Twins bring back Matt Capps to close in 2012

When it was announced that the Minnesota Twins had a deal in place to bring back closer Matt Capps, the move has been met with streams of vitriol for the obvious reasons.

The first and foremost reason was that Capps’s 2011 season was a big bag of flaming poo. Elevated back into the closer’s role after Joe Nathan returned prematurely from Tommy John surgery, Capps struggled to slam the down shut. He blew nine saves – second-highest in baseball last year – and his 63% save conversion rate was the lowest among closers with 20 opportunities or more. Adding to the problem was that Capps’s strikeout numbers, already a fairly low career rate for a closer, took a nosedive, declining from 20% to 12% as hitters stopped missing on his offerings altogether.

From June 28th to August 18th, his season bottomed out. In 24 outings in that span, Capps managed to convert just four saves while blowing three more. He allowed 12 runs in 18.2 innings and posted a gawdawful 3-to-7 strikeouts-to-walk ratio. Even though it was downplayed in-season and the coaching staff talked about a “mechanical problem”, I sourced it to an injury problem based on his arm action. It was later in the year that he admitted to having a “dead arm” and it was revealed more recently that his forearm was strained.

To make matter worse, the Twins, by the grace of the restructured collective bargaining agreement, were given a free draft pick for Matt Capps. Instead of being a Type A free agent who the Twins would have had no interest in extending arbitration to thereby unable to collect on any potential draft picks, the Lords of the Realm granted Capps amnesty from Type A status – giving the Twins a supplemental round pick (between the first and second rounds) – if another team signed him.

For teams interested in keeping their internal pipeline of prospects flowing, this was an ideal situation. It is this type of decision-making that keeps the Tampa Bay Rays in continual contention while keeping their overall budget low. So, the Twins would land another prospect and could redirect that money they would have spent retaining Capps on another similar or better relief arm.

Perhaps it was because they believe that they wanted to curb their investment in this year’s draft (they do have the number two pick as well as up to three more supplemental picks if Michael Cuddyer and Jason Kubel sign elsewhere). Perhaps it was because they looked at this year’s draft class and determined – like Keith Law noted – it will be weaker than the previous drafts.  Or perhaps they just loved the idea of the guy who “takes the ball everyday” despite being hurt in 2011 and genuinely believe he is poised for a rebound year. Whatever the reason, the Twins decided to turn down the free draft pick that fell into their laps.

The idea of declining free money is hard to fathom for this franchise, and that is the hardest pill to swallow when it comes to analyzing this deal, but all else being equal, I don’t hate it.

While holding the belief that the closer’s role is often overvalued and overpaid on the free market, I had encouraged the Twins to holster their search for one, citing the methods of the aforementioned Rays who have made fiscally prudent decisions by signing an arm like Kyle Farnsworth – a guy who was written off as unable to handle high pressure situations by Baseball Prospectus – only to thrive as a closer for Tampa.  There are plenty of arms on the market that fit the same profile as Farnsworth and likely would have been obtained at a similar pay grade (one-year, $2.6M). In many respects, Matt Capps also fits in that group. Sure, he does have nearly the impressive strikeout pedigree even when healthy as a Farnsworth but he throws strikes, limits base-runners and could be signed at a reduced rate coming off the bad season. The $4.75M is twice as much as what the Rays paid Farnsworth but it isn’t an outrageous amount to hand to Capps (unlike the $7M they burnt on his last year) and, according to Fangraphs.com’s valuation system, he’s been able to come very close or match that value in three of his last five seasons.  

The Twins believe that Capps will have a bounce-back year and that is a completely reasonable expectation.

One of the reasons his strikeout rate plummeted so greatly was undoubtedly due to his forearm pain. In 2010 his biggest strikeout pitch was his slider as 20 percent of plate appearances were strikeouts on that pitch. Additionally, hitters swung chased after 39 percent of sliders thrown out of the strike zone. This past season, just 7 percent of plate appearances ended on a strikeout from his slider and opponents chased just 29 percent percent of all out-of-zone sliders. Also worth noting is that his slider’s groundball rate dropped from 44 percent in ’10 to 34 percent in ’11.

Matt Capps’s Slider (2010-2011)
	K%	Chase%	Groundball%
MLB avg	29%	33%	46%
2011	7%	29%	34%
2010	20%	39%	44%

According to Pitch F/X data, Capps’s 2011 slider did not demonstrate nearly the same amount of run and drop it did 2010. Also, velocity-wise he was throwing it nearly two miles an hour harder this past year as well:

What you see here is that whereas a majority of Capps’s sliders had a spin angle between 60 and 120 degrees in 2010, this last year a more substantial portion of his slide pieces fell between 120-to -180 degrees – a range closer to that of a fastball. So in 2011 his main secondary offering now looked more like his fastball and hitters were able to either hold up their swing or punish the pitch.

Given his forearm injury, it is easy to see why he struggled with his slider. The mechanics of the slider require a fairly strong wrist/forearm combination to execute and with a weak link in the chain, the results often are bad. So, with a healthy forearm, I would anticipate a revival of sorts for this pitch and with it, an increase in his strikeout count. Still, I can’t say with the utmost confidence that Capps will be 100% throughout the 2012 season. As I outlined last year, his arm action – one in which he cocks his elbow above shoulder level – has been identified by biomechanics as an attribute that leads to arm injuries and one that could have incited the forearm pain. Because of this delivery, it seems there would always be the possibility of another flare up.   

Truthfully, I don’t think this move is as egregious as the crowd would like people to believe. Yes, the draft pick decision was a wasteful maneuver but given both the surplus of picks in the first and supplemental round as well as the fact that the organization likely did not count on even having the Capps pick until after the CBA was renewed, declining one is not the end of the world nor the mark of a bad front office. In terms of the contract, the one-year deal for $4.75M isn’t completely out of line. And, as I mentioned before, Capps has managed to produce at that value level in the past and that is a substantial savings for the cost of a free market “experienced closer”.

Rumors swirl as winter meetings begin

The GM Winter Meetings starts today in Dallas and the event holds plenty of promise for adding new faces to the roster - including potentially finding a starting pitcher to complete the rotation.

The Twins were aggressive with the left-handed Chris Capuano but ultimately lost out to the Los Angeles Dodgers when the veteran decided to sign for a two-year, $10 million to stay in the National League last week. Nevertheless, reports surfaced that the team has been connected to free agents Jeff Francis and Edwin Jackson.

Jackson is a fairly young (28), right-handed power arm (averages 94.5 miles per hour on his fastball) who has been a 3-wins above replacement the previous two seasons and is now poised to command a multi-year deal which we estimated to be in the ballpark of three years at $11 million per year.  Francis, on the other hand, is a slightly older (31 in 2012), left-handed soft-tosser (managed to average just 84.7 miles per hour on his “heater”) who has averaging 2-wins above replacement the past two years and is fortunate if he gets offered employment for one year.

The likes of Jeff Francis and Edwin Jackson couldn’t be any further away from each other on the pitcher spectrum. Jackson is a hard-throwing fastball/slider guy while Francis is a control-oriented, slow-slower-and-slowest pitcher. Having interest in the pair is like being at the bar and trying to decide between a shot of bourbon or a wine cooler. Yet, when you peeled back some of the data, you can see that these two have a lot of common ground.

The pairs’ fastballs, with an almost ten mile per hour discrepancy between them, could not elicit a different response. Some people have actually attempt to compare Edwin Jackson to the legendary Bob Gibson, Jeff Francis’s fastball reminds people of Debbie Gibson. Still, even with the difference it is amazing that they both wound up with similar results on the pitch:

Comparing Fastball Results (2011)
	Velocity	%Pitches	Miss%	Well-Hit Avg	Ground Ball%
Edwin Jackson	94.5	55%	10%	.295	44%
Jeff Francis	84.7	53%	11%	.278	48%
MLB Avg	92.0	62%	15%	.248	44%

(via Inside Edge)

For the most part, both of the pitchers’ fastballs were below average in all categories. Jackson clearly had an advantage in the velocity department as his fastball held the fifth-highest velocity on average in 2010. Meanwhile Francis had the second slowest fastball in baseball, trailing the Nationals’ Livan Hernandez for that honor. In spite of having the livelier fastball, it was Francis who was able to get more batters to miss. Likewise, it was Francis’s ground ball tendencies that put him slightly better than the norm and thus likely caused his well-hit average to be twenty points lower in that category than Jackson.

Jackson, blessed numbers that set radar gun-enthusiasts hearts aflutter, typically just hurls his fastball to the fat part of the zone. He is a “here-hit-this” type of pitcher. As it turns out, opponents do hit it. Conversely, not afforded the same genetics, Francis is forced to work the outer-half and just off the plate in attempt to coerce the softer contact.

What separates the two pitchers is their secondary offerings. Jackson is reliant on his slider while Francis works in a changeup. Jackson’s slider has been able to generate a high percentage of swing-and-misses (34% miss percentage). Francis favors the changeup which nets him a swing-and-miss of 23% but a high rate of grounders. It is because of this that Jackson has been able to strikeout 17.2% of hitters faced while Francis has been only able to whiff 11.3%.

But strikeouts don’t tell the entire story. Sure, they are a great predictor of future success but it does not paint a picture of the complete pitcher.

In 2011, both Jackson and Francis both shared a WHIP of 1.44 - meaning they averaged roughly the same amount of base-runners over the season. Jackson had struggled with his control over his career whereas Francis has actually improved his since his injury, cutting down his walks in the past two years. Both give up a hefty number of hits. Because of his down-the-middle approach, Jackson had a much higher line drive rate as hitters were able to square up more. Francis’s attempts to incite contact indubitably led to base hits. In the end, Jackson has been roughly one win above replacement better than Francis (or he provided his team with $5 million in more “value”) yet he will be able to land a deal worth three times as much as Francis in both years and dollars.

Current Free Agent SP WAR (2011)
Name	WAR
C.J. Wilson	5.9
Edwin Jackson	3.8
Mark Buehrle	3.4
Javier Vazquez	3.2
Bartolo Colon	2.9
Jeff Francis	2.6
Roy Oswalt	2.5
Hiroki Kuroda	2.4
Erik Bedard	2.4
Paul Maholm	2.1

Presented with the option between the two, odds are that the vast majority of fans would prefer Jackson over Francis eight days a week (I’m certain a quick scroll through the comments section will validate this). The reality is that likelihood of landing Jackson, who is one of the top free agents on the market due to a small pool of starting pitchers and a Scott Boras client, is minimal. As mentioned above, he stands to collect a decent paycheck for the next few years which the Twins budget does not appear able to accommodate. And, given the interworking of his arsenal, I would say that he stands to be overpaid as well.

If you are looking at it from a purely investment standpoint, for an organization that has stated it has a $100 million payroll budget, bringing in Francis would make more sense – giving the team flexibility to address other areas like the bullpen or an outfielder. Guys like Mark Buehrle and Edwin Jackson are poised to make northwards of $10 million next year and will provide a small uptick in value over Francis who will likely make south of $5 million.

Signing Francis would not be a sexy acquisition in any shape or form. It would be settling. He has proven capable enough to throw over 180 innings and, even with an unimpressive repertoire, he has shown that he can almost match Jackson’s output. With a better defense and a more supportive lineup, Francis has the potential to post a better season in 2012 than in 2011 – at a reasonable price.

Twins should put their closer search on hold

In efforts to rekindle the passion that has subsided after a disappointing summer, the Twins hosted yet another one of their fan forums. This time, it was general manager Terry Ryan’s turn to attempt to talk the disgruntled down from their ledge.

Howard Sinker listened in on the conference call, one that allowed season ticketholders to interact with the man in charge of the team’s roster construction, and Sinker relayed to his non-season ticketholding twitter followers the talking points in 140-characters or less. In outlining his offseason plans, Ryan said that two of the immediate priorities were finding a closer as well as another starting pitcher.

Ryan has made several mentions of his plans when it comes to addressing the closer’s role. He told listeners on 1500 ESPN that Glen Perkins was not going to inherit the role and that he is looking for an “experienced closer.”  Last night, Ryan commented that the Twins are currently targeting pitchers outside of the organization, mentioning that that person could come in the form of a free agent or possibly through a trade.

The question is, why are the Twins making finding a closer such a high priority?

It’s easy to understand from the team’s perspective. Last year the Twins had 52 save opportunities and the back of the bullpen managed to hold on to just 62% of those. That was the lowest save conversion rate for the franchise since the 1997 season team converted on just 61% of their save chances.

This was clearly a black-eye for the organization that had prided itself on securing games for most of the century. After all, since 2002, they have recorded more saves than Billy Graham.

But here’s the thing: those 52 save opportunities were also tied with the Boston Red Sox for fourth fewest in baseball. Boston’s lack of save opportunities only stems from having baseball’s most potent offense which averaged 5.4 runs per game. The Twins, unlike their Red Sox counterparts, were not afforded the same luxury of running away with ballgames considering they average the second fewest runs per game in the American League (3.82 runs per game) and the fifth-lowest in all of baseball.

And therein lies the problem.

The front office is seemingly trying to stop the bleeding where the team blew a handful of save opportunities when the real problem is that the majority of their games played did not require a closer because the bats were flaccid or the starting rotation failed to keep the game within reach (they allowed 4.96 runs per game, second-most in baseball) or both. Focusing on a closer now would be like putting a tourniquet on a paper cut on one leg while the other leg is lopped off at the knee and still hemorrhaging blood everywhere.

Yes, the anticipated return of Denard Span, Justin Morneau and Joe Mauer along with the addition of Ryan Doumit should assist in a modest uptick in offensive production. Yes, the acquisition of Jamey Carroll should hopefully fortify the middle infield and support the pitching staff. And perhaps the future addition of someone like Chris Capuano, who the Twins have expressed interest in, will help solidify the rotation as Francisco Liriano, Scott Baker and Nick Blackburn all regain their health. Still, is all of that enough to raise the runs scored and shave off the pitching staff’s runs allowed – at least to the point where you may be creating more save opportunities?

To me, that is not enough to do so. As Joe Christensen wrote about earlier this week, the team is growing perilously close to that $100 million mark that was estimated to be the 2012 budget capacity. At an approximate $87.7 million now, sinking $7 million or more for the going rate of an “experienced closer” would leave the team front office with $6 million or less to address the other outstanding issues (starting pitcher, outfielder, bullpen depth, etc).

Building a strong bullpen is one thing; doing so by throwing money at a closer with an extensive resume is the wrong way. Rather than sink money into an experience closer, the Twins should be taking a cue from the Tampa Bay Rays, who have been very successful at compiling a relief staff on a shoestring budget. They coaxed some of the best work out of retreads in Troy Percival and Kyle Farnsworth while landing Rafael Soriano from Atlanta in a severely lopsided trade in their favor.

Ultimately, the Twins will need someone to close but they do not need to land a budget-buster to do so. Instead of trying to reel in the big closer fish, the Twins should be targeting the likes of Takashi Saito, who pitched well in the set-up role for the Brewers after closing for the Dodgers from 2006-2008. Or taking a look Joel Zumaya who is scheduled to pitch for scouts in mid-December and find out if he can be this year’s Joaquin Benoit, a recovering power arm in need of a one-year deal. Heck, find out if the Rangers will part with Koji Uehara, who had a brief stint as a closer in Baltimore and has the highest K/BB ratio (10.00) among relievers since 2009 as well as the second highest strikeout percentage (33.6%), now that Texas has signed Joe Nathan.

Instead of allocating a high percentage of what’s left of the 2012 budget on a player whose contributions may be minimal, the Twins should rededicate that funding towards the starting rotation, grabbing an outfielder and buttressing the rest of the bullpen while spending what is leftover on a closer.

In the end, if you don’t have save opportunities, what good is a closer anyway?

******

DiamondCentric has a special deal for the holidays - $15 for all Game Six, Nothing Runs Like Revere and The Killer shirts. Get yours for the baseball fan in your life!

Duensing was made for the bullpen

While the Twins try to piecemeal together their once glorious bullpen that has now been blown to smithereens, there is one player already on the roster who should help make the late innings much less of an adventure.

As the Star Tribune’s Joe Christensen reported that the team is bumping Brian Duensing from the rotation and relocating him back to the bullpen.

If you separate out the data from Duensing’s match-ups against same-sided opponents, you would see a pitcher with a tremendous track record:

Duensing vs Left-Handed Hitters (2009-11)
	PAs	K%	BB%	GB%	Swg. Str%
2009	90	21.1%	6.7%	60%	24%
2010	153	22.2%	4.6%	53%	28%
2011	187	20.3%	3.2%	55%	23%

(via Fangraphs & Inside Edge)

Last season, Duensing held lefties to a .210 batting average against, the 14^th-lowest among qualified MLB starters last year. What’s more is that Inside Edge’s video scouts found that lefties had a .103 well-hit average off of him – the best in baseball - meaning that nobody on the left was able to put good wood on the ball.

He absolutely stunned them with his outstanding slider. Against his slider, they had a .036 well-hit average (fourth best in baseball) and routinely beat the ball into the ground (61%) for an easy conversion to an out.

Meanwhile, his peripheral stat line against right-handed opponents paints the picture of a much more ordinary and pedestrian hurler:

Duensing vs Right-Handed Hitters (2009-11)
	PAs	K%	BB%	GB%	Swg. Str%
2009	269	12.6%	9.3%	44%	17%
2010	382	11.5%	7.3%	52%	14%
2011	524	14.7%	8.8%	41%	18%

(via Fangraphs & Inside Edge)

Of course, we know the results in 2011 were not simply “pedestrian”, they were an abomination. Thanks to righties teeing off on him, their .558 slugging percentage and their .329 batting average against him paced baseball.

Part of the reason for this barrage was due to his inability to keep the ball down against righties – which I pointed out back in August. Specifically, Duensing failed to his two main pitches to righties down: his fastball and his changeup. His fastball, on average, finished a little over an inch higher in the zone than it did in 2010. His change, his favored secondary offering to righties, finished nearly two inches higher on average in 2011 over the previous season. Because of this, Duensing experienced a significant spike in the amount of square contact being made. His line drive rate allowed to right-handers rose from 15.7% in 2010 to 22.2% last year.

To be honest, I have had troubles pinpointing what in his delivery has caused this much fluctuation. Video wises, it is hard to pick up on any major changes. Judging from pitch f/x data, however, it would appear that he is dropping his arm angle slightly for his changeup. His average release point on his changeup to righties in 2010 was several inches higher and several inches closer towards first base. This may be an indication that he was been lowering his arm slot when releasing his change thus having it remain up in the zone rather than staying on top of it.

Interestingly enough, the video scouts at Inside Edge did not feel that right-handers actually smashed the ball around off of him as much as his the stats from the previous two paragraphs would indicate. According to them, they concluded that righties had a .236 well-hit average off of him. It was well above the league’s average but 17 other starters saw harder contact including Tampa’s David Price and Arizona’s Ian Kennedy.

So here’s what we know: Duensing’s stuff is stupid good against lefties. If he is limited to a higher portion of left-handed match-ups, as would be the case if he had the luxury of being inserted into those prime situations in a given ball game, he will likely succeed and put up very good numbers. We also know now that he struggles mightily against right-handed opponents. Given a higher pool of those opponents to face in 2011, overexposed Duensing was battered continuously. Then again, he demonstrated in 2010 that when he was able to locate his pitches properly, he was able to keep righties from launching an extra base hit assault (52% groundball rate is not too shabby).  

I tried to make it abundantly clear last year heading into spring camp that his arsenal is best suited for relief. Yes, he had some impressive outings in 2010 but that did not detract from the fact that he would be substantially more effective among the relievers. Without any outside additions or prospects ready to move him from the rotation, the Twins decided to let their good fortune ride. His results in 2011 should more or less solidify this fact in concrete: Duensing is made for the bullpen.