The Monroe Doctrine (Or How I Learned To Not Accept the Twins Offseason Moves)

A few days has passed since the Twins announced that they are relinquishing one of their dimmer stars for the 30-year-old Craig Monroe. While most in the Twins community seem to believe that this is yet again another indication that the Twins are only interested in second-rate stars (Gleeman, TwinsGeek, Nick&Nick ) and truthfully that was my initial gut reaction as well. Why spend any amount of the payroll towards Monroe even if he is a 4th outfielder/DH platoon? Last year the Twins acquired Jeff Cirillo in what turned out to be the final season of his career. When Cirillo wasn't on the DL, his contributions were minimal and was eventually waived and picked up by the Diamondbacks. To some, it would appear that the Twins were once again acquiring an overpaid, low-reward hitter.

Don't be fooled because this is exactly what they got. The only mitigating factor is how the team deploys Monroe.

When the rumor mill began to buzz that the Twins were in talks with the Cubbies for Monroe, my first inclination was that if you are negotiating with the Cubs, why not attempt to get Matt Murton, a young right-handed bat with years left in his legs? After all, the numbers certain indicate that Monroe has probably peaked with his production. Monroe's numbers prior to his 2007 drop-off were not all that impressive and since his best offensive season in 2004 he has steadily declined and his strike out rate has increased.

Monroe	AVG.	OBP.	SLG.	BB%	K%
2004	.293	.337	.488	6.0%	16.4%
2005	.277	.322	.446	6.4%	15.2%
2006	.255	.301	.482	6.3%	21.5%
2007	.219	.268	.370	6.0%	25.0%

In an ensuing conversation with a high-ranking organizational official, I learned that the Twins view Monroe as a no-risk deal. Essentially the Twins bought themselves the ability to get a free look at Monroe and the ability to negotiate a lower contract. The team believes that Monroe would be a better option instead of Lew Ford as the outfielder on the bench. Meanwhile, Murton was discussed both internally and with the Cubs, however the consensus within the organization is that Murton is not an "everyday player" and the Cubs were seeking several prospects in exchange for Murton.

The Cubs wanted too much for Murton and the Twins were only in the market for a 4th outfielder/platoon DH with power that is seemingly affordable (giving up a Garza or Slowey isn't affordable). I realize that the parameters that the Twins acquired when they sold a prospect for Monroe was the right to (hopefully) reduce his salary to play a very specific role: a right-handed platoon and a power-bat off the bench in a pinch-hitter capacity. Only there are two problems with that: (a) Monroe is not a particularly good hitter against left-handed pitching and (b) Monroe has made 25 pinch-hitting appearance and has hit exactly zero home runs.

So is Monroe the solution to the Twins problem? No.

As a vigilant advocate for Kevin Mench, a player that has continual speculation that the Brewers are going to non-tender him this offseason, I believe the Twins should be bringing Mench in instead of Monroe. In 812 plate appearances against southpaws in his career Monroe has hit .273/.319/.495 (6.7%BB%/18.5%K%). Mench, however, in 775 plate appearances against left-handers has hit .305/.361/.563 (7.7%BB%/6.8%K%). Monroe has hit home runs in 4.4% of his plate appearances against lefties. Mench has homed in 5.1% of his.

While I was lead to believe in my brief conversation with the Twins official that the options present were Lew Ford versus Craig Monroe, in which case, everyone would hopefully opt for Monroe. The spin from the front office would like you to believe that there were no other options for the same product for the same price range when that simply wasn't the case. There was a better product at the same price range.

Prospects in the Pen

Three minor leaguers you will hear about in 2008:

Jose Mijares

2007	Batters Faced	K%	BB%
AA/AAA	316	25.6%	16.7%

A girthier Dennys Reyes (if that's possible), the 22-year-old, 6 foot, 230 lb lefty has made a quick ascension through the Twins organization. Originally signed as a 17-year-old out of Venezula, Mijares dominated in the bullpen at every level moving from from a 19-year-old rookie ball closer to the 22-year-old left-handed specialist who is currently playing for the Tigres de Aragua in the Venezuela Winter League. Last season when camp broke, Mijares had the tragedy of losing his brother to violence in Venezuela. He is certain to begin the season in Rochester, however, if Liriano is not ready by the opener and Glen Perkins is moved into the starting rotation, Mijares might be tapped to be an additional left-hander out of the bullpen.

Bobby Korecky

2007	Batters Faced	K%	BB%
AAA	358	19.8%	9.4%

The 28-year-old Korecky was the final player sent to the Twins in the Eric Milton deal with Philadelphia in December 2003. Drafted by the Phillies in 2002 out of Michigan, Korecky was the centerpiece of their pitching staff. In the Phillies farm system, Korecky bounced between a starter and a reliever until his final season there in high-A Clearwater. Once with the Twins, he moved to Double-A New Britain and continued to perform well in the pen. In April 2005, Korecky underwent season-ending Tommy John surgery but reemerged in 2006 with 13 saves he split between Double and Triple-A. Rochester leveraged Korecky like the relief aces of old. In 66 appearances, Korecky pitched 85 innings and saved 35 games an all-time high for Rochester (a mark that was previous set at 23 by Travis Bowyer). Currently pitching with the Tigres in the Venezuelan league, Korecky has held batters to a .179 average in 10.2 innings pitched. Because of the Twins' glutton of bullpen help, his age and his overinflated saves, Korecky could stand as a great bargaining chip much like Bowyer was in getting Luis Castillo. I would not be surprised to see him move prior to the beginning of spring training. If he is not, he could be brought in midseason to play the role Matt Guerrier played in 2006 if Guerrier expands to be more of a specialist of late inning stopper that Juan Rincon once was.

Eduardo Morlan

2007	Batters Faced	K%	BB%
A+/AA	289	34.2%	6.9%

This 21-year-old right-handed Cuban, tore through the Florida League in 2007. He was dispatching batters at a 30%+ rate. If you watch this video of him warming-up, you will notice that he is built solid from the waist-down much like a younger version of Juan Rincon. While his lead foot does not reach and drive as much as some of the other pitchers who generate power from their legs (Colon comes to mind), it is obvious that he has a very steady, very balanced delivery. While still a season away from the majors since Morlan only has limited time in Double-A, Baseball Prospectus's Joe Sheehan views him as potential trade bait for the Twins to find a power-hitting third baseman (namely Garrett Atkins).

What to do with Rincon

In an alternate 2007, the Twins would have passed on pitchers Sidney Ponson and Ramon Ortiz opting to use Matt Garza, Kevin Slowey or Glen Perkins from opening day in the rotation, they would have declined to resign Rondell White instead electing to extend Torii Hunter's contract passed 2007 (before the season began when his stock was still reasonable), offered a minor league contract and an invitation spring training to Dmitri Young, traded a C-list pitching prospect for career minor leaguer Jack Cust, traded one or two of several pitchers from the farm system to the Milwaukee Brewers for Kevin Mench, and, most importantly, packaged Juan Rincon in a trade with one of several teams looking for bullpen help.

With the 2007 emergence of Pat Neshek as Gardenhire's 8th inning guy, it was apparent that Juan Rincon was being phased out of the primary set-up role to Joe Nathan. Rincon certainly did not aid his cause with his regression into a bullpen liability either. Some have questioned whether the decrease in productivity was directly correlated to his 2005 suspension for his use of performance-enhancing drugs. Following the 2006 season in which his strikeouts per game plummeted from 12.6 in 2004 to 10.1 in 2005 to 8.0 in 2006, Rincon avoided arbitration by signing a 1-year, $2 million dollar contract. The Twins were rewarded in 2007 by his worse season to date, posting averaging 7.0 strikeouts per 9 innings and surrendering 9 home runs in 59.7 innings (a horrid 16.1% home runs to flyballs ratio). Not only were his 63 appearances in 2007 a low in the previous four seasons and his ERA had inflated to 5.13, nearly 2 runs higher than his previous 3 seasons.

Gardenhire began dispatching Neshek into the 8th innings regularly in 2007. In 171 matchups in the 8th inning, batters were hitting a paltry .193/.278/.359 with 39 strikeouts (22.8% K%) and 18 walks (10.5% BB%). Meanwhile, Rincon was asked to retire 108 batters in the 8th inning and faired poorly letting hitters bat .313/.361/.525 with only 21 strikeouts (19.4% K%) but only 7 walks issued (6.4% BB%). The numbers indicate that Rincon certainly was around the strike zone but was being hit hard.

It was clear that Rincon was expendable. Despite a decline in production, Rincon (or rather the entity that he is) was still highly valued in major league baseball terms prior to and during the 2007 season. Focus after the 2006 season was the bullpen. Cleveland, Detroit, and Baltimore all gave lucrative contracts to relievers attempting to bolster ailing pens. Rincon, meanwhile, has been a proven set-up man still arbitration eligible. In mid-season 2007, teams were willing to part with young players for bullpen help: The Dodgers gave up Wilson Betemit for the Yankees Scott Proctor. Super utility player Ty Wigginton was traded to Houston for Dan Wheeler. Naturally, both Proctor and Wheeler had a better leverage considering Proctor had the most appearances the previous season and Wheeler had those coveted (yet overrated) saves in his resume. And neither were implicated in substance abuse allegations.

In 2007, Scott Proctor was having a down-year coming off a season in which he had 83 appearances with the Yankees in 2006. In 2006, the 30-year-old right-handed reliever was averaging 8 strikeouts per 9 innings while walking only 3 and giving up 12 home runs in 102.3 innings pitched. Aside from Rivera, Proctor was the most reliable member of the Yankees bullpen. In 52 appearance in 2007, Proctor's strikeout rate was down to 5.8 per 9 innings and his walk rate had inflated to 4.6. On July 31st, the teams on rival coast's made the deal sending Betemit to New York and Proctor as bullpen insurance in LA. While Proctor's strikeout rate improved slightly in the Senior Circuit (7.7 per 9) he still was putting people on base regularly (4.4 walks per 9). The Dodgers never really had faith in Wilson Betemit and had several prospects ahead of him at third base. While displaying some power, Betemit strikes out too frequently and is not that good with the leather. The 25-year-old Betemit hit .262/.322/.417 in three seasons of Triple-A. In retrospect, is that the Twins could have marketed Rincon to the Dodgers as their potential bullpen insurance and the Twins would have been happy to have another candidate for third.

Ty Wigginton was frequently mentioned on the rumor mill list because of his pop and ability to play all 9 positions. Tampa Bay was looking for anything with an arm that threw in the general vicinity of the plate. Houston had been playing musical closers with Brad Lidge and Dan Wheeler. Wheeler was the likely candidate to move. His productivity was a swing-pendulum at one point in the season he was closing games and at others he was in mop-up duty. Wheeler's stock benefited the most from having saves. In 2007, he had trouble with runners in scoring position and 2-outs, a critical matchup where you would want your reliever to win on more occasions. In 45 matchups, batters hit .432/533/.622 and surrendered 18 runs. Rincon on the otherhand, was deployed 29 times in similar situations and rendered only 4 hits and 7 runs while limiting batters to a .154/.241/.154. In all likelihood, the Twins would have had to do some savvy marketing and package Rincon with another prospect to balance the Wigginton deal.

What is apparent is that the Twins do not understand how to evaluate the trade market. As confidence in Rincon was slipping withing the organization coupled with Neshek, Jesse Crain and Matt Guerrier's ability to provide the same output as Rincon was did in latter innings, the Twins should have been determined to unload him while the market was still high on right handed relievers.

Win Now, Or Win Later?

Following a four-game sweep to the St Louis Cardinals on November 10th, 2006 Detroit GM Dave Dombrowski changed the overall philosophy of the Detriot Tigers from a franchise focused on rebuilding and stregthening a depleated farm system to one that is concievably mortgaging the future for that elusive World Series title. With two World Series appearances with two different teams, creating a winning environment is not new to Dombrowski, this "win-now" mantra uncharted territory for the executive.

Dombrowski had seen previous action building, destroying and then rebuilding again the Florida Marlins. He used the market to sign free agents (Kevin Brown, Gary Sheffield and Moises Alou ) while filling in the positions through the internal sytem (Edger Renteria, Luis Castillo) and well orchestrated trades. Moves like trading Dustin Hermanson and Joe Orsulak to the Montreal Expos for the little used Cliff Floyd has been the corner stone of the Dombrowski era. While Hermanson ended up having a decent tenure in Montreal, Floyd emerged as a dangerous middle of the order hitter (and was later traded back to Montreal in 2002 that netted the Marlins frontline starter Carl Pavano ).

During the ensuing implosion of the Fish, Dombrowski sent away numerous vital players of the 1997 World Series team. Most trades brought Florida back players who would later help the team complete in 2003. Kevin Brown was traded to San Deigo for Derrek Lee, Al Leiter sent to the New York Mets for A.J. Burnett, and Floyd for Pavano as mentioned above. These are three of the trades that later allowed the Marlins to reclaim their championship title in 2003. It should also be noted that he delt some of his elite players for prospects that never panned out (Conine to Kansas City for a low-A washout, Alou to the Astros for three nobodies, Robb Nen for more nobodies). More the exception than the rule, it was through the shrewed trades and draft picks, that Dombrowski aided in building the 2003 championship following the fire sale.

Never during his time as the GM of the Marlins did Dombrowski dabble in trading prospects for over-hyped stars. Signed them via free agency sure, but never did he sacrific the stability of a franchise. Which is why when he completed the trade of aging and often injured Gary Sheffield for three high quality prospects Humberto Sanchez, Kevin Whelan and Anthony Claggett, I was somewhat dumbfounded. Sheffield, the 38-year-old high-priced and limited the designated hitter, had spent a large amount of 2005 on the DL. He seemed to be growing older by the at-bat so any production the Tigers did gain from him, it would be for only a couple of seasons. Shortly after the 2007 season ended, Dombrowski executed a trade with the Atlanta Braves sending the Tigers' fourth and seventh best prospects (Jairs Jurrijens and Gorkys Hernandez ) for the 32-year-old Edgar Renteria. A player that has been excused of being an NL-only player after a down season with Boston. This one season after he sent his 6th (Sanchez) and 10th (Whelan) for Sheffield. Within two seasons, Dombrowski has sent four of his top ten prospects for expensive aging free agents.

What is happening?

The 2006 Tigers, built from genuine homegrown prospects (Granderson, Inge, Verlander, Zumaya), well-executed trades (Guillen, Polonco, Bonderman) and several key free agent signings (Rogers, Ordonez, Rodriguez), had a strong resemblance to the 1997 Florida Marlins (in fact, both finished with 90+ wins and claimed the wild card spot). The nucleus of the 2006 Tigers could be attributed to three trades in Dombrowski's reign:

1) Bonderman (and Pena and German) for Weaver.

"I couldn't believe that's what the trade was," said a seemingly disgruntled Jeff Weaver told the media on July 7th, 2002, "There were no big leaguers. Zero. They let one of the best pitchers go and got nothing for it."

On July 5th, 2002, the Tigers were 39 and 53, 17 games behind the first place Twins and admittedly looking to rebuild. Their solitary trading chip (and number one starter) Jeff Weaver was 6 and 8 with a 3.18 ERA. Weaver had chewed up 200 innings in the previous two seasons for a franchise that lacked stability. In a three way trade that sent Weaver to the New York Yankees, while the Tigers recieved minor leagues Carlos Pena, Franklyn German and a (a month later) prospect named Jeremy Bonderman from the Oakland Athletics.

Of course, this one move started a domino effect of trades that landed Detriot the necessary core to push them from the bowels of the AL Central to the cusp of World Champions. Granted, it is hard to predict the future, just as Weaver pointed out in is triade to the media above. Despite his delusions of granduer, did the Tigers recieve "nothing" as Weaver liked to say?

Weaver, 25-years-old at the time of the trade, was packaged to New York and contributed 12 wins and 12 losses in his two seasons as a Yankee. In 2002, he added 5 wins and 3 losses in addition to 2 saves. His greatest detriment to the Yankee organization came in the form of post-season collapse. After winning two straight games following the series opening loss, the Yankees were in dire straights. In game 4 of the 2003 World Series, Weaver surrendered the game winning home run to Alex Gonzalez of the Florida Marlins in a Series that the Yankees would ultimately lose in six games. Even if you are dubious about statistical value, this sole moment signalled the end to the Yankee dynasty (then again, Torre could have dispatched Mariano Riviera and did not) and Weaver's arm was responsible for that.

Upholding Weaver's predictations, Pena never lived up to his gospel-like praise from Baseball America for the Tigers. Pena did manage to get on-base a fair share for a power hitter while contributing 75 home runs in his three seasons in Detriot before being released after 2005. Pena displayed all the tools that Billy Beane coveted: power, patience and a respectable on-base percentage. Detriot did not have similiar patience. Had the front office waited on Pena, they might have been reward with the similiar season he had for Tampa Bay in 2007 finishing with 46 home runs, 103 walks, and .282/.411/.627.

Franklyn German won 8 games out of Detriots bullpen between 2002 and 2005. His only losses came in 2003 with 4 losses though he saved 7 games. German was claimed off of waivers by the Florida Marlins on August 3rd, 2006. Incidentally, German could be regarded as the "nobody" Detroit recieved.

Which brings us to Bonderman. The trade was executed on July 5th, 2002. The Oakland Athletics still owed Detriot a "player-to-be-named-later". Bonderman was a 19-year-old toss-in from the high-A California league. He had 144.3 innings and 160 strikeouts under his belt when he went from high-A to the majors. The Tigers threw him in -sink or swim- and Bonderman promptly lost 19 games in 2003. To his credit, the Tigers lost an additional 100 more games when he didn't start coupled with an offense that was outscored 928-to-591.

In a move that was percieved as a payroll dump where the Tigers avoided having to pay Weaver nearly double his 2002 salary, the Tigers ended up netting Jeremy Bonderman who started 3 games in the 2006 playoffs with a 1 - 0 record. Bonderman and the Tigers slowly started to improve over the next couple of season, he finished with 11-13, 14-13, 14-8 and 11-9 records in 2003 to 2007. Weaver's record has trailed off significantly, he went 5-7, 14-11, 8-14 and 7-13. Weaver finished 2007 being paid $8.32 million while Bonderman was compesated half of that at $4.5 million. Despite not paying immediate dividends, it is clear that Detriot was rewarded for its return on investment netting a future dominate front-line starter at half the cost of Weaver.

2.) Guillen for Santiago and low-A burn out.

Dave Dombrowski turned his attention next to shoring up the infield. On January 8th, 2004, the Tigers acquired Carlos Guillen from the Seattle Mariners for a pittance.

Never too big on the entire youth-movement (see: various USS Mariner posts ) Seattle's new general manager Bill Bavasi insisted on going a different direction at shortstop for the 2004 season. After failing to unload Guillen onto the Cleveland Indians for Omar Visquel, a deal that ultimately fell apart, the Mariners signed Rich Aurilia and Scott Spiezio for shortstop and third.

Left with Carlos Guillen and no place to put him, the Mariners began shopping him around. Detroit offered a utility infielder and a low-A prospect and Seattle bit. The centerpiece was Ramon Santiago, 24, a career .231/.297/.311 hitter. His appeal to Seattle was that he was under contract for $307,000 and was not eligible for arbitration until after the 2005. Seattle would have been better off simply dumping the entire salary upfront.

In 2004, Santiago had exactly 39 at-bats with the parent club and witnessed 8 more in 2005 before returning to Detriot after he was outright released. Juan Gonzalez, the low-A prospect, has yet to ascend higher than A ball and is currently in the Dodgers organization. Guillen, meanwhile, has anchored a position in Detriot that hasn't been occupied steadily since Trammell, he has been a two-time All-Star and hit 65 home runs over four seasons. He contributed 76 Win Shares to the Detroit Tigers, Seattle recieved zero.

In the same year the Mariners opted not to pay Guillen, who by the way produced 23 Win Shares for Detriot in 2004, Aurilia managed 3 Win Shares (On July 19th, 2004 the Mariners ended the Aurilia experiment by trading him to San Diego for "future consideration" and began using Willie Bloomquist at shortstop). Spiezio, meanwhile, faired a tad better, lasting the entire 2004 season with Seattle but was released on August 19th, 2005 after a horrendous season (he did have a renaissance of sorts with the World Champion Cardinals in 2006). Spiezio provide the Mariners with 2 Win Shares in 2004 and 2005.

3.) Polanco for Urbina & Martinez.

By June 8th, 2005, the Tigers were in a familar spot battling the lowly Kansas City Royals for the dweller with a record of 27-30 and 12 games out of the AL Central race. Unsatified with the performance Omar Infante had been providing at second base, the Tigers traded away Ugueth Urbina, the 31-year-old closer who was 1-3 with 9 saves in 25 games with Detriot and 32-year-old utility infielder Ramon Martinez to Philadelphia for 29-year-old Placido Polonco.

What can be said is that Detroit grifted Philadelphia. In exchange for two aging players, one a relief pitcher who was steadily declining (and would be out of the league soon) and making $4.0 million for the season and a punchless utility infielder scheduled to make $1.025 million the Tigers recieved a solid-contact rate, line-drive hitting, young second baseman who was making $400,000 less than the two players traded away. The Phillies recieved 1 Win Share from their newfound utility man in 65 plate appearances in 2005 while Urbina converted one save in seven opportunities adding 5 Win Shares in the process. Polanco became the most consistant contact hitter in the AL, hitting .338, .295 and .341 since the trade. He also added 51 Win Shares. This is the definition of smart trade. And with that, Detroit had found a very cost-effective number two hitter.

The trades represent a complete plan when it comes to addressing the needs of an organization. Because of these three moves coupled with the emergence of draft-picks and the performance of the free agents, the Tigers packaged one of the strongest offensive and defensive rosters since the first Bush administration, and took the American League's wild card spot into the World Series. While the efforts fell short, the combination of talent and prospects certainly made the Detroit Tigers early favorites for 2007 and beyond. Depleted your farm system, however, is not in the best long term interest of your franchise.

Little About Matt Macri

In the Phoenix Desert Dogs first fourteen games, Matt Macri has been establishing himself in the Arizona Fall League (with a decent .283/.313/.522 line with 2 HRs in 46 at-bats) and could emerge as a strong candidate for the Twins third base spot. Macri as you might recall was the last Terry Ryan minor league acquistion of his GM tenure and came to the Twins from the Colorado Rockies in exchange for Ramon Ortiz. If he finishes the fall league as well as he starts coupled with a strong spring showing, we may have a genuine third base controversy on our hands.

According to Baseball America on August 16th, 2007 the Twins had finally grown tire of Ortiz's 5.14 ERA over 91 innings both starting and relief and were looking to rid themselves of responsibility of his $3.1 million contract. The Rockies were in desparation after their rotation had succumbed to numerous injuries to Aaron Cook, Jason Hirsh and Rodrigo Lopez. Colorado offered Matt Macri who was currently in Triple-A Colorado Springs after spending the majority of the 2007 season in Double-A Tulsa and was in the middle of a rebound season after posting Matt Moses-like numbers (.232/.293/.370) the previous season at the same level. Dethroned of his prospect status following his first year in 2004, the now 25-year-old Macri was hitting .298/.349/.502 in 79 games from the Tulsa Drillers and recieved a promotion to the Triple AAA affiliate.

Born and bred in Iowa, the 6'2", 200-pound Macri was, prior to being drafted by the Rockies in 2004, the Twins original 2001 17th round draft choice. He instead opted to go to Notre Dame where the right-handed batting Macri hit .367/.465/.667 in his final season with the Irish. Placed in Tri-City in the low-A Northwest League following his 5th round selection by the Rockies in 2004, Macri played third and hit well finishing the season with .333/.410/.569. Following this season, the Rockies organization began to play musical positions with him. In response to the logjam at third where the Rockies were blessed to have two outstanding candidates ahead of Macri in Ian Stewart and Garrett Atkins, Macri began 2005 in High-A Modesto in the California as a shortstop. In the hitter's league that is the California League, Macri saw his numbers fall slightly (.283/.381/.443). The Rockies continued to move Macri up in the organization even if they had no real idea where on the diamond he would be most beneficial. In his first full-season in Double-A Tulsa, the Rockies shifted him yet again to 2B where he posted his lowest totals of his career (.232/.293/.370). Assuming that it must be all the defensive tampering effecting his bat, at the beginning of 2007 the Rockies reinstated Macri as the Drillers third baseman and he rewarded them with a blazing start (.298/.349/.502 with 11 HRs in 275 at-bats) and recieved a promotion to Colorado Springs.

His decline obviously troubled the braintrust of the Rockies even though taken in its entirety his stats never indicated that there was a reason to hit the panic button on him. His peripheral numbers were almost identical over those three season:

	ABs	Hits	HRs	BB	K	AVG.	OBP.	SLG.
2004	195	65	7	23	52	.333	.404	.569
2005	247	69	7	34	67	.279	.379	.437
2006	288	67	8	22	66	.233	.294	.372
2007	331	98	15	23	71	.296	.345	.511

It was not as if Marci suffered from an increased amount of strikeouts or suddenly becoming impatient while at the plate when jumping levels by being overmatched. His 2006 season appears to be a case where his BABIP dipped well below his norm and that the 2006 Macri was actually the anomally. In 2005 for Modesto his BABIP was .365, a well inflated number, while the following year his .276 BABIP skewed the opposite end of the spectrum while with the Tulsa Drillers. This suggests that it had nothing to do with technique rather that Macri was the benefactor of both good and bad luck.

A franchise like the Minnesota Twins who lacks the depth in the system at third base certainly could use all the talent they can accumulate at the position (Buscher, Moses, Macri) while the Rockies certainly had enough prospects to merit trading Macri. As the years progress, I believe we will witness in Matt Macri yet another Terry Ryan project in the same caliber of a Jason Bartlett or Alexi Casilla where one team devalued a prospect and was willing to concede that player for a deshelved veteran. Admittedly Macri, like Bartlett or Casilla, may never reach superstardom but could provide the Twins as a serviceable third baseman who has the potential to hit 15-20 home runs and flirt with .300.