Did Dewan (and company) diss Denard?

The Fielding Bible Awards results were released this week, outlining the final ballots for each position in baseball. Notably absent from the center field list of vote-getters was the Twins anchor, Denard Span.

Now, I'm not suggesting Span should have won as baseball boasts several superior players in that position, but I do believe Span's defense should have be highly regarded, especially by the voters of this particular award.

The voting was conducted with a ten-person panel including such distinguished, forward-thinking baseball minds as Bill James, Rob Neyer, John Dewan and Peter Gammons as well as columnist/Gardy-lover Joe Posnanski. The voters could rank their top ten players at each position but not one member of that panel gave one of their ten votes in Span’s direction in the center field category. Twenty-two other center fielders received votes. Twenty-two.

How is it possible that all these well-established baseball men came to the same conclusion that Span’s center field defense is worst than 22 others, particularly when some of the defensive metrics that they invented suggest otherwise?

Most of the advanced fielding metrics (those promoted by Bill James and some devised by John Dewan) actually portray Span’s 2010 season as a top ten defender. For instance, Dewan’s own Plus/Minus system, the one that most of the Fielding Bible Awards are based on, ranked Span at +14 runs above average, the seventh-best at the position. Meanwhile, Ultimate Zone Rating (or UZR) located at Fangraphs.com states that Span’s number (6.3 UZR) is the fifth-best among his counterparts while his .935 revised zone rating was the best in baseball. What’s more, he did all this while logging the second-most innings in baseball at his position.

Span’s Fielding Metrics (2010)
	Total	CF Rank
Plus/Minus	+14	7th
UZR	6.3	5th
Revised Zone Rating	.935	1st
Fielding Percentage	.990	8th

It is curious that someone like Dewan, who touts his Plus/Minus system as one of the most advanced, more or less voted against what his own system suggested was a defensive talent. According to Dewan’s website:

“My book, The Fielding Bible, goes into great length (ad nauseum to some) describing the new fielding system we developed at Baseball Info Solutions, the Plus/Minus System. Video Scouts at BIS review video of every play of every major league game and record detailed information on each play, such as the location of each batted ball, the speed, the type of hit, etc. Using this in-depth data, we’re able to figure out how each player compares to his peers at his position.”

Essentially, the Dewan-designed defensive rating system says that Span compared very favorably to his peers. Roughly the seventh-best. Dewan and company simply chose to ignore all that. So as all these metrics and nerd numbers inform us that Span should be hailed as a glove pimp, those that used the power of observation (also known as “scouting”) were underwhelmed by his performance in his first season as a full-time center fielder.

Admittedly, Span appeared to lack the confidence to take control as the quarterback of the outfield. For all of his closing speed that helps him compensate for the lack of agility from his flanking co-stars, Span didn’t appear to be in command. On various occasions this past season, when balls were hit towards the gap in that no man’s land region between center and the corner outfielders, Span deferred and pulled up rather than track it down himself. This was a scene that we hadn’t seen with Carlos Gomez in center. He treated every fly ball like a real-life game of Hungry, Hungry Hippos.

In addition to that, Span also has a fairly weak arm. According to Dewan’s stats, Span finished the season at -1 runs saved by his arm – 24th among center fielders. Likewise, Fangraphs.com’s ARM accounting system suggested that his wing was worth -2.0 runs below average (fifth-worst among qualified center fielders). Because of this, runners have been able to advance bases more frequently (move up on 58% of total opportunities on Span).

Did the subjective nature of Span’s defensive prowess as well as his arm stats influence the voters to drop him behind the likes of Carlos Gomez, Torii Hunter or Aaron Rowand? Because their votes are public we know that some very data-oriented people decided to go against what the numbers say. In the end, because they do not offer commentary behind their votes, we will never really know the reason behind why Span was omitted across the board.

Keeping Jason Kubel

Last Friday, the Twins decided that they would exercise the 28-year-old Jason Kubel’s $5.25 million dollar option on 2011. This was one of the more significant decisions that loomed on the offseason landscape for the team. When we were creating our individual blueprints for the TwinsCentric Offseason GM Handbook, it was noteworthy that the four of us split on the decision to keep Jason Kubel. Nick Nelson and I found it in the Twins best interest to hold on to the lefty while both Seth Stohs and John Bonnes recommended that the two part ways (John suggested a straight dump of his salary while Seth submitted that the team pick up the option only to trade him later). Certainly, this discussion must have occurred among the Twins’ top brass as well.

With reason, trepidation and speculation existed that the organization may have opted to decline Kubel’s option year. His final numbers were not wholly indicative of a player worthy of a $5.25 million payday, particularly on a team whose budget will be less flexible in 2011 and may also have the opportunity to bring back Jim Thome. After all, it was Thome rather than Kubel whose DH production was instrumental in propelling the Twins to their second straight AL Central Division title. For his part, Kubel, after raking a succulent .300/.369/.539 a year ago, only managed to generate a .249/.323/.427 line in 2010, results that were substandard comparative to the average American League DH (they hit .252/.332/.425 as a group).

But why not focus on Thome over Kubel? After all, it was Thome who rocked righties (.302/.455/.698 with 19 HR in 246 PA) and also figures to sign for a lower amount than Kubel’s $5.25 million. Why not lock up Thome and invest the difference in relief arms?

In spite of his statements indicating that he would like to remain a Twin, we still do not know what Thome’s true intentions are. While his 2011 salary estimates to be lower than that of Kubel’s option, it is contingent on whether or not some teams overpay for his services. His hometown White Sox might reconsider their decision to allow the big man to walk and offer him more money to return. Other AL organizations that have interest in spending money this offseason might contact Thome’s agent to inquire on the aging slugger and drive up the bidding. Because of this, the Twins had to move forward with an alternative plan and exercising Kubel’s option allows them to still kick the tires on Thome but have a safety net in the event that Thome’s asking price soars.  

Hidden within the mediocre slashes for Kubel were the incremental improvements he made when it came to breaking balls. Up to this point in his career, Kubel excelled at handling fastballs but had been tied in knots when pitchers tossed a wrinkle at him. Because of his tendency to decimate fastballs, opponents stopped throwing him fastballs as often as Kubel saw the 10th-fewest fastballs in baseball this past season. Instead, he was treated to a high amount of changeups (14.9%) and curves (10.3%). While changeups frequently fooled Kubel (a .217 average and a 29% swing-and-miss rate on changes), he slugged .660 on curves resulting in 6.5 runs above average (7th best in baseball) on a pitch that he had been otherwise completely unproductive on previously in his career.

Truth be told, Kubel’s past two seasons demonstrate the extremes of what batted balls can do. In 2009, his totals greatly outpaced what should have been expected from him. While the rest of the league finished with a BABIP around .300, Kubel’s ‘09 BABIP culminated at .327 – exaggerated by a boost in his line drives finding vacant real estate. Conversely, his 2010 totals were the polar opposite of his previous season, witnessing far more line drives gloved down.

	League Average	Kubel 2009	Kubel 2010
Groundball BABIP	.240	.168	.186
Flyball BABIP	.134	.252	.214
Line Drive BABIP	.729	.836	.694
Overall BABIP	.295	.327	.280

As you can see, there was a sizeable shift in his overall BABIP numbers, mostly derivative of a 142-point drop in his line drive BABIP. This is one indicator of what statistically-oriented analysts refer to as “bad luck”.  “Bad luck” is the catch-all descriptive used far too often to label a BABIP anomaly like Kubel’s when it comes in below the league’s average. While we would like to assign the blame to the baseball gods, something less celestial probably influenced this, like better scouting reports.     What we do know is that Kubel unleashed liners at roughly the same rate has he did in 2009 (19.6% versus 19.2%) but somehow had a whopping 84% land safely for hits while only 69% fell in for hits this past season. If he continues to replicate this amount of liners in 2011, odds are that his batting average and on-base percentage will creep northward as his BABIP likely normalizes.

Of course, there is another factor that makes spending $5.25 million on Kubel questionable and that is his inability to hit same-sided pitching. The perception is that left-handers have their way with him like he was Ned Beatty wandering the Georgian woods and, for the most part, this is true. In the past two seasons, Kubel’s hit just .233 off of southpaws while striking out in 21.9% of those plate appearances. Likewise, just four of his 49 home runs have come against left-handers. Although many figured the retention of Kubel should not come without a platoon partner (which the Twins should do either this offseason or at the deadline in order to appropriately match-up against the left-handed heavy pitching of the AL East in the postseason), let’s keep in mind that right-handed pitchers, as a demographic, far exceed that of their wrong-handed counterparts.

Consider this: Last season in the American League, where right-handed pitchers were on the mound for 62,275 out of the total 86,725 match-ups. That is, 71% of the overall encounters saw a righty on the mound. Therefore, stacking the lineup with potent left-handed bats presents a sizeable platoon advantage to the offense. With the likes of Justin Verlander, Matt Scherzer, Zack Greinke, Jake Peavy, Edwin Jackson, Justin Masterson and other hard-throwing right-handers in the division, it makes complete sense for the Twins to have a stable of left-handed hitting offensive answers.  

Kubel’s 2011 season will likely fall somewhere between his 2009 and 2010 output. If the Twins can limit his reps against tough left-handed pitching that would greatly improve his chances of bettering his numbers. But the decision to pick up his option goes beyond simply expecting an improved season out of the lefty. With the unknowns of Jim Thome’s future, keeping Kubel is essentially a bird-in-hand situation allowing the team to move forward if Thome opts to sign elsewhere. Independent of Thome, at 29 years old in 2011, Kubel is potentially at the peak of his career and, for a marginal investment, the Twins could reap offensive dividends on that before he becomes expendable in his 30s. 

Nathan returning to form in '11? Don't count on it.

One of the cogs to the 2011 bullpen, Joe Nathan, recently told John Shipley of the Pioneer Press that he plans to come to camp in the spring healthy and ready to compete for his old job.  

Said Nathan:

"I plan on being healthy enough to not miss a beat in spring training. I'm sure the coaches will be cautious at first, but I hope to prove early in spring that I don't need to be babied or coddled in any way, and that I can go out and play baseball as normal."

The Twins closer-in-exile is scheduled to make a non-refundable $12 million next season - a substantial amount of dough - so the organization is understandably anxious that Nathan fulfills his promise of returning at full strength. At the same time, there has to be cautious concern and on-going contingency planning to be prepared if the closer’s arm is not ready.

There is a lesson to be learned from the two most recent Tommy John post-ops, Francisco Liriano and Pat Neshek, and their first seasons back on the mound. Upon their return, neither Liriano nor Neshek (in his limited sample size) were very effective. In fact, most of their vital signs suggested that they were nowhere close to the pitchers they were prior to the procedure:

	Francisco Liriano	Pat Neshek
Velocity Before TJ (mph)	94.7	89.0
Contact Rate Before TJ	76.0%	73.1%
Velocity After TJ (mph)	90.6	85.6
Contact Rate After TJ	87.6%	81.9%

(via Fangraphs.com)

In addition to both losing roughly four miles per hour on their fastballs, Liriano and Neshek struggled with their control as well in their initial seasons back. Because Liriano was able to mix in a still viable slider, he managed to escape his that year with a 6-4 record along with a 3.91 ERA. However, his control was less than sharp as he had troubles getting ahead of hitters (48.9% first-pitch strike versus 60.5% first-pitch strike prior to Tommy John) as well as getting opponents to miss (10.8% swinging strike versus 16.4% prior to Tommy John). With another hiccup in 2009, it took until this past season before Liriano regain the form he had before the surgery.

Neshek, too, returned with a decreased velocity as well. Like Liriano, in his limited exposure at the major league level in 2010, Neshek also had troubles getting ahead of hitters (44.2% first-pitch strike compared to 66.1% in 2008). Because of his radar readings, the Twins sent him back to Rochester in hopes that he would be able to strengthen his arm more. He has yet to prove that he can come full-circle after the surgery.

According to Will Carroll’s Saving The Pitching: A Revolutionary Analysis Of Pitching Injuries And How To Prevent Them, the standard amount of time for recovery of Tommy John surgery is 22-to-24 months. Following that timeline, Liriano would not have been fully healed until November 2008. Instead, he was throwing again in the Twins uniform on April 13^th, 2008, a mere 17 months after his date with the knife. Likewise, Neshek was submarining again for the team 17 months after his surgery as well.

Of course, given the right individual and training program, one can hasten the recovery process. For the Braves’ closer Billy Wagner and starter Tim Hudson, 17 months was more than enough time to get game ready. The two Atlanta pitchers should be role models for Nathan as they were able to return to work 11 months (Hudson in 13 months) after having their elbow rebuilt. As such, Nathan was quoted as talking to both Wagner and Hudson regarding their trials and tribulations through the Tommy John recovery process.

Unlike Liriano and Neshek, neither pitcher lost much in terms of their stuff:

	Billy Wagner	Tim Hudson
Velocity Before TJ (mph)	94.5	90.3
Contact Rate Before TJ	78.3%	79.4%
Velocity After TJ (mph)	94.2	90.3
Contact Rate After TJ	69.6%	80.5%

(via Fangraphs.com)

Wagner only got in 15.2 innings in his first season back but was far better than before the operation, inciting less contact afterwards. Hudson also had an enviable season as well, actually getting ahead of his opponents much better (66.1% versus 60.4%) after the surgery in his reps.

Nathan’s motivation to converse with the two TJ survivors goes beyond seeking inspirational slogans as April 2011 will also be Nathan’s 11-month anniversary of his surgery date. Given the previous track record of his teammates, is this really a feasible goal for the Twins’ all-time saves leader?

According to one article detailing Wagner’s swift return:

“[M]ultiple major-league sources suggest that medical risks persist for a pitcher until he is at least 14 months removed from such a procedure. There are still risks of setbacks, and it would be vastly premature to suggest that the pitcher is out of the woods.”

It would be a fairly accurate assumption that Nathan is working through the same programs with the team’s trainers as Liriano and Neshek did before him. While plenty of the turnaround has to be assigned to the drive and motivation of the individual, there is a share of responsibility that goes to the training staff as well. As Carroll’s book says, the real work begins during the rehab protocol and the Twins have little evidence of returning a Tommy John survivor back into the wild. Judging from the outcome of Liriano and Neshek, the probability of Nathan returning to his 2009 self in 2011 appear very premature.  

The Goose Gossage Award ballot (Best AL Reliever)

Tasked with the responsibility of determining one of the two votes from the Minnesota delegation for the Baseball Bloggers Alliance for the Goose Gossage Award (best reliever), I must admit I figured my vote would probably come out of the Tampa Bay bullpen, I just didn’t expect that it would have been the one I selected.



As a unit, the Rays relief staff was the best in the American League. They finished the season with had most saves (51), the fewest runs (180), the fewest hits (383), the fewest walks (tied with the Twins with 150 but probably would have finished better had their manager not decided to intentionally walk five more hitters) and, ultimately, cost their team as a whole only 16 games in the loss column.
 On the surface, closer Rafael Soriano could have easily have been the right choice. After all, his 45 saves in 48 chances led the league. For those that value that kind of termination, that’s outstanding. Flavoring that, Soriano’s WPA was the second-highest among relievers in baseball at 4.98, meaning he was directly influential at ensuring his team won games. Additionally, in his 62.1 innings of work, Soriano allowed just 14 runs, struck out 57 and a .190 opponent batting average.


Of course, what most people do not notice is those that help create the environment in order for the closer to succeed. Often times, closers are like Senior Vice Presidents that have been promoted over a middle manager or worker that might assume more of the dirty work with far less of the recognition. Given the right opportunity, the underling might actually be a superior contributor than his direct report. And that appears to be the situation in Tampa when it comes to my vote for the Goose Gossage Award, Joaquin Benoit.


Whereas Soriano received the accolades and saves, Benoit labored to ensure that Soriano would be in-line for his save when the ninth inning came. Coming off a missed season recovering from torn labrum surgery, Benoit was simply phenomenal at a low cost to the Rays. While taking on a similar workload as Soriano (60.1 innings) but was slightly more dominant than his bullpen-mate with more strikeouts (75), fewer runs (10) and a lower opponent batting average (.150). Furthermore, Benoit held baseball’s lowest WHIP (0.68) as well as the lowest on-base percentage (.189).


To be sure, Benoit’s season seems to transcend the factor of luck influenced by the small sample size of relieving. In analyzing his stuff, we find that he was downright lights out. The righty was reaching 94 miles an hour on average on his fastball, producing a heater that was 12.2 runs above average (5th best), and used it to get ahead of opponents then deploying what manager Joe Maddon described as an “elite changeup”. The so-called elite changeup garnered Benoit a dirty-filthy-sick-nasty 8.2 runs above average, best in the game, and was swung-and-missed at on 46% of hitter’s swings (3rd best changeup in that category). His stuff was simply disgusting in 2010.


Here’s my final ballot:


Third: Neftali Feliz


Already our selection for Willie Mays Award (best rookie), Feliz had a tremendous season as a closer in Texas, helping elevate the Rangers deep into the postseason. In addition to his 40 saves in 43 opportunities, Feliz held a 9.2 K/9 as well as a tidy 0.88 WHIP and a .180 opponent average.


Second: Rafael Soriano


Pretty much for all of the reasons listed above. Also, pitching in the AL East can never be emphasized enough.


First: Joaquin Benoit


Given his performance this past season for a team that won an extremely tough division (Yankees and Red Sox hitters were a combined 6-for-44, .136, against the right), Benoit has earned the right to be considered the BBA’s Goose Gossage Award winner.

Did Cuddyer's knee diminish his power?

The Twins announced this week that a handful of players, including Michael Cuddyer, will have some offseason surgery to combat the lingering injuries. Reports Star Tribune’s La Velle E. Neal:

Twins first baseman Michael Cuddyer said he will need surgery to clean out his right knee, which has been bothering him since the beginning of the season. 

"I need my right knee scoped," Cuddyer said Monday. "I wasn't that affected by it as far as playing."

I am not so certain that last part is true.

Like most hard-nose players who ooze machismo all over the clubhouse, Cuddyer’s quote is an attempt at downplaying the injury and the potential it could have had on his overall game. If the knee was enough of an irritant to incite him to say it was bothering him all season, it probably had some influence over his playing. The announcement that the Twins mainstay would require surgery on his right knee might also help explain some of the diminished power and a damaging trend of hitting more grounders as the season progressed.

When Cuddyer amassed 32 bombs in ‘09, he did so in dramatic tape measure fashion. According to HitTrackerOnline.com, the right fielder averaged 412 feet per shot in true distance while the rest of the American League was averaging 396 feet on their home runs. While some of this distance might be attributed to hitting in the favorable atmospheric bubble of the Metrodome, Cuddyer also jacked 14 of his 32 home runs away from the climate-controlled park, an indication that he had effective power everywhere.

Given not just the total but the magnitude of the distance on his shots, expectations that Cuddyer could match his 2009 contributions seemed like a fair bet.

This year, however, not only did he hit 18 fewer home runs in 25 additional plate appearances between the two seasons, Cuddyer’s distance shrank considerable in those homers as well. His average true distance decreased to 396.4, just slightly better than the rest of the league (395.7). While Target Field’s conditions certainly may have been a factor in his decline in home runs at home as well as his diminished frequent flier mileage, his decrease in home runs on the road -- both in totals and distance -- suggest a more likely correlation with an injury. 

Then there is the case of his groundball totals increasing throughout the season. My initial diagnosis last month was that Cuddyer was rushing through his swing, often fooled by sliders and offspeed pitches and turning over on those by being out in front. While he was still rushing through is swing - more so than last year - with this revelation, it appears that there is a chance the injured knee may have been culprit rather than Cuddyer’s eagerness. With an injured right knee, the one that a right-handed hitter uses to drive off of, there may have been discomfort in his mechanics, which would cause the hitter to prematurely shift his balance off of his back leg sooner to alleviate the discomfort. 

Regardless of his statistical contributions are perceived, knowing that Cuddyer persevered and played through ailments such as his knee, just when the Twins needed him the most, seems to validate some aspect of his team MVP argument. No, he didn’t get many key hits, as his WPA was beyond the pale (-1.52), and he was utterly overmatched defensively at first base, acting as a sieve whenever a short hop was thrown in his direction. Still, Cuddyer was able to maintain some semblance of order by remaining in the lineup instead of having Jose Morales, Brendan Harris or the likes fill in at first. To some manager’s, that might be enough to consider your player a downright superstar.

Because the Twins are already on the hook for his rather overpriced $10.5 million in 2011, the organization needs to hope that the minor procedure of “cleaning up” his knee will help resurrect his power potential.

****

As a reminder, when you are finished here, head over to TwinsCentric.com and purchase your pre-sale copy of the TwinsCentric Offseason Handbook 2010-2011. Heading into my Billy Mays mode, if you act now, you can buy the Handbook for $4.95 now instead of the $9.95 full-price that all of the Johnny-Come-Latelys will pay.