Twins front office got one right with Jim Thome

Since taking over as general manager of the Twins in late 2007, Bill Smith and his front office staffers have signed over 50 free agents. And, without question, Jim Thome has been the best of the Smith era.

While the majority of those 50-plus signings spent their time as minor league roster filler, since taking over the big chair, Smith has signed the likes of Adam Everett, Craig Monroe, Mike Lamb, Livan Hernandez, Joe Crede and Orlando Hudson. With maybe the exception of Hudson, none of those players have even come close to matching the on and off-field production of Jim Thome.

Like the bulk of Smith’s free agent acquisitions, Thome had flaws which dropped him into the Twins’ price range. His 2009 was marred by nagging injuries that wreaked havoc on his ability to catch up to fastballs. Baseball analysts began to question whether his career was entering an inevitable slide and, at that time, I reached the same conclusion based on the data that suggested a decline in power and bat speed. Because of this, interest in Thome was tepid at best so the Twins were able to land him for basically a pauper’s wage of $1.6 million.

Meanwhile, Thome spent the 2010 season feeding big ol’ s&*tburgers to everyone who doubted his ability to play at the elite level. His isolated power mark of .344 that year was bested only by Toronto’s Jose Bautista who managed to lead the league with 54 home runs. Not only did his power return but he also showed that he could still catch up to big league fastballs – including this 93 mile per hour one thrown to him by Chicago’s Matt Thornton:

Because of injury concerns, Thome’s playing time was understandably rationed - that is, until Justin Morneau’s concession in Toronto forced him into a more regular role. In his last 179 plate appearances that year, Thome mashed to the tune of .301/.436/.664 with 15 home runs and helped propel the Twins to the top of the AL Central.

Due to his clubhouse presence in addition to his on-field performance, the Twins justifiably re-signed him for the 2011 season, offering him $3 million. Thome reportedly turned down more money from Texas to return to Minnesota – a place where he felt had as good an opportunity as any to win a World Series.

With injuries, ineffectiveness, steady decline and decay of the team around him, Thome put together a solid if unspectacular season of his own. Considering he smacked nearly 34% of his fly balls out of the park in 2010, a figure well above his career rate and not encroached upon since his Phillies days, it was expected to see a decline in that area. That rate tumbled to 21.8% this year – perhaps a sign of his age as it was his lowest rate in a non-injured season. Likewise, his line drive and walk rates both took a hit which led to his on-base percentage dropping from .412 to .357. Nevertheless, he was certainly one of the Twins’ best hitters even if he had a noticeable drop-off from his contributions the previous season.

In all, Thome has provided the team with almost unparalleled production from their DH position:

DH Production (2010-2011)
Name	PA	AVG	OBP	SLG	wOBA
Jim Thome	578	0.268	0.389	0.567	0.407
David Ortiz	1075	0.284	0.378	0.542	0.390
Billy Butler	1213	0.308	0.380	0.467	0.366
Luke Scott	753	0.264	0.347	0.492	0.362
Victor Martinez	993	0.310	0.359	0.470	0.358
Travis Hafner	781	0.279	0.370	0.449	0.356
Jack Cust	695	0.249	0.376	0.395	0.347
Edwin Encarnacion	779	0.261	0.321	0.465	0.342
Jorge Posada	792	0.246	0.342	0.430	0.339
Bobby Abreu	1167	0.253	0.355	0.399	0.338

What's more impressive is that the Twins received this production - valued at $17.4 million by Fangraphs.com - for a small sum of just over $5 million.

Given the team’s steady descent to the bottom of the standings, the need for a part-time DH – one who would be a free agent at the season’s end - was essentially non-existent. So the Twins bid adieu to Thome – shipping him to Cleveland and saving him from the local abomination. For their part, the Twins will pocket the half-million owed to him for the rest of the season as well as receive a player-to-be-named later before an October 15 deadline. Nobody should get too excited about the return – it will likely be a C-list prospect – it is still something for nothing.

So even though the Jim Thome era has ended in Minnesota, let’s remember this as one of the few moves that the Twins front office got right.

Changes have made JJ Hardy a powerhouse once again

At the end of 2009, JJ Hardy was an offensive mess.

His overall numbers were bad but his power production had almost evaporated. He had gone from a hitter who had hit 50 home runs from 2007-2008 to one who hit 11. Unable to figure neither his problem out nor willing to pay his escalating salary, the Brewers shipped in to Minnesota for an equally perplexing talent in Carlos Gomez.  

Not long after the trade, Alex Eisenberg at Baseball-Intellect.com compiled a marvelous progression of Hardy’s mechanical changes through his Brewers years. In determining his sudden drop-off in ’09, Eisenberg identified that Hardy had a significant arm bar in his swing causing him to have a longer swing in general. Knowing this, it is no surprise that Hardy struggled that year against left-handed pitchers who frequently targeted the outer-half of the plate. Likewise, another facet of his game that gradually worsened was his ability to turn on a baseball – this skill slowly eroded almost completely in his final season in Milwaukee.

Shortly after the Twins acquired him, I spoke with Twins assistant general manager Rob Antony who said that hitting coach Joe Vavra had seen the same thing – that he was barring out which led to a longer swing. The club went to work making some adjustments to his swing in spring camp. When he emerged, he had an overhauled swing.

Said Hardy last April:

“I shortened up my swing; my stance is a lot different. My hands aren't as far away from my body as they were in '09, which makes it a lot easier to get to the ball. It was a full year of creating bad habits, and it's taken some time to get rid of them, but I feel like I'm on the right path." 

While it may have been easier to “get to the ball” as evidence by his reduced strikeout rate (from 18.3% in ’09 to 14.4% in ’10) and increased contact rate (from 80.4% in ’09 to 85.5% in ’10), the power never manifested as his isolated power actually dropped in his move from Wisconsin (from .128 to .126). What’s more is that Hardy experienced a 4-year low in pulling the ball and for power:

Year	% of Pitches Pulled	Slg% on Pulled Pitches
2007	69%	.729
2008	58%	.969
2009	49%	.526
2010	42%	.445

(fangraphs.com)

Without question, plenty of his power potential and wrist quickness was drained when he jammed his wrist in May. After returning at the end of the month with minimal offensive production, Hardy sat out the majority of June and came back with some pop in July, finishing the season hitting .302/.356/.436 over his final 227 plate appearances. Ignoring his late-season breakout and fixating on the shortcomings that paled in comparison (not to mention his growing salary), the Twins flipped Hardy to Baltimore for a pair of marginal bullpen arms.

Now, following a brief flare-up this spring, Hardy says his wrist in 100%.  Given that his output has put him on pace to have his best season at the plate since 2008 -- including 24 home runs up through Monday night – I tend to agree.

Part of the reason he has put up such impressive power numbers is that he has thrived when pulling the ball: he’s pulled almost half of his pitches to left (48.5%) and has his best slugging percentage that direction since ’08 (.907).

Look at Hardy’s home run-to-swinging strike chart from 2010 below. (Remember that these pitch f/x charts are shown from a catcher’s perspective so a right-handed batter would be on the LEFT side of the chart.) Here we see that only one of his six home runs (the green dots) came on pitches on the inner-half of the plate while the rest of his bombs came on pitches middle-away:

In comparison Hardy has been decimating pitches thrown inside this year:

Although factors such as a clean bill of health and hitter-friendlier ballpark have aided in his resurgence, Hardy has also made a slight change to his stance that is helping him exploit pitches on the inner-half better. As mentioned above, Hardy and the Twins worked diligently on getting him to keep his hands closer to his body – which offers better bat control – but it came at the expense of power. Once he got to Baltimore Hardy ditched the 2010 stance and has extended his arms while lowering them slightly:

The changes have provided Hardy with the ability to muscle it into the left field seats.

Hardy’s success in Baltimore has made me think a bit about the Twins’ teaching methods. The Twins appeared to have given Hardy a makeover that led to a decreased ability to pull the ball. While this could have been a byproduct of his wrist injury, it would not surprise me to find out that the team was trying to rid Hardy of that habit. Clearly, the Twins are advocates for using the whole field – something that they have tried to pound into Danny Valencia for much of the season when he grew pull-happy. Before him it was David Ortiz. So was a part of Hardy’s offensive re-education while in Minnesota an attempt to get him to conform to the team’s “whole field” mentality?

Hardy may never have thrived with the Twins this season like he would have in Baltimore. In addition to a less forgiving stadium in Target Field, based on the team’s insistence on contact over power, Hardy may have been spreading his hits out more rather than into the seats in left field. He may have continued to work with his hands closer to his body rather than moving them out and generating the pop he has with the Orioles.

Whatever the case or lesson here may be, Hardy’s healing and minor correction in his stance has converted the almost-non-tendered shortstop to a surefire AL Comeback Player of the Year winner. 

Twins' infield needs work this winter

Yesterday, Star Tribune columnist Pat Reusse put together his agenda for the Minnesota Twins this off-season. The gist of it focused on not re-signing any of the expensive veterans and channeling that money into areas of need – specifically the pitching staff:

“When the Twins discuss the rotation for 2012, this should be the plan:

No. 1 starter: Yet to be signed/acquired hard-thrower (doesn't pitch to contact); [italics mine] No. 2: Yet to be signed/acquired veteran starter with solid stuff; No. 3: Pavano; No. 4: Liriano; No. 5: Baker, with Swarzak, Blackburn or Slowey to fill in when Baker is on the DL.”

Mr. Reusse’s request is echoed throughout every radio call-in show and blog comment section that touches the subject of what the Twins should do next season (heck, it’s been the same thing repeated since the loss of Johan Santana). While I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiment, the unfortunate truth is that there is likely little opportunity for the Twins to acquire anyone fitting that description.

In terms of free agents, Texas’s CJ Wilson is the top name on the market. The 30-year-old Wilson has emerged the past two years after being a bullpen arm for the Rangers, compiling a 27-13 record with an impressive 3.28 ERA (better when you consider his home environment) and 329 strikeouts in 378.1 innings of work. When you add the fact that Wilson’s workload was light during his younger years (just 280.2 at the major league level between ages 24 and 28), a team would land a pitcher they can be somewhat confident that his arm should hold up the duration of a contract.

Of course, the Twins are not the only team looking for number one types and Wilson will potentially be a hard commodity to reel in. In addition to the Rangers who would want him to stick around, the Yankees, Cardinals, Tigers, Cubs and other spend-happy teams will be at least slightly interested in him. Outside of Wilson, there is not a name on the free agent list that qualifies as what Mr. Reusse described.

The next route -- trading for a number one starter -- is perhaps just as difficult. For argument’s sake, let’s say the Rays decide to shop James Shields. Now the Rays have proven extreme good at extracting top value for their commodities and are better than most teams, however, any team with a number one-type will be getting plenty of offers. The Rays will likely be able to get a significant package for Shields (or any other top pitching talent) and the Twins appear unlikely to assemble a matching deal – at least be able to form one without hurting the system’s long-term viability. So, while there are teams that may be inclined to moving a few good arms, it would cost the Twins dearly when it comes to the already talent-depleted farm system.

Here’s hoping the Twins are able to find a pitcher that fits the bill of a number one starter but if the Twins want to improve their rotation in the short-term, the next best option is to improve their defense. Nowhere is this more needed than in the infield.

Consider this: the Minnesota Twins – once touted as the defensive darlings of the universe – have become the worst team in the AL at turning groundballs into outs.

American League Grounders
Team	Defensive Efficiency Ratio
Mariners	78.5%
Angels	78.5%
Blue Jays	78.3%
Rangers	78.2%
Rays	78.0%
Red Sox	77.3%
Indians	77.2%
Athletics	76.5%
Royals	76.4%
Yankees	76.0%
White Sox	75.9%
Orioles	74.5%
Tigers	74.0%
Twins	73.3%

The Defensive Efficiency Ratio tells us in broad-based terms how many times a team has successfully converted a ball in play into an out. Breaking this down into the trajectory of how a ball is put into play, we can use this to give us some idea of how teams’ outfield or infield units perform. So far in the American League this year, nearly 77% (76.6%) of all grounders have been turned into outs, but the Seattle Mariners and the Los Angeles Angels boast the league’s top slot for keeping ground balls from becoming hits.

Around the horn, the Seattle Mariners’ infield has been fairly stalwart. Their shortstops have managed track and convert 74 plays on balls out of the standard shortstop zone while holding a very good .837 revised zone rating (converting 252 of 301 plays inside a shortstop’s zone) which is third-best in the AL. Meanwhile, Mariner second basemen have made 40 plays out of the normal zone while posting a .827 revised zone rating (5th-best in AL). This – along with some exceptional pitchers in Felix Hernandez and Micheal Pineda – have given the Mariners one of the league’s best ERA’s at 3.77. While King Felix and Prince Pineda were supplying strikeouts, rotation-mate Doug Fister – a groundball pitcher who is far from a strikeout pitcher - posted a 3.33 ERA thanks to his infield backup. Had the Mariners infielders had the slightest bit of lumber to compliment the glovework, they may have wound up competitive in the AL West.

The Angels, while not nearly as rangy as the Mariners infielders, have compiled an infield that does their jobs. The shortstops and second baseman have the third-best revised zone ratings (.843 and .844 respectively) among their peers while the corners demonstrate an above-average ability to make the additional plays out of the zone. The first basemen lead the league with 35 out-of-zone plays while the third basemen are fourth with 32 out-of-zone plays. Perhaps not surprising, at 3.49, the Angels own the AL’s best ERA.

On the opposite end of the spectrum from the Mariners and Angels rest the Minnesota Twins. The Twins are the American League’s worst at turning a groundball into an out. Their 73.3% conversion rate in 2011 represents a significant drop over their 76.1% from a year ago.

The agglomeration of middle infielders has provided little additional support for their pitchers. The shortstops – mainly headlined by Tsuyoshi Nishioka and Alexi Casilla – have done a decent job of nabbing an extra 60 plays out-of-zone. However, that is overshadowed by the way the shortstop unit has performed within their designated zone: their .769 revised zone rating is the worst in the AL. One year ago, with JJ Hardy and Nick Punto manning short, the team had the AL’s best revised zone rating at the position (.839). Nishioka, once thought of to be a defensive upgrade at the position, has demonstrated regularly that he is incapable of holding down a starting job at this time.

At second, the Twins have added 27 out-of-zone outs (second-fewest in AL) with a .802 revised zone rating (fourth-lowest). While Casilla has done a decent job when able to be on the field, there is an obvious drop off in the quality of defense provided when Michael Cuddyer and, to a lesser extent, Luke Hughes is playing. In 2010 the Twins put up good marks at second with veteran Orlando Hudson. That year, the Minnesota second basemen posted a .833 revised zone rating and added another 42 outs that were not in their zone.

Perhaps the most substantial decline has been the defensive production at third. Danny Valencia – given the position full-time – has shown as much range as Gilbert Gottfried in 2011. Valencia and the few fill-ins have chased down just 19 plays out-of-zone this year. Comparatively, the Blue Jays have converted an additional 46 out-of-zone plays. More worrisome, like shortstop, the in-zone plays have dropped from a league-lead .780 in 2010 to .691 this season.

The Twins pitchers are pitch-to-contact. This strategy is not sexy but it can be successful if the necessary support is there – after all, for the majority of the century the team has won division titles based on this. All of this fumbling, bumbling and stumbling in the infield has led to more hits, more base-runners, more pitches and, ultimately, more runs for the Twins pitching staff in 2011. It is not hard to see an association between the infield defense and the staff’s ERA which jumped from 3.95 to 4.48.

Even if the Twins do bring in the marquee-number-one-with-a-bullet starter, they still need to address the defense for the remainder of the rotation. 

600 Naturally

And with two mighty lumberjack swings, Jim Thome sent the white orb whistling through the Detroit night air only to disappear on both occasions over the Tigers’ left field wall.

Those swings marked home runs number 599 and the 600th home runs of his career, placing him in an elite group of individuals – eight to be exact – who have circled the bases over 600 times in their careers. Yes, the modern era with the miniature ballparks, better equipment and other performance enhancers may have removed the sheen somewhat but Thome’s name undoubtedly helps restore some credibility:

Rank	Player (age)	Home Runs	Bats	HR Log
1.	Barry Bonds	762	L	HR Log
2.	Hank Aaron+	755	R	HR Log
3.	Babe Ruth+	714	L	HR Log
4.	Willie Mays+	660	R	HR Log
5.	Ken Griffey	630	L	HR Log
6.	Alex Rodriguez (35)	626	R	HR Log
7.	Sammy Sosa	609	R	HR Log
8.	Jim Thome (40)	600	L	HR Log

(via Baseball-Reference.com)

Thome’s first blast came in an empty Yankee Stadium on October 4, 1991. Just a young whippersnapper of a September call-up, Thome dispatched a shot deep into the third deck in the Bronx. How could those on hand realize that he would continue to mash taters for the next two decades?

Now, twenty seasons and 599 taters later, Thome has reached the incredible milestone. Congratulations Mr Thome.

****

To commemorate his remarkable feat, DiamondCentric has created a limited edition t-shirt that you can purchase at the website – www.DiamondCentric .com. 

The disappointing defense of Tsuyoshi Nishioka

On two separate occasions this month, shortstop Tsuyoshi Nishioka has failed to perform the elementary exercise of covering second base in key situations.

On August 3 in Anaheim, pitcher Brian Duensing fielded a comebacker and spun towards second to start a double play. Nishioka, whose responsibility it was to cover the bag, was nowhere near the base. To his credit, he did adjust in time to get the one out at second but they were unable to covert the double play. Similarly, on Friday in Cleveland, after a series of misplays by the shortstop Justin Morneau nabbed a grounder while ranging to his right, positioning himself perfectly to make the easy throw to second – the direction in which his momentum was carrying him. The problem was, once again, nobody was covering the base.

It was Nishioka’s play on Friday night that inspired columnist Patrick Reusse to write: “This young man knows less about the basics of playing shortstop (or second base) than any big-leaguer I've ever watched.” Given his body of work in the field this month, it is a statement that is hard to argue with.

All of the fielding metrics – RZR, UZR, LOL, OMG, INBD, etc - suggest that Nishioka is a bottom-feeding defensive talent this year. But you don’t need these stats to tell you the obvious. So why is Nishioka is struggling so much in the field?

First is the issue of inexperience. While those aforementioned plays in which he failed to cover second are inexcusable in any country, some misplays have been an extension of this inexperience. For example, in the play in which the Indians’ Travis Hafner chopped a ball past Carl Pavano, Nishioka charged hard and hastily tried to field and throw on the run. Now, had he been more familiar with his competition he may have taken his time to ensure he gloved the ball and made a set throw. After all, Hafner moves with the velocity of someone submerged in wet cement. 

This is exactly the kind of situation that he was warned about. Over the winter, fellow countryman and failed MLB shortstop Kaz Matsui offered Nishioka some advice through the Japanese media. The first point was about not worrying about the transition from artificial turf to grass, the second was about being aware of getting spiked at second (d’oh), and the final point was for the incoming infielder to keep tabs on the foot speed of his competition. As I wrote back in January on the topic:

“The final word of advice from Matsui, “gather data on baserunners”, is fairly straight-forward. Unlike those that develop within the minor league system, Matsui had little experience educating himself on players in the majors. He was thrusted into a starting role without the proper knowledge of his opposition and, unlike someone like Cal Ripken who goes to great lengths preparing for each opponent, Matsui was likely manning a demanding position cold-turkey (particularly when you factor in a language barrier). Either way, Matsui’s message to Nishioka is clear: Spend time learning the competition.” 

Had Nishioka been more familiar with the league, he would have known that Hafner’s grounder did not require the hurried play. Essentially, Nishioka – who was a superstar in Japan – needs to become a student of the game again. If he is not already, he needs to be reviewing video of upcoming opponents and discussing the base-running abilities of hitters with the coaching staff. This would help minimize miscues like the one against Hafner.

Then there is the issue of how Nishioka fields the ball.

For those who follow the Twins regularly, you may have noticed Nishioka’s propensity to maneuver his body behind the ball on plays towards the third base hole instead of backhanding the grounder like the majority of shortstops do. It is not so much his failure to do so but rather the method in which players in Japan are taught to field the ball. Reporter Naofumi Murakami explains why:

“In Japan, it's typical to catch a grounder facing front toward the incoming ball. There is more focus on the stability gained from not using the back of the hand to catch the ball. But in the major leagues, the backhand catch--in which the shortstop grab grounders to their right side with one hand by stretching out their arm with the glove--is mainstream. There is a risk of the ball bouncing off the glove, but the shortstop can get into a position of throwing the ball faster because of the lack of unnecessary moves.”

Here we see an example of this Japanese style of fielding. Instead of extending his arm across his body, back handing the ball and putting himself in a better position to throw, Nishioka slides his entire body in front of the Padres’ Ryan Ludwick’s ground ball:

 

Even though it worked in this instance, had someone speedier than Ludwick been running down the baseline that runner may have easily beaten the play.

Nishioka and the Twins continue to work on getting the shortstop adapted to the American-style of play however changing this deeply ingrained technique may not be as simple as flipping a switch. Nishioka says that the backed play in Japan is viewed as “lazy” and getting him to change his style of play after decades of indoctrination and thousands of hours committing it to muscle memory would be like trying to get an American shortstop to ditch the backhand in favor of getting their bodies in front of those grounders.

Finally, although the physical aspects of his game have relatively simple solutions, the mental side – like failing to cover second - is a bit more perplexing. Is it deference to his more experienced middle infield partners? Is it a communication problem? Or your average run-of-the-mill brain farts and lack of focus? Who knows?

Personally, I see parallels in Nishioka’s current situation to Denard Span’s conversion to a full-time centerfielder in 2010. While Span had all the talent and tools in the world to be an outstanding defender, he often backed deferred to his corner outfielders to try to make plays on the in-between balls. Many of those unfortunately fell to the earth. Meanwhile, before his injury this season, Span showed a much better tendency to go all-out after those same types of fly balls and taking command of the outfield. It is not unreasonable to think that after Nishioka acclimates and gains the confidence to quarterback the middle infield, we will see improvements in this department.

In hindsight, it was wrong for the Twins’ evaluators and decision-makers to assume Nishioka could seamlessly transition into the highest level of baseball in the world. While competition in Japan may be comparable to AAA, there is still plenty of difference in the style of play that keeps it from being an effortless jump for players. Obviously his defensive development has been stifled by the broken leg as well as a language barrier, but it seems apparent now that Nishioka would have benefitted from a season in Rochester to acclimate to the American-version of the game.