Does the White Sox recent bullpen moves merit a response from the Twins?

After having arguably the American League’s most successful bullpen last season, leading the AL in strikeout rate (9.05 K/9), xFIP (3.79) and WAR (6.6), White Sox general manager Kenny Williams has continued to tinker with his relief staff.

Having already parted with the cantankerous closer in Bobby Jenks, who took the opportunity to offer some vapid parting shots at his former employer, choosing instead to replace him with Jesse Crain (which may or may not have been a move intended to keep Crain for destroying the Sox’s offense), the Sox have signed veteran left-hander Will Ohman to a two-year, $4 million contract.

Considering the cavalcade of left-handed hitters in the Minnesota Twins lineup, this should be interpreted as a direct assault on attempting to dethrone the reigning AL Central champions.

Ohman, who has held left-handed hitters to a .205 average in his career, will join the fireballing Matt Thornton and Chris Sale as Chicago’s lefties in the ‘pen, giving manager Ozzie Guillen yet another Southside southpaw.  

With Jake Peavy still an unknown, the Sox have a discussed a contingency plan of moving the hard-throwing Sale into the rotation if Peavy is not ready come April. Although Sale would give the Sox three proficient left-handed starters to complement Mark Buerhle and John Danks, his move from the bullpen would leave the Sox with just one lefty reliever in Thornton. The addition of Ohman assures the team that there will be at least two lefties in the event Sale is transferred to the starting rotation. On the other hand, if Peavy is able to begin the season as a starter, the Sox will be blessed with a surplus of lefties, which is a huge late inning advantage versus the Twins.  

Does this maneuvering by the White Sox require a response from the Twins front office?

Although the Twins have done well as team in terms of batting average against lefties (hitting .268, sixth best in baseball), most of those hits have not exactly packed a punch (.326 wOBA, 14^th in baseball), leading to the natural conclusion that the Twins need a right-handed presence in the dugout to counteract Guillen’s bullpen strategy.

The popular name that continues to be bandied about by Twins fans is free agent Vladimir Guerrero. While he is a brand-name slugger that is coming off a bounce-back season with the Rangers and has slaughtered left-handed pitching  in his career (.412 wOBA against lefties), there are several reasons to be bearish on him.

Although Guerrero finished the season with a respectable .300/.345/.496 batting line, the bulk of the work was done in the season’s first-half. In the first few months of the 2010 baseball season, Guerrero hit .319/.364/.554 with 20 home runs in 354 plate appearances. Meanwhile, in the latter portion of the year, the right-handed free-swinger coasted in to the finish line somewhat, hitting .284/.336/.461 with nine home runs in 289 plate appearances.

The power drop-off coincides with Guerrero’s inability to elevate the ball in the back-half of the season. As you can glean from the chart below, Guerrero’s groundball rate spiked significantly post-July, resulting in fewer home runs and thus a degeneration of his power numbers:

To me, this is a solid indicator of age and nagging ailments impeding him for sustaining a high-level of production throughout the entire season. According to BaseballInjuryTool.com, he’s had no less than five instances where leg-related injuries have sidelined him for a period of time.

Even if Guerrero manages to repeat his 2010 season in which he avoided any lengthy time in the trainer’s room, there are other indications of a drop-off.  In spite of leading the Rangers with six “No Doubt” home runs (those home runs according to HitTrackerOnline.com that cleared the fence by at least 20 vertical feet and landed at least 50 feet past the fence), lending credence to the notion that he is still very much capable of inciting a charge into the ball, he was also second on the team in “Just Enough” (balls that cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet, or that landed less than one fence height past the fence) and led the team in “Lucky” home runs (a home run that would not have cleared the fence if it has been struck on a 70-degree, calm day). Because his “Just Enough” rate of 31% exceeds the standard 27% in additional to relocating to an environment that has been, so far, unfavorable to home run hitters in comparison to the Ballpark at Arlington, a natural conclusion is that Guerrero’s numbers would experience some deterioration in his home run totals.

What’s more is that while the Twins would require his presence just a few times a week and to occasionally supplant Jason Kubel against left-handed starters, Guerrero is seeking a full-time job. Unless the front office or Ron Gardenhire can figure out how to carve out playing time between Jason Kubel, Delmon Young, Michael Cuddyer so that Guerrero is satisfied, the Twins appear to be unlikely suitors for his services. Rather, a team like the Rays, who have a vacancy at DH, would be able to provide him with his requisite playing time.      

From the Twins’ perspective, in a perfect world, the market for Guerrero would continue to dissipate, leaving Guerrero and his agent accepting a reduce contract with the understanding that he is a role player. After all, he’s mashed left-handed pitching and the Twins could use that. However, Guerrero wants a full-time position and has a desire to be compensated as such

As I said back in December:

“Given that left-handed pitchers represent a smaller universe compared to their right-handed counterparts, Twins needn't sign a right-handed hitter who is interested in 500-plus plate appearances – marquee guys like Paul Konerko, Maggilo Ordonez and Derrek Lee are going to want full-time jobs and also be compensated as such. What the Twins need is a player that can siphon off 250 plate appearances during those other 29% of match-ups against left-handed pitchers -- basically a right-handed version of Jim Thome last year.”

Naturally, it would be nice to sign a formidable player like Vladimir Guerrero or Derrek Lee to a nominal contract, but both want more substantial role that other teams could guarantee. The Twins simply do not have the plate appearances to go around, limiting their ability to entice those types of players to signing with the team.

In the end, the White Sox recent moves likely require some sort of response from the Twins. What seems to be relevant is that the Twins seem to recognize that due to the statistical fact that right-handed pitchers greatly outnumber left-handed ones, there is no need to overpay for a role playing right-handed hitter. Plenty of hitters are on the market, including established hitters like Andruw Jones, Troy Glaus, Marcus Thames and Jorge Cantu to consider alongside Luke Hughes and Jeff Bailey. 

What seems clear, given the current circumstances, is that that option is probably not going to be Vladimir Guerrero.

What Pavano could bring the Twins in 2011

With mainly baseball’s afterthoughts pursuing his services, reports emerged late Thursday night that the Twins were increasing their pursuit of starter Carl Pavano.

Tweeted by Sports Illustrated’s Jon Heyman, up until this point, the Twins had been extending a one-year contract to the Pavano camp but have recently added a second year in their offer. Unless another club swoops in and sweetens the deal with that mythical third year which Pavano has been requesting, the likelihood he returns to pitch in Minnesota in 2011 appears imminent.

From the Twins perspective, Pavano addresses several of their needs.

For starters, with a questionable assortment of bullpen arms, the starting rotation is going to be pressed to work deeper into games next season. Outside of three other starters in the league, no one averaged as many innings as Pavano did per start in 2010. This was an exhaustive problem last year as Scott Baker (5.8 innings per start) and Kevin Slowey (5.5 innings per start) frequently taxed the bullpen. Pavano, meanwhile, averaged 6.9 innings of work, allowing the ‘pen to take some much needed nights off.

Secondly, there is the fact that he is a quintessential Twins-type of pitcher. Not only does he have a miniscule walk rate, a low 1.6 walks per nine innings of work since 2009, but he rarely engages in any semblance of flirtation with the base-on-ball. Last year just 12% of his total match-ups resulted in a three-ball count bested only by some guy named Cliff Lee. For an organization that places a great deal of emphasis on restricting free passes, Pavano is an ideologue.  

What makes him so stingy in the walks department is his tenacious introduction to each hitter. In his tenure in a Twins uniform, Pavano attacked the strike zone with gumption, getting ahead of hitters with a first-pitch strike 67.8% of the time, the best in baseball since ‘09. What’s more is that of his first two pitches, Pavano has located one or the other for a strike over 90% of the time in the past two seasons, also one of the highest in the game.

Although Pavano’s early count zone dominance does not come without some blowback, not only does this aggressive approach keeps him from walking hitters, it also affords him the luxury of turning to his harder to handle off-speed offerings. Using a change-slider combination the veteran right-hander likes to work on the fringe of the strike zone, attempting to inspire opponents to chase after these less than perfect pitches. In fact, his 34.1% out of zone swing percentage was the highest among starters since 2009:

Highest Out-of-Zone Swing% 2009-2010
Carl Pavano	34.1%
Shaun Marcum	32.9%
Roy Halladay	32.5%
Dan Haren	32.1%
Francisco Liriano	32.1%

(via Fangraphs.com)

Unlike some of the other names on that list, Pavano rarely induces the same amount of missed bats, instead relying on generating weaker contact then putting himself at the whim of the defense behind him.

It is this tactic which makes some analysts question where his output will be in 2011.

In 2010, Pavano posted his lowest career batting average on balls in play (BABIP). As a pitcher that allows a high amount of contact and has an unusually suppressed BABIP not typical of his recent track record, the laws of regression suggest that he will see his BABIP return towards the league-average or his career-norm in the ensuing year. If you adhere to this reasoning, it would imply that Pavano is likely headed to a season filled with more hits than his last.

Then again, because he was a prolific ground ball pitcher last year, Pavano’s BABIP (and ultimately his success) will likely be tied to the performance of his infielders. Even though the Twins have dismantled perhaps one of the league’s best defensive middle infields, the replacements in Alexi Casilla and Tsuyoshi Nishioka are projected to be a faster combination than their predecessor, leading one to speculate that they might be able to cut down more ground balls for Pavano than last year.

Similarly, the configuration of the home stadium also provides him some insulation. Although Pavano surrendered more hits at home versus on the road in 2010, he gave up fewer detrimental hits. WhenTarget Field played big in 2010, pitchers could throw to contact could and get away with hitting a sizable portion of the plate middle-away without too much backlash as fly balls would simply die in the power alleys. Specifically for Pavano he allowed far fewer homers at Target Field (0.74 HR/9) than he did on the road (1.16 HR/9).

While most of the aforementioned indicators are favorable, there are also some signs that Pavano may have hit the wall in late 2010 or worse, have the makings of a potential injury.

In early August, Joe Christensen reported that the coaching staff said Pavano had a tired arm. Not long after that, Pavano, who has had a reoccurring sore neck throughout his career, had it flare up but decided to pitch through it. According to LaVelle Neal, this soreness originated in his neck on the right side and extended towards his shoulder area of his throwing arm.

Despite downplaying the significance of the discomfort, the results from August on were brutal. After allowing 131 hits in his first 148.2 innings, he finished the year allowing 96 hits in 72.1 innings including seven home runs post-August. In addition to that, Pavano’s strikeout rate fell off the table:

While it is likely that these results were purely the effects of high mileage on his arm, and an off-season of rest should rejuvenate him, it is still possible that his discomfort in his neck problem leads to something more substantial.

It is easy to go back-and-forth on whether signing Pavano makes sense for the Twins. On one hand, he's 35 years old, ripe for regression and assuming a significant chunk of the payroll. On the other hand, he’s the proverbial “gamer” who works deep into games and racks up innings, alleviating the bullpen’s workload.

When you add it up, for the most part, signing Pavano is a sensible transaction for the Twins. Financially, a two-year contract is reasonable and the $8-to-$10 million per season contract moderate but not outrageous. The biggest downside is whether or not adding Pavano restricts the Twins for making subsequent moves, such as re-signing Jim Thome or adding another quality bench option, or perhaps inspiring them to trade the arbitration-eligible Kevin Slowey to reduce overhead.  

Based on his last two seasons of work, he’s clearly capable of chewing through a large quantity of innings and can work deep into the ballgame. Regression is certainly a probability but given his ability to limit walks, work ahead in the count, get opponents to chase out-of-zone pitches and hit plenty of ground balls, his totals in 2011 should not be too far off from his 2010 season.

A Handful of Predictions for 2011

Seeing as that this new year is just three days old and we are still a month away from pitchers and catchers flying down to the warmer climate to trot off their holiday weight, it is probably very premature to make these predictions. Even so, in no particular order, here are four things I expect to happen in the 2011 season:

Denard Span will be on base more.

After posting his career low on-base percentage in 2010 (.331), the Twins center fielder should be primed to rejuvenate that mark this year.

When pitchers adjusted to Span’s patient approach by buzzing strikes in on the first pitch more frequently, the left-handed lead-off man was often put in debt in the count. This led to fewer walks overall as his rate decreased for the second straight season, lowering from 10.4% to 8.5%. Nevertheless, because of his keen eye at the plate (his 18.5% out-of-zone chase rate is the fifth-lowest in baseball since 2009) and his ability to make contact (90.9% contract rate since ’09, seventh-highest), Span will continue to exercise judicious decision-making in the batter’s box moving forward.

But that wasn’t the only factor towards his reduced on-base percentage.

Span, a habitual line drive/groundball hitter, witnessed his batting average on those balls diminish greatly in 2010. Since more of his batted balls went to gloves in 2010, Span had a fair share of hits taken away from his totals and thus decreasing his on-base percentage.

Batting Average on Balls In Play	2009	2010	Career
Groundballs	.287	.223	.254
Line Drives	.763	.677	.701

In all, this led to a 59-point decrease in his batting average on balls in play, significantly influence his overall numbers. Part of this BABIP decline may have to do with his minor yet potentially impactful alteration with his hand position, bringing the bat closer to his body at the beginning of the year. This led to an inordinate amount of grounders in the season’s first-half. Later in the year, it appeared that Span was getting his hands further away from his body, resulting in more line drives as the season progressed.

As noted above, Span maintains terrific plate discipline skills. Likewise, because of his ability to utilize the spacious center field area at Target Field with a high percentage of line drives, Span is poised to be the catalyst at the top of the order that the Twins envisioned when they signed him to a long-term deal.

Danny Valencia will encounter the proverbial “sophomore slump”.

This one isn’t that hard to foresee. After all, his batting average on balls in play was at an inflated .345 – a hearty fifty points higher than the league average. But that’s not the reason that I anticipate some decline in his numbers.

Often, communication and scouting reports move at various speeds throughout the league. Someone who can’t handle breaking pitches might be discovered immediately and word spreads like wildfire. Other times, certain holes and tendencies are not exposed until after the season. Take Denard Span for example. It took nearly two years for teams to pepper the strike zone early in the count in order to put Span at a disadvantage and it kept him off the bases in 2010.

In Valencia’s case as the 2010 season progressed it became clear that, while demonstrating great plate coverage, he had a soft spot in the zone: down and in.

 Whereas the 2010 season was a dance of trial-and-error for opponents when facing Valencia, as this information gets disseminated through the league, teams will attempt to exploit this weakness while avoiding his strengths in 2011.

Of course, this doesn’t automatically mean Valencia will have a down year, just that he will struggle more this coming season. To be sure, the Twins third baseman has shown that he is a monster when it comes to hitting up and out over the plate. In fact, according to Inside Edge his .203 well-hit average on pitches up in the zone was the second-best in baseball behind teammate Joe Mauer. Unlike some overeager rookies who tend to yank that pitch, Valencia uses the “big part” of the field – hitting 21.3% of balls in play to center field.

Jim Hoey will have a Grant Balfour circa-2008 emergence for the Twins.

Okay, this one is not based on anything remotely scientific, but bear with me on this.

Both Hoey and Balfour are cut from the power-pitching ilk, born from the same lineage that loves lighting up radar guns. Likewise, both had various arm injuries sidetracking promising careers. Balfour required Tommy John surgery in 2005 at the age of 27 while Hoey had his foray with Tommy John in 2004 at 21 years old. More recently, while attempting to correct his career path, a tear in his labrum required additional surgery for Hoey.

In Balfour’s case, the Twins decided to cut ties with the right-handed Aussie after the 2005 season, shortly after his date with the surgeon. He would sign a minor league deal with the Reds only to be selected off the waivers by the Brewers at the end of the ’06 season and rehab in their system. Before being called to Milwaukee, the Brewers shipped Balfour to Tampa for Seth McClung in the middle of the ’07 season. It was there with the Rays in ’08 that Balfour regained his health. That year, Balfour, tossing a 94.6-mph fastball, carved through opponents, striking out 82 in 58.1 innings of work and leading to a very impressive 1.54 ERA.

The savvy Rays front office targeted a talented yet damaged product and received an amazing value as Balfour has become an integral part of the Tampa bullpen the past three seasons.

Minor League Comp.	K/9	BB/9	HR/9
G. Balfour	10.1	3.4	0.6
J. Hoey	10.3	4.4	0.5

Many skeptics question Hoey’s control, particularly given his walk rate in the last two seasons. Certainly, his 5.9 walks per nine innings is un-Twins-like however this is more likely a byproduct of his recovery from labrum surgery as prior to that Hoey averaged just 2.5 walks per nine innings. Like Tommy John, recovering from labrum surgery can be a long, tedious process. Fans may recall Jesse Crain’s road back after a similar surgery in 2007 in which he didn’t appear fully recovered until the second-half of the 2009 season.

If the Twins coaching staff can help him regain his control this spring, Hoey could be a big contributor in the bullpen this coming season and beyond.

Scott Baker will be the second-best pitcher in the rotation.

I know what you are thinking, “If that is true, the 2011 season ended up being an unmitigated disaster”, but hang on. Scott Baker is actually much better than advertised.

Since 2008, Baker has held one of baseball best strikeout-to-walk ratio (3.39 K/BB, 11th-best), showing both the ability to avoid walking hitters and striking them out when necessary. These are the foundations of a very good starter: No walks, high amount of strikeouts.

Of course, that is just a part of the pitching equation, the other part happens when hitters put the ball into play.

Because he likes to work up in the zone and above it, hitters find it easy to get underneath Baker’s offerings. This is why he is a predominately fly ball-type pitcher. This is not a problem in and of itself but there were two factors that influenced his season in 2010.

In 2008 and 2009, Baker had an outfield defense that had both Carlos Gomez and Denard Span behind him. This past year, with Gomez gone, not only did Baker have Delmon Young and Michael Cuddyer covering more real estate in Target Field, when Justin Morneau’s season-ending concussion required Cuddyer to relocate to first it was Jason Kubel who was pressed into duties in right field, further diluting the defensive talent.

This means that more balls found grass and shot gaps than in previous seasons:

	BABIP on Fly Balls
2010	.198
2009	.139
2008	.119

To compound the problem, in the middle of the season, Baker revealed that he was having tendonitis issues in his elbow. It was this that likely caused him to drop his release point. With the lowered release point, we see flattening of his fastball and some loss of command in the zone leading to more hard hit balls.

If Morneau returns from the concussion and Cuddyer able to return to his normal position, this should improve Baker’s outfield defense over the assortment at the end of last sesaon. (Of course, platooning in the speedy Jason Repko in Baker’s starts would be an ideal alignment.)  Likewise, since he opted to have a minor procedure in the offseason to correct his elbow issue, Baker will likely return to his pre-tendonitis release point where he had much better command. Together, this should reduce the amount of hits surrendered and leave the 29-year-old righty with his low walk, high strikeout stuff. 

Taking Advantage of Target Field

Perhaps the biggest Twins event of 2010 was the opening of the new downtown ballpark. With much fanfare and hype, Minnesota baseball returned to the natural environments.

However, after the first full season not everyone had rave reviews about the newly constructed baseball cathedral. The field drew criticisms from members of the offense that the park was unfair and deflating their power totals. In November, Justin Morneau even implored via email to the Star Tribune beat writers that the Twins should consider altering the confines:

"Right-center to left-center is ridiculous. It's] almost impossible for a righthanded hitter to [homer to the] opposite field and very difficult for lefties. It affects the hitters a lot, and you start to develop bad habits as a hitter when you feel like you can only pull the ball to hit it over the fence. You take those habits on the road."

Because of the wall height, distance, temperature and wind patterns, the field in its first season deterred plenty of would-be home runs back on to the field. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the area Morneau noted. Michael Cuddyer, who had hit nine home runs to center and right-center at the Metrodome in 2009, was able to reach those seats just once in 2010. Likewise, Jason Kubel hit 10 home runs in center and right-center at the Metrodome in ’09 but just two this past season.

In the recently released Hardball Times Annual 2011, Greg Rybarczyk, operator of the seminal site HitTrackerOnline.com which tracks “true” distances of the league’s home runs, published what he considered the “Ultimate Home Run Park Factors”.

For those unfamiliar with the metric, Park Factors measures the influence of a ballpark’s configuration that may increase or decrease the possibility of offense in comparison to other parks across baseball. By ESPN.com’s account, Target Field finished dead last when it came to home runs. Although ESPN.com has been carrying this number for years on their website unlike Rybarczyk’s totals, the World Wide Sports Leader’s website does not include wind patterns and temperature into their equation.

Rybarczyk’s research revealed that, thanks to the extremely inviting Crawford Boxes down the left field line, the Houston Astros’ home ballpark, Minute Maid Park, was the easiest field to hit a home run at (especially if you were a right-handed pull hitter) with an overall Home Run Park Factor of 119. Conversely, based on the distance and size of the walls (16 feet high around), Citi Field in Queens was considered the most difficult venue to book a round-trip vacation at with an overall Home Run Park Factor of 70.

Probably to the surprise of Morneau and company, Rybarczyk’s findings showed that Target Field’s overall Home Run Park Factor was 96, ranking 16th out of 32 possible major league stadiums. This is an astonishingly neutral result:

“True” Home Run Park Factors	LF	LCF	CF	RCF	RF	Total
Target Field	96	104	98	103	84	96
Average	97	97	97	97	97	97

(via Hardball Times Annual 2011)

What we find, based on Rybarczyk’s conclusions, is that Target Field isn’t all that daunting after all. Certainly from the alley-to-alley the field is a bit home run resistant, but in general, the corners are favorable (right field is a particularly alluring spot for left-handed sluggers who pull the ball) and the ballpark rated out as a field that slightly favors hitters. In short, hitters like Cuddyer, Kubel and Morneau may struggle at times to vacate the field in center and right-center, but they will also be rewarded if they pull the ball a bit more.

While Morneau stated his concern that the home configurations would ultimately affect how players hit on the road, Delmon Young was one player who recognized that this wasn’t a bad thing. After posting a .576 slugging percentage with 7 home runs while pulling the ball in ’09, Young demonstrated much better pop by knocking out 17 home runs to left while slugging a much more robust .846 when pulling the ball. Without much alteration to their approach, Cuddyer and Kubel might be able to mirror Young’s success.

If you are in charge of the team-building for the Twins, what this means is that your ideal free agent acquisition is either a (1) dead-pull hitter to either field or (2) a line drive hitter to center/alleys (fly balls will likely just die in the wind). If you are targeting a free agent who has a majority of their home runs to the alleys or center field, that player is probably going to witness a significant drop in power. This means that someone like Derrek Lee, who has hit nine of his 19 home runs to center, right-center and right, would likely not replicate that total in a Twins uniform. Meanwhile, someone like Vladimir Guerrero, who pulled 23 of his 29 home runs in ’10, would likely have a better chance of having his power numbers remain static.

To be sure, despite the neutral results in ’10, Rybarczyk also acknowledges that Target Field may wind up playing more towards the pitcher in the future but, at the same time, the field should not finish dead last like ESPN.com’s Park Factors suggests:

“Target Field is a fair park if you consider only the field dimensions, but the cool temperatures will shave some distance off most homers hit in the Twins’ new park. I suspect that after an adjustment period, home runs will settle in at Target Field at a level around 90 overall, based on the fence layout and the early and late-season temperatures.”

In the end, the Twins will simply have to learn how to cope with their surroundings. In terms of offense, either hitters need to attempt to pull the ball more if they want the extravagant home run totals or look to capitalize on the spacious alleyways if they can settle for the home run’s less sexy cousin, the double. Delmon Young made some adjustments and it served him well, leading to a team-high 25 doubles at home. Similarly, Danny Valenica, a line drive machine to center field, hit .386 at Target Field by shooting gaps. These success stories can be emulated.

By focusing on playing to the field’s strengths in 2011, the Twins will be able to produce a distinct home field advantage.  

Protecting the midsection

In the newly released Hardball Times Annual 2011, Baseball Info Solution’s John Dewan presented his yearly review of team defense based on his Plus/Minus system. Perhaps a little surprising, the speedy Oakland Athletics (+77) paced baseball in this area. This is noteworthy because the Green and Gold held the 24th-worst spot in the rankings just one short season ago.

For their part, Oakland, who had already boasted supreme outfield coverage (procuring a +43 tally in this area), went to work improving their infield for the 2010 season. Shortstop Orlando Cabrera was blight on the defensive landscape, turning in a season in which he was -30 runs below average. Similarly, they employed Adam Kennedy as their everyday third baseman who was -5 runs below average. Across the diamond, they used the drug-addled remnants of Jason Giambi for 58 games (who had wasted his entire defense in front of congress apparently).

Realizing this bunch of aging fielders was not going to do the pitching staff any favors, the A’s began to make maneuvers. At the trade deadline in 2009, Billy Beane moved their defensive-less shortstop to the Twins and implemented the rangier Cliff Pennington as the starter.  A week later, the A’s granted Giambi his outright release. This allowed for a defensive-minded first baseman in Daric Barton to take over. Last January, Oakland tapped their outfield surplus to acquire third baseman Kevin Kouzmanoff from the San Diego Padres. The only constant around the infield diamond between the ’09 and ’10 unit would be second baseman Mark Ellis.

Pennington gave the A’s a supreme defender at short, finishing with a +10 rating, seventh-best in the game. Meanwhile Barton was a +27 first baseman, the best in baseball and 13 runs better than the next closest player in Ike Davis. Perhaps because of maturity and dedication to his defensive craft or a statistical anomaly, Kouzmanoff improved his Plus/Minus totals from +7 with the Padres in ’09 to +20 in ’10 with the A’s.   

The moves provided an immediate upgrade to the defense and assisted in elevating Oakland’s pitching staff to one of the best in the American League. After allowing 4.70 runs per game and posting a below-average .682 defensive efficiency ratio, the next year the A’s had the American League’s best defensive efficiency ratio (.709) and allowed the fewest runs per game (3.86). Indeed, a significant portion of this improvement was associated with shoring up the infield defense.

The only other team to have such a dramatic improvement in that timeframe was none other than the Minnesota Twins.

After finishing baseball with the 23rd-worst Plus/Minus ratings with a -31 total, the Twins managed to climb their way into respectability, concluding the 2010 season with a +37 rating.

Minnesota Twins	Middle Infield	Corner Infield	Outfield	Total
2008	-13	-21	-8	-42
2009	-59	+17	+11	-31
2010	+36	+17	-16	+37

(via Hardball Times Annual 2011)

In the previous offseason, the Twins targeted their middle infield which had been the worst in all of baseball. Admittedly, the relocation from an artificial turf field to a natural one helps in slowing down some of the would-be hits at the Dome, the team also grabbed two of the best defenders at their position.

Like Oakland, the Twins realized that Orlando Cabrera was simply not an elite defender and quickly traded for Milwaukee’s J.J. Hardy at the conclusion of the 2009 season. As I wrote back in March, Hardy was destined to be a middle infield repairman for the Twins. While sidetracked by injuries that limited him to 858 defensive innings, Hardy was still +5 runs above average, good enough for tenth in baseball. Although members of the Twins organization indicate Hardy’s lack of foot speed played a critical role in his exodus from Minnesota, data suggests that Hardy’s range was outstanding the past three years, possibly due to his positioning and anticipation rather than his outright quickness.

Hardy’s middle infield mate, Orlando Hudson, was acquired in early February for a nominal one-year, $5 million dollar deal. Hudson’s long outstanding reputation as a defensive wiz, finishing in the top ten of Dewan’s Plus/Minus system five times in the past six seasons, lent itself well to the Twins way of baseball. To his end, Hudson provided the Twins with the best second baseman effort (+22) in the majors.

In all, the Hardy/Hudson combination helped the Twins move from a -59 team up-the-middle to a +36 team. This tandem made up for the defensive shortcomings exposed in the outfield when Jason Kubel was subjected to extended time wearing a glove. Now, with a similar outfield alignment projected in the 2011 season, the Twins have stripped down the infield combination that helped a pitching staff that transitioned from a fly ball one in ’09 (41% FB%) to a groundball one in ’10 (44.7% GB%).

Essentially, the Twins are making the gamble that the two birds in hand are not worth as much as the two birds in the bush.

For the majority of his career, Alexi Casilla’s defense has been questioned by both on-field and off-field representatives. In 2008, despite a fantastic .400 on-base percentage in the Grapefruit League, Casilla was sent back to Rochester because Ron Gardenhire was displeased by his “lack of attention to details” saying:

“He just seems to get really sloppy at second base, because of the short throw and (because) he doesn’t have to use his arm. He’s just got to really get a few things straightened out ... And that’s learning to get outs when you’re supposed to get outs, and get away from all the flashy stuff and get back to the basics of baseball, catching the ball and getting somebody out and using your feet and making good throws. He gets too flashy, thinks that he can do a lot of different things. We’re going to get him away from that.”

A year later, after claiming the starting second base spot in 2008, Casilla received a demotion in 2009 as he continued to display lapses on the field. After several fielding gaffes, the then-Twins second baseman failed to run out a pop fly – trotting to first with the bat in his hand.

He’s quick, with decent hands and a fairly strong arm yet his lackadaisical reputation precedes him. At the same time, there are plenty of indications that he could be a defensive upgrade over the very good incumbent Hardy.

In his small-sample size at short, Casilla managed to save +2 runs while turning 15 double plays in 17 opportunities (88% success rate). That double play rate is a good indication of great footwork, awareness and release. While Hardy has a very good arm, he only converted 55 double-plays in 101 opportunities (54.5%). Although Casilla’s pace isn’t likely going to stay up in the 80 percentile as his playing time increases if he stays at the 60-to-65%-range however he will remain in the top of the league as one of the best twin-killers at short. In the end, if he can keep his over-rambunctiousness under control while maintaining the focus that Twins management requires, he has the potential to perhaps be a superior groundball-stopper than Hardy (particularly if Hardy’s maladies continue in Baltimore and keep him off the field).

The other replacement, Tsuyoshi Nishioka, is even more of a mystery in terms of what he is capable of providing. A recipient of a Gold Glove in Japan, critics like to state that former Japanese convert Kaz Matsui also won several Gold Gloves at short before moving to the Mets where he was below average as a defender at short. This revelation got Matsui shifted to second where he was better suited.

Matsui, who recently signed back in Japan, had some advice for his inbound countryman. Matsui told Nishioka through the media that:

“(1) The effect natural grass has on defense at second base is small. Don’t have negative preconceptions. (2) Be careful about getting spiked during double plays (3) Gather data on batters with speed.”

Obviously, some of this advice can be interpreted as the issues that Matsui had when making his conversion to Major League Baseball. The first issue involving the natural grass versus artificial surfaces that are favored in Japan’s stadiums is of moderate concern. For one, the hops produced on the artificial surface winds up being much more “true” than that of real grass. You don’t wind up with divot holes in the base paths that kick worm-burners up like they do on a dirt surface. Likewise, balls that normal seem to accelerate on the fake green stuff is slowed by the longer grass. However, by Matsui’s experience, the grass factor had only a small effect on his game.

The second piece of advice is aimed at the fact that American players will go hard into second base to break a play up. This is not a tradition shared on the other side of the Pacific. To speculate, Matsui was probably surprised by how little amount of time he had to turn a double play and would likely rush his throws (he made 13 throwing errors in his first season). In the same vein, Matsui also demonstrated issues feeding a double play to his middle infield partner. His 29 double plays started were the fewest among qualified shortstops. Again, while it is pure speculation, it might be different approach in feeding a second baseman if there were less of a probability of him going ass-over-tea-kettle. For instance, a shortstop might not need to hasten a throw to the bag to give his partner additional time to pivot the relay before being barreled into by the runner.

The final word of advice from Matsui, “gather data on baserunners”, is fairly straight-forward. Unlike those that develop within the minor league system, Matsui had little experience educating himself on players in the majors. He was thrusted into a starting role without the proper knowledge of his opposition and, unlike someone like Cal Ripken who goes to great lengths preparing for each opponent Matsui was likely manning a demanding position cold-turkey (particularly when you factor in a language barrier). Either way, Matsui’s message to Nishioka is clear: Spend time learning the competition.  

Needless to say, dismantling one of the better middle infield defensive units in baseball can be frustrating and a painstaking process to watch. After all, the team had moved from the worst to the third best in just one winter. For some, it may be even more difficult to readily accept the unknown as well since Hardy and Hudson represented two of the more tangible commodities while embracing Casilla and Nishioka as improvements requires eschewing advanced defensive data.

Naturally, Casilla and Nishioka will be behind the curve when it comes to knowledge of the competition which Hardy and Hudson benefitted from. At the same time the new duo has better tools – particularly speed – which could provide a big advantage (at least the Twins are betting on that it does). A year from now, we will know if Casilla hit well enough or remain focused to lock down the position for an entire season. We will know if Nishioka heeded Matsui’s recommendation and become a key component in the Twins lineup.

Then again, it is entirely possible that the middle infield will regress back to pre-2010 numbers. Only time will tell.