Gardy will split time with his closers

On the eve of the Twins’ opener in Canada, manager Ron Gardenhire resolved perhaps the biggest indecision of spring camp with his announcement that he will split time between Joe Nathan and Matt Capps in the closer role.

Gardenhire explained to reporters:

“We know our closer situation and how we’re going to handle that. We’ve talked to Joe and Capper about it. We know Joe can’t go three, four or five days in a row, or maybe even two, so we’ll protect him early. We have two pretty good ones.”

Even though he made significant strides in his first time back on the mound competitively, Nathan still was struggling with his slider and the fastball did not have the same pop as it did two years ago. Reaching this verdict to split time was likely even easier when comparing the two relievers’ spring results. While Capps finished the spring throwing 10 innings while whiffing nine and not allowing a walk, Nathan rarely missed bats as he walked four and striking out just three in his eight innings of work.

After a particularly rough outing against the Phillies in Florida, Nathan noted that his slider was not responding the way he wanted it to:

"I'm just fine-tuning my slider, which is a big pitch. It's one of those pitches that seems to come later in the spring for me. So it's something I'll have to touch up and stay on top of, because it's a big pitch for me."

Just how big of a pitch was Nathan’s slider when he was healthy?

According to Inside Edge's data, from 2007 to 2009, opponents managed to hit just .163/.205/.234 (AVG/OBP/SLG) off of his slider. Twins infielders would regularly get a quick breeze in their directions as opponents swung-and-missed a whopping 40.8 percent of the time when taking a cut. For Nathan, his slider was his go-to out-pitch racking up 122 of his 242 strikeouts on it. When hitters did make contact, the slider was typically kept on the ground – a stark contrast to his fastball which they tended to elevate.

Speaking of the fastball, as important as the slider is to his dominance, there is the growing concern that he has not yet regained the velocity necessary in order to set up the slider effectively.

After a month of being reminded constantly not to fret over his fastball’s velocity – that he ramps up towards the end of spring training - Nathan took the mound in Atlanta for the exhibition game on Wednesday for his final showing before the regular season. Deep in the dirty south, he was still chucking unleaded gas. Unlike his previous outings in the Grapefruit League, Turner Field provides us with access to his stuff through the pitch f/x system and allows for a strikingly accurate velocity reading.

The pitch f/x cameras registered Nathan’s fastball as reaching 90 miles an hour at its maximum speed, nearly four miles an hour slower than his seasonal average in ’09. In comparison to his first appearances in ’08 and ’09, Nathan’s fastball pales:

Joe Nathan’s early season velocity
	Velocity (avg)	Velocity (max)	Time to Plate (sec)
2008 (3.31.08 vs LAA)	95.5	96.5	0.406
2009 (4.8.09 vs SEA)	93.3	95.0	0.404
2011 (3.29.11 vs ATL)	89.7	90.4	0.420

via BrooksBaseball.net

Is this something to be concerned over?

Over at Baseball Prospectus, Mike Fast’s research shows that most pitchers’ velocity has quite the bell-curve throughout the duration of the season. Many start at a lower level then peak as the temperature warms up before descending again in the fall. Like most of his hurling brethren, Nathan shares this trait. Dating back to 2005, Fangraphs.com data says Nathan enters the season’s opening month tossing up 94.4 mile per hour cheddar at hitters. This too has increased as the season progressed. So it’s entirely possible that he will ramp up his heat as the 2011 season ages but even still, a four mile per hour decrease is hard to recover over seven months.

Likewise, it should be emphasized that for most Tommy John veterans velocity does not levy nearly the same amount of focus as their control does. After all, an 87 miles per hour fastball can be just as effective as a 96 mile per hour one if spotted correctly. For the most part, the issue is that the elbow is an instrument of command (whereas the shoulder is the driving force) so as pitchers re-acclimate themselves to their newly repaired elbow it’s often the control that is the last facet of pitching to return. So if the velocity does not make an immediate return and pitches are left up in the zone, they have a nasty habit of getting lost in the bleachers.

In Nathan's case, hetypically liked locating his fastball up in the zone on hitters. With his hard velocity, it was often difficult for opponents to catch up to the pitch. Below are heat maps of Nathan's fastball found at Fangraphs.com. As you can see, against left-handers, Nathan typically spotted his fastball up-and-away. For righties, Nathan went middle-up:

 

This fastball location was particularly effective considering Nathan supplemented this with a slider thrown low in the zone. This combination would give hitters a large swath of the zone to patrol. However, at his current velocity levels, Nathan might experience more damage if he continues to throw his fastball at those areas. According to John Walsh's research at the Hardball Times, pitchers with velocity in the 88-to-91 mile per hour range gave up far more runs on pitches up in the zone versus those in the same speed range who kept the ball down. So if Nathan in unable to increase his velocity during the regular season when his adreneline is flowing, he will need to keep the pitch down in the zone.

Furthermore, consideration must be paid to the fact that Nathan is returning from a major surgical procedure and attempting to do so just 12 months after his date with the knife. When closer Billy Wagner returned to action just 11 months after his Tommy John surgery,multiple major-league sources warned him that the medical risk persists for a pitcher until he is at least 14 months removed from the procedure. For Nathan, that 14-month milestone comes at the end of May. To make matters worse, he will be asked to pitch in Minnesota when the chilly spring weather takes a toll on healthy arms, so it shouldn’t surprise anyone to see Nathan’s recovering elbow experience a setback or hear reports of tightness after some outings.

Given his early returns, the troubles finding his slider and the disconcerting drop in velocity on his fastball, it is not unreasonable to expect Nathan to encounter some rough outings in the early going. That said, the decision to split the end of the game between Nathan and Capps is a sound one. Not only does it give Nathan the time to refine his pitches both in game and in bullpen, it also gives him the necessary time between outings to recoup - especially when the elements are less than favorable in the spring. Regardless of whom Gardenhire ultimately selects to achieve the overhyped statistic of the save, having Nathan healthy and available throughout the season should improve the bullpen, even if he does not regain his pre-injury form. 

Mechanical flaw responsible for Span's 2010 offensive woes?

There have been a lot of theories thrown around this off-season attempting to identify the reasons behind Denard Span’s 2010 regression:

He’s been hitting with two-strikes more frequently.

The transition to natural grass from turf has shaved points off his batting average.

He played too much and needed more rest.

While all of those were factors to some extent, more tangibly, Twins Hitting Coach Joe Vavra recently acknowledged a slight flaw in his mechanics last year that he believed contributed to his offensive woes.

In conversations with Vavra on the subject of Span, 1500ESPN’s Phil Mackey wrote that Vavra attributed the increase in grounders on the center fielder not keeping his head as still as he had in previous season:

"A little bit of a mechanical thing. He was raising up off the ball when the ball was coming in. Usually the head's really still, and with him he was raising up a little bit. So when he went to swing it, he wasn't seeing actually what he saw out of the (pitcher's) hand. He was kind of creating a little different up and down trajectory, or plane of the ball. So he was either on top of it or underneath it, but he wasn't squaring up as much as he had been. It was just hard for him to get rid of. He's much better now."

Reviewing video footage of Span’s swing dating back to 2008, there is ample visual evidence of additional bouncing this season. Comparative to his two prior years, Span’s 2010 mechanics demonstrate a wellspring of pre-swing movement:

Whereas in his first two seasons with the Twins Span remained relatively still prior to moving his front foot forward, he has since implemented a bit of a squat. What you will also notice is that Span’s top half loads up more, pulling his front shoulder inward towards the plate as he brings the bat back. Either of these variations could be causing his eye level to change planes as Vavra mentioned. And because of that, it would make complete sense that he would be striking the top half or lower half of the ball more frequently.

Clearly, the pre-swing movement needed to be ironed out and toned down if Span hopes to get back on track as one of the game’s best lead-off hitters and, judging from Vavra’s comments, it sounds like that was a big focus this spring. Yet, I’m not entirely convinced that the bouncing is the only influential factor for his regression.

Last May, after Span trudged into the first two months of the season with an absurdly high groundball rate, I noticed that he was positioning his hands slightly different than he had in the past. Because of Vavra’s comments, I went back to explore some of the footage.

As you can see from the side view, Span’s starting point with his hands has shifted noticeably since his rookie season:

In 2008, Span kept his hands fairly low, well below his front shoulder level while leaving his bat almost perpendicular to the ground. The following year, Span transitioned to holding the bat higher with his bottom hand parallel to his front shoulder. Additionally, he cocked the bat slightly at an angle towards his head. Meanwhile, this past season, while maintaining a similar level, Span wound the bat even further behind his head.

I’m not going to pretend to be Joe Vavra and say I know why Span made the adjustments. This progression could have been designed in order for Span to generate more power in the hopes of creating a whip effect in this swing. Likewise, the alteration may have been added to improve his zone coverage as raising his hands also gives him the ability to handle pitches up in the zone better. Then again, it could be that Span simply felt more comfortable at the plate that way.

Regardless of why, it makes me wonder if it increases the amount of time from the start of his swing to the point of contact. As he wraps the bat further back, the distance the bat needs to travel grows. Even if it elongates his swing a fraction of a fraction of a second, there are still ramifications. In addition to playing a role in his grounders, the shift may also play a part in his decrease in productivity on fastballs:

Denard Span’s production and power versus fastballs
	Runs Above Average	Slugging Pct
2008	12.4	.467
2009	6.7	.377
2010	-9.5	.348

*via Fangraphs.com & MyInsideEdge.com

In 2008, his first season with the Twins, Span blasted away on heaters. In 280 plate appearances that ended on fastballs that season, the lefty hit .313/.425/.467. The following year, with almost double the amount of plate appearances, Span hit .303/.390/.377, a sizeable drop in power for sure. Certainly, the jump in sample size could have an effect on the overall numbers but in 2010, the returns on fastballs dropped once again for Span as he hit .272/.356/.348.

Could drawing his bat back further each year have led to this decrease?

I’m not trying to make any definitive connections, rather I’m simply suggesting where there is smoke, there’s fire. Because Span has experienced incremental decline in his power numbers the past two seasons – particularly against fastballs – one has to wonder if the slightly longer swing is, at the very least, partially responsible as well. To me, while Vavra is untangling one aspect of his swing in Florida, it appears that there is another element of his mechanics that may need some addressing too.

As the catalyst at the top of the order, the Twins need Span to get on base regularly throughout the season one way or another. Even though he has shown he is quite capable of doing so through the virtues of a walk, Span is also a high-contact hitter and requires a considerable amount of those to be turned into hits to buoy his elite on-base percentage. While the baseball gods may help elevate his depressed BABIP next season, refining his mechanics could go a long ways to ensure he doesn’t need the assistance of the diamond deities to guide ground balls away from infielder’s gloves. 

Unlucky Liriano?

If you had tuned in to Fox Sports North on Wednesday night, you were treated to a supernova-like outing from left-hander Francisco Liriano. The Twins starter blew through the Baltimore Orioles’ lineup, racking up a remarkable nine strikeouts, but managed to only last three innings as he burned out bright and quick.

I realize that striking out this bunch of Orioles is about as easy as getting accepted to St. Cloud State. For instance, the Birds’ sixth hitter, Mark Reynolds, has struck out in almost 40% of his plate appearances dating back to 2008. Likewise, Derrek Lee and Adam Jones both have k-rates above 20% in that same period of time. Ditto for outfielder Nolan Reimold. Vlad Guerrero – while not much of a strikeout candidate – swings at everything not tied down. Mix in a weak hitting Cesaer Izturis and back-up catcher Craig Tatum and Liriano’s ownership of this lineup, as impressive as nine outs all on strikeouts were, should not come at a complete surprise.

Had this been a game against a more historically patient team like the Yankees or Red Sox, Liriano may not have lasted even the full three innings. His fastball was constantly up in the zone and was frequently bailed out by his secondary offerings that hitters flailed at. His slider was solid while the velocity differential likely aided in keeping his changeup from being crunched as it routinely came in belt high. Nevertheless, because of the errant command, he continually found himself throwing four or more pitches per plate appearance, burning through more bullets than a Brian De Palma movie.

Not surprising, both the coaching staff and Liriano sounded less than satisfied by the gaudy strikeout totals. Said manager Ron Gardenhire on his 76-pitch performance:

"It was a little bit out there. But he got his work in and got to 70-plus pitches to build his arm strength up. But we were just hoping he'd get to five or six innings, not three. There were a lot of punchouts, but I'm sure Frankie was a little bit disappointed by the way he threw the ball tonight."

Liriano’s comments echoed his manager’s sentiments:

"I need to go deeper in the game and not try to strike everybody out. I wasn't really happy with how I pitched tonight."

There’s the rub for Liriano. In order to reduce the amount of strikeouts to lower his overall pitch count, he has to allow the hitters to put the ball in play more frequently. Of course, you will have to excuse him for not putting 100% of his faith in his defense to convert the out based on their track record in 2010.

Aside from Adam Jones’s at bat in the third inning in which he tried to put a hole in the sun with one of Liriano’s fastballs (not a bad location down-and-away), the Orioles managed to test the Twins defense just twice the rest of his outing. In the first inning, Jones fought off a pitch and gorked it on the other side of shortstop Alexi Casilla and in front of the suddenly beefy Delmon Young. One batter later, Guerrero bled another pitch through the infield between short and third.

Two weakly batted balls, two hits.

To me, this epitomized last year’s season for Liriano. Stop me if you’ve heard this before, but when it came to help from his defense, he was one of the most unlucky pitchers in the game. Aside from Tampa Bay’s James Shields, Liriano was the runner-up for recipient of the Least Fortunate Pitcher Award, posting the second-highest batting average on balls in play (BABIP). Essentially, despite wielding some dominating stuff – leading baseball in swinging strikes, posting below average line drive rates, walk rates and allowing just nine home runs – Liriano finished the year with having the second fewest amount of balls in play converted to outs behind him.

What it amounted to was a death by paper cuts. Death, in terms of his pitch count anyways.

Normally I come to the table bringing statistical analysis or other such evidence to back-up the majority of claims I make here. This time, I’m making a purely speculative statement. It seems to me that based upon my recollection of the hits Liriano’s allowed last year many of those were similar to Jones and Guerrero’s singles on Wednesday night. Again, nothing too dangerous: a simple bouncer past an outstretched infielder or a blooper that fell in front of a charging outfielder.

In the end, those of us that are sabermetrically inclined tend to attribute that to bad luck. But what if those results are more than just bad luck? What if there is a bigger root cause that we’re not able to measure at this point?

As we all know Liriano is a strikeout-oriented pitcher. Roughly a quarter of all of his match-ups have ended with the hitter grabbing some pine. I am certain his fielders are acutely aware of this fact too, possibly making them wonder just want they are doing out there and who is that cute girl three rows above the dugout? Perhaps lulled into a less attentive state by anticipating Liriano to single-handedly dismantle the opposing lineups, his fielders do not get the same jump as they would with someone like Nick Blackburn on the mound who they know a hitter is going to put a ball in to play (for better or worse). Suddenly, with Liriano on the mound, those borderline bouncers and dying quails are a step or two out of reach as the fielders are not nearly as vigilant as they otherwise would be with the high-contact pitchers out there.

Yes, you could try blowing this entire theory out of the water but simply invoking someone like the Tigers’ Justin Verlander. Verlander, who averages 4.03 pitches per plate appearance (more than Liriano), exhibits a lot of the same qualities as Liriano but managed to produce a significantly lower .283 BABIP. Why, you would then ask, would a pitcher who seems to labor more through each match-up receive better defense? To that point, I have no real answer. It could have something to do with the makeup of their respective rotations. Detroit’s brimming with pitchers who tend to amass large pitch counts whereas the Twins boast pitchers who own three of the four lowest pitches per plate appearances spots. Then I would add, stop being a jerk, I’m just sharing a theory.

Indeed, once the technology like FIELD f/x is finally released, we will have a better understanding if that is actually a factor. Through the FIELD f/x system, we will be able to say with some certainty that Shortstop X is able to get to more groundballs Y distance away when Pitchers 1 through 4 are on the mound but his range is reduced when Liriano is pitching. Until the day that we are able to quantify and measure it, this remains conjecture.

You can’t often get a zebra to change its stripes and Liriano has developed as a strikeout artist and remains one. That said he needs to attempt to make inroads towards lowering his pitch count in 2011. What I would like to see is a hybrid of the strikeout artist and one that can dial up a grounder on one pitch occasionally, if for no other reason, to keep his fielders on their toes. After all, strike outs a fascist and ground balls are democratic – or so the Crash Davis idiom goes.

A Closer Look At Kevin Slowey

For me, it’s hard to get immediately on-board with the Free Kevin Slowey movement. I suppose you could say I'm flying stand-by. 

Yes, without question, I believe that a healthy Kevin Slowey is a far superior option in the rotation versus the likes of Nick Blackburn. Across the board, Slowey has put up better numbers at the major league level. His opponent on-base percentage is lower as is his walk rate. He’s got a far better strikeout rate, demonstrating the ability to retire hitters without waking his defense. The statistical analysis of the two puts Slowey light years beyond Blackburn’s capabilities.

While Dave Cameron jotted all of those explanations down in a post yesterday, all of which – if you think along statistical lines – surely made you nod your head in agreement but, to me, it felt that his write-up did not paint the entire picture of the situation.

Undeniably, based upon Slowey’s numbers and minor league track record, it is easy to reach the conclusion that Cameron’s presenting. Slowey’s incredible strikeouts-to-walk ratio is worth salivating over by any GM. Yet, he seems to skim over the larger issue and that was the fact that hitters received the ball on a tee this year. There was little deception, just guile.

While he alludes to the fact that the Twins right-hander is susceptible to the long ball, saying he gives up “a good amount” of home runs, Cameron more or less glosses over to what extent Slowey’s been taken yard. Over the course of the same period of time Cameron cites Slowey’s impeccable strikeouts-to-walks ratio – noting that it is better than all but three high-quality hurlers – he fails to mention that his home run rate per nine innings is also near the top of the list. His 1.28 home runs per nine innings is currently the seventh highest since 2008 among those with a minimum of 400 innings.  To his credit, because he is so miserly with the walks, a small majority of those round-trippers have come with no one on base (48 of 74 career home runs allowed) so the damage is usually minimal.

That said, last year we saw somewhat of a different version than the one that had accumulated most of those stats dating back to 2007. This version of Kevin Slowey saw a decrease in pitch movement.

In 2008, pre-wrist surgery, Slowey appeared on the cusp of becoming an elite pitcher in the American League. That season, he three complete games including two shutouts on his way to 13 quality starts in 27 outings. What’s more is that he dominated right-handed opponents. In addition to holding them to a .637 OPS against, he posted a stupid good 57-to-3 strikeouts-to-walk ratio. Fast forward to a season removed from wrist surgery and Slowey struggled some to subdue the same-sided hitters. Righties produced a .807 OPS off of him while launching 15 home runs (opposed to nine in ’08) while he held a much more reasonable but still very good 49-to-11 strikeouts-to-walks ratio. Slowey still threw strikes in bulk; only now his secondary pitches weren’t getting the same break as they had been two years prior – perhaps a lingering side effect from the wrist surgery.

Slowey’s slider, his main secondary offering to right-handed foes, was not getting the same downward bite it showed in 2008. Below are two of the heat maps found at Fangraphs.com that shows the location of his sliders against right-handed hitters. As you can see, in ’08 (on the left) Slowey placed his slider down-and-away in the zone. This past season (on the right), Slowey’s slider had a much higher tendency of staying up and in:

To provide more flavor, here are two isolated samples showing the different trajectory of Slowey’s sliders to provide you with an idea of the movement (or lack thereof). In the first clip, Slowey’s 2008 slider has great downward dip, falling under the swing of the Royals Miguel Olivo. In the second clip, Slowey’s slider fails to drop as the Mets’ David Wright tears it down the left field corner for a double:

2008 - via MLBAM

2010 - via MLBAM

What Slowey throws to Wright is your standard, run-of-the-mill cement-mixer slider. While it shares the same velocity to the one in 2008 (85 miles per hour), it had on average an inch less vertical drop. When you have a pitch with less drop and a mid-80s velocity, this gives the hitter ample opportunity to square up on the ball. And square up they did.

Because of the location, the results were extremely different, particularly in the groundball department:

Slowey’s slider versus right-handed opponents
	% Thrown	Miss%	GB%	OPS Against
2008	18%	28%	41%	.608
2010	16%	23%	29%	.710

 (via Inside Edge)

With a decline in grounders from this pitch, Slowey’s ability to keep right-handers from taking flight on him all but disappeared. In ’08, right-handed opponents took to the skies just 43% of the time. This past year, they went airborne a whopping 53% of the time – the highest amount by a non-left-hander.

In addition to his surgically repaired wrist, there was a noticeable difference in Slowey’s follow-through which may have been another factor in his loss of movement or at least somewhat responsible for his late season arm ailment.

These clips, from a start against the Brewers then one in Oakland back in 2008, shows a powerful and fluid back leg push from the rubber with an almost pendulum swing of his leg on the follow-through:

This was when his fastball was a devastating weapon with a decent amount of velocity in the low 90s with some sick movement to boot. That season, Slowey’s fastball was 13.4 runs above average according to Fangraphs.com. Somewhere between 2008 and last year, Slowey abandoned this motion. Compare that to his follow through from his May 2010 start in Cleveland. In this instance, his back leg follows a more deliberate and methodical pattern:

Why the change?

My assumption is that based on the way the first follow-through rendered him almost unable to field his position (a similar knock on Liriano), the run-in with Juan Uribe’s line drive possibly made him alter his follow-through in order to put him in a better position to field (or avoid) lined shots. Under that circumstance, it makes complete sense to adjust. However, overall fastball movement and stamina may have come at the expense of the alteration.

Then there was the issue of the sore right tricep which landed him on the DL from August 22 through September 9.  While culling through video clips, I notice that in his start against Tampa Bay on August 5, the day before reporting the sore elbow, Slowey went so far as to make some fairly abrupt stops in his follow-through:

It hurts my arm watching these clips. You can see why he may wind up experiencing tricep discomfort. Slowey discontinues his motion altogether, putting a lot of strain on the arm.

These two factors working in conjunction – losing his slider or not engaging his lower-half – may have led to his inability to get himself through the prerequisite innings last year in order to qualify for that quality start that Ron Gardenhire desired. Without his slider, Slowey had troubles retiring righties regularly, most likely leading to more pitches in the early innings. Likewise, by not engaging his lower-half, Slowey likely tired out his arm sooner as well as added pressure on his elbow which culminated in a bout of tendinitis.  

You have to wonder if the coaching staff watched him throughout the spring and decided that he needed more time to work out some of the kinks. Like get his slider back or try to engage his lower-half more in his motion. If that happens to be the case, it’s not irrational for the coaching staff to have him work on these areas in the bullpen rather than the starting rotation.

While Slowey’s stuff actually took a significant step backward – leaving him exposed to right-handers - his precision tuned command guided him through the 2010 season. At least to the point where he was able to amount respectable peripherals despite hitters elevating more of his pitches. If you were trying to predict his 2011 season on the peripherals alone, you would have to assume that he was going to have a better year. It is possible that he needed just a year to get used to the new sensation in his throwing hand, that 2011 will witness a renaissance of movement in his pitches.

Until he proves otherwise, there is no harm keeping him in the bullpen until he pitches his way into the rotation or someone pitches their way out. 

End of the Neshek Era in Minnesota

The Pat Neshek era for the Minnesota Twins ended on Sunday with little fanfare. The 30-year-old right-handed reliever tweeted that he was “now a member of the San Diego Padres” and was heading west. Word spread quickly that the Twins had placed Neshek on the outright waivers, hoping to clear space on the 40-man roster, and the Padres nabbed him before he could clear and either get re-assigned or released.

Basically, Minnesota’s patience in Neshek’s ability to return to his pre-Tommy John surgery levels had run out. While most pitchers who undergo the procedure wind up having a rough re-introduction upon their return to the game, most find that in the second-year their velocities and control make a comeback. Consider Francisco Liriano’s 2010 season. In his second-year removed from the surgery, his results were almost polar opposites of his 2009 numbers. However, while Liriano took steps forward in winter ball and spring training prior to last season, demonstrating he had the stuff and the command to bounce back, Neshek, in his second spring training back since the surgery, had not showed anything indicative of a resurgence.

The Twins assistant GM Rob Antony reported over a week ago that Neshek was likely throwing 89 miles per hour - although Antony admits that he did not have a radar gun on the side-armer at that time. Antony continued to say that the Twins were impressed by the development of Neshek’s slider which was showing “more depth” in his more recent outings. From 2006 to 2008, Neshek’s slider was an unbelievable weapon for the righty. In that time he was able to miss bats a whopping 42% of the time when he threw his slider. This past season, Neshek’s slider only was able to get a whiff 11% of the time as he struggled to even get hitters to offer at the often errant pitch. Certainly progress in this department would be crucial to any kind of return to his former dominant self. Still, none of that would matter if he didn’t have a respectable fastball available to set that pitch up.

Without putting too much reliance on the accuracy of the Hammond Stadium radar gun, during my visit on March 8, Neshek was averaging just 82-to-84 miles per hour. This is roughly the same velocity he was hitting in his limited time with the Twins in 2010. Lending further credence to the fact that his velocity was down was that he was ripped hard throughout his inning of work. He allowed a massive home run to Lyle Overbay and each ball off of the opponents bats’ were like ballistic missiles. In all this spring, Neshek had given up six hits (three of which were home runs) in six innings of work. Although he posted a decent 5-to-1 strikeouts-to-walks ratio possibly indicating that his control was on the verge of return, it was apparent that, despite their claims to the contrary, his stuff was not at the level the Twins were anticipating at this stage of his recovery.

That being said, even with his slow rehabilitation, it would seem to be a foolhardy decision to expose a pitcher with the potential upside of Neshek to the waivers in order to clear space on the 40-man roster when he had a minor league option left. What’s more curious about the decision is that the front office opted to hang on to a pitcher like the 28-year-old Eric Hacker, a minor league free agent signed this past winter, who has little upside and has had a more tumultuous spring than Neshek. In six innings, Hacker has allowed 13 hits and nine earned runs. Hacker, two years Neshek’s junior, has only sampled the bigs with Pittsburgh while producing some mundane numbers a career starter in the minors.

There may be other unspoken reasons for the Twins to take the chance on losing him to another ballclub aside from his performance alone. For instance, Neshek irked organization last year when he took to the social media outlets but tweeting and Facebooking his irritation over the “misdiagnoses” of his finger injury and the time lost due to the team’s doctors. Furthermore, there is the question of whether or not his unique mechanics may be a leaving may be leaving him susceptible to further elbow injuries. While Twins top brass likely did not take this into consideration given that not too many teams focus on the biomechanics of baseball, Neshek’s overall motion seems to place a lot of stress on his elbow and would make some wonder if he can ever fully recover. Opening up that spot for someone like Carlos Gutierrez or Kyle Waldrop – both of whom have turned heads this spring and have a future with the organization while Neshek dropped out of favor - makes sense both in the short-term and long-term for the team.

Credit is due to the Padres who have scooped up an arm that may have some use in it in addition to having the added comfort of a remaining option. While Neshek’s spring performance doesn’t inspire much confidence that he is heading towards the typical second-year after rebound from Tommy John surgery, San Diego can move Neshek to Triple-A and monitor his progress until he is deemed ready. If he can improve on his velocity and command, the Padres have scored a late innings arm that can overwhelm right-handed opponent, supplementing their bullpen at a very low cost. In short, it is a very savvy move for the NL West team.