .304).  In addition to the pitches with hard break action, Pavano also had an above-average change – one that he threw for a strike 75 percent of the time and had opposing hitters chase nearly half of those offerings out of the zone. 

 

He has pitched well enough to earn a well-deserved raise, the question for the Twins, is it one that will price him out of the running for the rotation in 2010?  With his history of injury, age and the crooked-looking ERA, Pavano may not get anything more than two-years in the range of $5-to-$9 million per depending on how the free agent market unfolds.

2009 Pitching Appraisal: Kevin Slowey

 

K. SLOWEY (16 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.46	DNQ
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.349	+16.3%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	5.69	+18.1%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score Greater Than 50:	8-0	0-1
Game Score Less Than 50:	2-3	0-2
Average Game Score Per Start:	48
Season High/Low:	69 (4/25)	23 (4/13)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	0
Game Scores 60-69:	5
Game Scores Below 40:	7
Record of Opposing Batters:	.309/.340/.503 (843 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Matt Kemp

 

Even while pitching with bone spurs in his throwing wrist since the previous September, Slowey still managed to demonstrate why he will be a front-of-the-rotation starter with college-level velocity (88.9-mph fastball in ’09): his outright ownership of the strike zone. 

 

Prior to landing on the DL in July, Slowey was leading the league in first pitch strikes and overall zone presence.  This dominance of the space that resides from knees to letters and 17 inches across allowed the Twins righty to keep pace with some of the league’s already elite pitchers.  Among those that worked a minimum of 80 innings, Slowey’s 5.00 K/BB ratio was fourth behind Roy Halladay, Dan Haren and Javier Vazquez.  The man trailing him is the presumed AL Cy Young in Zack Greinke.  Slowey’s rise to the top of that list includes a solid 7.44 K/9 but is magnified by his ultra-stingy issuance of base on balls.  Only Joel Pineiro (1.14 BB/9) and Halladay (1.32 BB/9) relinquished fewer free passes than Slowey. 

 

In addition to his command, Slowey refined the use of his changeup in 2009.  The results showed more aptitude to getting empty swings – a long-standing criticism of his pitching style:  

CHG	Pct Thrown	Vel	WHIFF Avg
2008	7.8	82.8	.190
2009	9.2	82.7	.270

It was this improvement that provided Slowey with a much needed “out pitch”.  On the other hand, Slowey had multiple problems with his slider.  The wrist injury may have contributed to the evaporation of his vertical break and the elongation of the horizontal break rendering the pitch much more hittable:  

SLD	hBreak	vBreak	WHIFF Avg
2008	1.8	6.1	.227
2009	3.0	4.3	.160

 

If there are supporters in the clubhouse for keeping a Gomez/Span outfield in 2010, Slowey should be one of the most vocal.  As a largely contact-oriented pitcher, nearly 50 percent of balls in play were of the fly ball variety.  The rangier outfield would help ensure several more balls find leather rather than turf. 

 

The most important thing to take away from Slowey’s 2009 season is to disregard the 10-wins in 16 starts - it boils down to a product of his ridiculous amount of runs support (5.69 runs per start).  Do not attempt to extrapolate that winning percentage over 33 starts in 2010.  That would be just wishful thinking.  Nevertheless, he is one of the top three starters in the rotation when healthy and could make a run at a 15-win season provided the right mix of defense.       

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Glen Perkins

G. PERKINS (17 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	5.07	DNQ
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.321	+7.0%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	4.40	-4.7%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score Greater Than 50:	5-1	1-0
Game Score Less Than 50:	1-6	1-2
Average Game Score Per Start:	43
Season High/Low:	73 (4/9)	5 (8/2)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	2
Game Scores 60-69:	2
Game Scores Below 40:	7
Record of Opposing Batters:	.304/.341/.463 (803 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Shane Victorino

Glen Perkins’s 2009 season peaked on April 19^th following his third start of the year.  Accounting for the fact that MLB’s schedule runs through October, this story does not have a happy ending.  Up until that point the lefty had tossed 24 innings, allowing only four runs on 16 hits and maintaining a tidy .188 batting average against.  Then everything he threw was sprayed all over the field.  Post-April 20^th Perkins worked 71.1 innings in 15 games, allowing 60 runs on 103 hits (13 of which were home runs), and went on to finish the season buried in Rochester on a rehab assignment.

His 6-7 record in 2009 should not surprise anyone when you note that Perkins was coming off a 12-win 2008 season that was inflated by an astronomical amount of runs scored on his behalf.  Perkins went 4-4 in starts where his Game Score was less than 50 but finished 1-6 in 2009 under the same circumstances. When the cavalry supplied less than league average support in 2009, it was apparent that his low Game Scores would not continue to provide him with victories.

Are there any takeaways that suggest Perkins can rebound from an ugly season in 2010?  Certainly.  Look at his batting average in play on groundballs.  It reads .327.  Meanwhile, the league average in this area was .240.  It stands to reason that approximately 10 of Perkins’s 55 hits on the ground bleed through or found unguarded seams.  These sorts of results do not last forever; eventually they find a fielder’s glove.  Because his balls-in-play tendencies shifted from an aerial pitcher to chiefly a groundball pitcher (from 38% in ’08 to 47% in ‘09), Perkins could be inline for a Plexiglas effect in 2010, if this trend continues.   That isn’t to say his overall woes won’t continue.  Outside of just three other starters with a minimum of 90 innings pitched, Perkins held the lowest K/9 (4.20) while not figuring out a way to subdue left-handed opponents (.878 OPS) and getting lit up while pitching from the stretch (.962 OPS men on vs. .687 OPS empty).  Without solving these three issues it is hard to believe shaving off 10 groundball hits a year will Cy Young-ify him.

Then there were the issues with management.

Including not revealing an injury which repositioned him in the manager’s doghouse and sparking some internal controversy when Perkins’ agent filed a grievance with the players’ association stating the Twins intentionally held him in the minor leagues to avoid increasing his service time, there is plenty of speculation circulating that Perkins’ name could be on the forefront of any potential trades this offseason.  Then again, Perkins’ stock is not high enough to wrangle in anything of substantial value without including at least one prospect.  

 

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Francisco Liriano

 

 

 

F. LIRIANO (24 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.78	DNQ
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.323	+7.4%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	3.82	-20.6%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score Greater Than 50:	3-3	4-2
Game Score Less Than 50:	2-10	None
Average Game Score Per Start:	45
Season High/Low:	74 (8/12)	13 (8/17)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	1
Game Scores 60-69:	5
Game Scores Below 40:	11
Record of Opposing Batters:	.279/.361/.469 (830 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Carlos Lee

 

It is hard to harp on a thing like “run support” (which was 20 percent lower than the league average) when he served up more runs than most South of the Border eateries, but even so, Liriano was hosed out of four wins in 2009.  He could have been 9-13.  There.  That’s the end of the positivity for now.

 

In just under half of his 24 starts (11), Liriano made a huge-antic (a combination of huge and gigantic) mess out of the game, seemingly putting the Twins further in debt every time he chucked the ball towards home plate.  What gives?   Like the pitching version of Jason Lewis, righties simply loved him.  In his return to the mound in 2008, right-handed batters demonstrated little advantage over him (745 OPS).  One year later, the right-handed nation was launching moonshots off him, responsible for 20 of his 21 HR allowed and raising their OPS to 899.  

Back in June, I noted that he was pitching differently to hitters depending on which batter’s box they were in. The Twins' lefty slides down the rubber towards the third base line when facing right-handed batters in efforts to run the fastball inside, however, he releases it with less of a more vertical of an arm angle which results in a flatter pitch often finishing in the fat part of the zone, above the waist.  With the decrease in velocity from 2006 (from 94.6-mph down to 91-mph) Liriano's location combined with lack of movement (not to mention the regularity of being behind in the count) led to some hard hit balls off for right-handed bats. 

 

In general, his slider still had bite.  Over 40 percent of swings in '09 resulted in a miss (just down from 48 percent in '06) indicating that the is enough break to incite plenty of awkward swings - even after the Tommy John surgery.  However, like the fastball, it was thrown at a reduced velocity from his breakout year in '06.  Also like the fastball, Liriano demonstrated that he had trouble placing it within the strike zone this past season.  As opposed to '06 where he threw the slider in the zone almost half of the time, Liriano threw the slider in the zone less than 40 percent of the time, eroding the effectiveness of the break.  Hitters, particularly right-handed ones, eventually figured out he was unable to throw the slider for a strike and held back waiting for the fastball (NOW WITH 5% LESS HEAT!). 

 

The haphazard command led to better counts for opponents or a walk.  His control problems led to the AL's second highest walk rate (4.28 BB/9) trailing only the Yankees Joba Camberlain with pitchers who had thrown a minimum of 130 innings.  Even so, and this might be a hard pill to swallow in context to his 5-13 record, the heaping ton of walks and a 5.80 ERA but setting aside those facts, Liriano had a decent season when it comes to projecting talent:  

 

• Liriano's strikeout rate (8.03 K/9) was good enough for eighth in the AL - this is an unsurprising revelation given that his 20 percent swinging strike total was the highest in the league. 
• His .324 batting average on balls in play was the seventh highest in the AL and well above the league average of .300.  Where he suffered the most was on groundballs.  As the rest of the league's pitchers held Defensive Efficiency Ratio of .760 on grounders, Liriano was given a DER of .694 - meaning more bouncers slipped through the infield than the norm. 
• His 66.3 percent left-on-base rate was the well-below the average of 71.0 percent and sixth-highest in the AL.  As this equalizes next season, the ERA will drop with it.   

 

The injuries and slow-to-return control (always the last thing pitcher's regain after undergoing TJ) helped make an unfortunate season his worst, yet, there is plenty of evidence Liriano could be a boon to the rotation in 2010.