Where traditional scouting and statistical analysis intersect?

Down in Fort Myers this past week, I had the opportunity to sit down with Twins Assistant GM, Rob Antony, and pick his brain about the organization’s use of statistical analysis. In his office in Hammond Stadium we covered a variety of topics with the din of the gathering crowd at the grandstand below. While a more detailed interview will be forthcoming on Monday, one portion of the chat was worth further examination.

Throughout the half-hour sit-down, I peppered in several questions from Doug Decatur’s GM IQ test from his book Behind-the-Scene Baseball. Decatur had worked as a statistical consultant for the Cincinnati Reds, Milwaukee Brewers, Chicago Cubs and Houston Astros and concocted a series of questions based on statistical thinking that all GMs (or aspiring GMs) should have some understand of. This was to gauge the Twins’ current comprehension of accepted statistical theories.

One such topic was runs batted in. Bill James wrote in his 1987 Baseball Abstract that RBI is “more subject to illusions of context.” Essentially, RBI are heavily contingent on hitters ahead of your 100-RBI guy to reach base regularly while a high slugging percentage is a product that is, theoretically, independent of other players. Using his quiz, I created a hypothetical scenario asking that if Antony were going to sign a free agent, would he go after the guy with a higher RBI total or slugging percentage?

Antony replied that he would prefer the player with the higher RBI total.  “Because you win with runs,” he said. “And I want that guy because you also have the correlation with a better batting average with runners in scoring position – he’s the guy that can step-up, the guy you want at the plate.”

Because Antony readily admitted that the organization had been reliant on traditional methods and had not dabbled too far into statistical analysis, the response was not at all surprising. At the same time, knowing that the statistical community commonly views RISP batting average as a small-sample size anomaly, I wanted him to elaborate further.

“I think guys are pitched differently when they have a chance to do damage and they can’t make adjustments. Then, sometimes the guy with a bunch of home runs and few RBI with nobody on base, they challenge him, and you look  and a lot of those guys do their production with the team behind and they tack it on and  enjoy a solo home run in the eighth inning.”

At the time of James’s publication, pitch data was not available to the general public and Antony’s contention throws a new wrinkle into the discussion. Do pitchers handle hitters differently with runners in scoring position?

According to Inside Edge data, hitters do witness a slight uptick in the amount of non-fastballs thrown while were tending to stay away from the strike zone once runners advance to second:

2009 MLB total:	Fastballs	Non-Fastballs	In-Zone
Non-RISP	65%	35%	52%
RISP	60%	40%	48%

 

How about more specifically? What barrage of pitches did Justin Morneau, who has 623 RBI since 2003, face once in RBI territory?

Morneau:	Fastballs	Non-Fastballs	In-Zone
Non-RISP	63%	37%	47%
RISP	59%	41%	38%

 

While the pitch type varies little, pitchers obviously respected Morneau’s power potential in 2009 and attempted to get him to swing at bad pitches. This had minimal effect as the Twins first baseman managed to produce a .908 OPS with RISP and a .866 OPS without RISP.

This is a steep contrast to someone like Delmon Young. After hitting in 93 runners in 2007 with the Devil Rays while procuring a rather pedestrian .408 slugging percentage, the Twins acquired him only to see his RBI total never reach his ’07 number. Reviewing his splits, you see that pitchers did not try to get too cute with the Twins’ left fielder:

D. Young:	Fastballs	Non-Fastballs	In-Zone
Non-RISP	59%	41%	49%
RISP	54%	46%	51%

 

Judging from the amount of pitches he sees in the strike zone under potential run-scoring conditions, a fair conclusion to draw is that pitchers have little fear of Young’s abilities.  Whereas Morneau contended with having to sort through over 60 percent of pitches thrown off the plate in order to find a good one, every other pitch to Young was in the vicinity of the strike zone.

Still, Young’s.425 slugging percentage in ’09 appears to validate that slugging percentage is a better statistical device than RBI. Was there anyone that actually fit Rob Antony’s profile for high slugging but a poor hitter under an RBI condition? Down south, Texas’s Michael Young personified that theory this past year. Young put up monster slash-numbers (.322/.374/.518) while jacking 22 home runs but drove in just 68 runners. Pitchers approached the Rangers’ third baseman with more non-fastballs and fewer strikes when runners had reached second and Young wilted:  

M. Young:	Fastballs	Non-Fastballs	In-Zone
Non-RISP	65%	35%	51%
RISP	52%	48%	45%

 

Under other circumstances, Young had a .959 OPS but that declined to .655 in scoring opportunities. Young’s ability to make contact dropped radically as well when pitchers bombarded him with off-speed offerings. Pitchers showed him different looks and he could not adjust with them.

While the opportunities afforded to a clean-up hitter and an eight-hitter differ as greatly as a graduate of Harvard and one of McDonald’s Hamburger University, there is truth that pitchers do handle hitters differently. As Antony noted, good hitters adjust. Even though I would maintain a preference for acquiring a hitter with a track record of better-than-average slugging percentages over the gaudy RBI guy, Antony’s preference for the opposite based on information from the traditional side of the fence does exist.  Once again, this is another area in which traditional scouting and statistical analysis can intersect.

 

J.J. Hardy: Middle Infield Repairman?

The Minnesota Twins have been cashing residual checks the past few seasons based on a sterling defensive reputation built in the early part of the decade. While the franchise continued to receive accolades, signs of cracks in the façade had started to appear. Nowhere is this more evident than in the middle of the infield. Upon review of the team’s 2009 fielding numbers, it was clear that the Twins were having as much troubles defending their midsection as director Kevin Smith did after being booted from a Southwest Airlines flight.

 

Consider this: Out of the fourteen American League teams, the Twins middle infield finished dead last at keeping groundballs from becoming hits.

 

Up-the-middle:	GB%	AVG on GB
Twins	21%	.443
AL Average	21%	.363

(All data provided by Inside Edge)

 

Because of the sheer volume of space, the positioning of the players and the constant shifting to covering second, the middle infield is perhaps the hardest region of the diamond to defend. Unlike the lines which are heavily fortified by the first and third basemen with backup in close proximity at second and short, the middle is about as unguarded as the Alaskan wilderness. This is why, on average, grounders escape through the middle at 36 percent clip versus just 20 percent if hit to the left or right. Though it would be easy to excuse the Twins gaudy number on the Metrodome’s turf, bear in mind that both Toronto and Tampa Bay - two other ballclubs that play on artificial surface - managed to produced slightly above average numbers in this category (.362 and .360 averages respectively). The difference came down to the personnel.

 

Using John Dewan’s Plus/Minus system, we can readily identify the Twins defensive shortcomings in this department. As you can see below, from ‘07 to ‘09, the shortstop position went from an area of strength to an outright liability when balls were hit to their left:

 

Plus/minus to shortstop’s left (toward 2nd base)
	2007	2008	2009
Jason Bartlett	+4	x	x
Nick Punto	-1	0	-7
Adam Everett	x	+3	x
Brendan Harris	x	-12	-12
Orlando Cabrera	x	x	-11

(All Plus/Minus data from BillJamesOnline.net)

 

In the Hardball Times Annual 2010, Dewan listed the Twins’ mishmash of shortstops and second basemen as the worst unit in all of baseball. According to his plus/minus system, the Twins were -59 plays worse than an average shortstop/second base combination. This downward trend began after trading away defensive stalwart Jason Bartlett and since then the position can be summarized in a Jack Johnson lyric: “It’s bad, getting worse so where’d all the good people go?”    

 

In 2008, veteran Adam Everett was brought in to ease the pain of losing Bartlett but injuries limited Everett to just 41 starts at short that year. Nick Punto was serviceable in Everett’s absence and was subsequently extended in ’09. Punto’s injuries and offensive woes pressed the Twins into acquiring perhaps the league’s worst defensive shortstop measured by plus/minus system, Orlando Cabrera. Cabrera, who had spent the first-half of the season weighing down the middle infield for Oakland, had anchored the second-worst unit in the AL at defending the middle (.395 average) - no thanks in part to his limited playmaking capabilities going towards the hole - prior to coming to Minnesota.

 

With this deficiency in mind, the Twins approached the offseason hell-bent on rectifying this problem instead of a patchwork solution. They traded for the 27-year-old J.J. Hardy even before the Yankees stopped celebrating their 2,935^th World Series championship. In acquiring Hardy, they not only received a shortstop with more pop potential than the previous tenants but also one with a solid defensive pedigree – at least in terms of converting plays up-the-middle while with the Brewers:

 

Plus/minus to shortstop’s left (toward 2nd base)
	2007	2008	2009
J.J. Hardy	+16	+18	+8

(All Plus/Minus data from BillJamesOnline.net)

 

Even if Hardy declines from his 2009 plus/minus numbers, as players are prone to do as they age, he still represents an infinite improvement over the existing aspirants. His acquisition, though shrouded somewhat in offensive uncertainty given his ‘09 results, gives the Twins a stable backbone in the middle of the infield unmatched since Bartlett’s departure.  

 

Why is his leather addition that important?

 

It’s no small wonder that the team that has had the most success thwarting would-be hits last year did so by massively upgrading their shortstop position. The Texas Rangers shifted the aging incumbent Michael Young over to third base to make room for defensive prodigy Elvis Andrus, who accompanied the talented Ian Kinsler at second base, to reinforce the middle of the diamond in Arlington. Andrus’s +6 ranging to his left was a significant upgrade over Young’s -13 contribution in ’08. As such, the Rangers had a .307 batting average on groundballs up-the-middle which was substantially better than the league average and a considerable cost-savings from their .363 average allowed in 2008.

 

If the Hardy can help the Twins replicate the Rangers’ middle infield formula of success from a year ago, the club stands a good chance of returning to the 90-win mark and making strides towards repairing a slightly damaged defensive reputation.

Nathan's injury: Should we have seen this coming?

The standard rule of thumb for sniffing out elbow injuries is a decrease a pitcher’s control. Whereas a shoulder injury will likely reveal itself through a decrease in velocity, the elbow injury will manifest itself through a loss of command.  

With that in mind, a more vigilant (read: paranoid) observer may have been able to detected Joe Nathan’s injury potential in the latter half of 2009, or at least raised the concern that maybe that tinge in your elbow might be a larger concern: 

Nathan’s Control:	In Zone%	BB%
2007	49.3	6.7
2008	48.3	6.8
2009	45.4	8.1

This trend was even more prevalent in the concluding portion of the season when his in-zone rate dropped to 40 percent and his walk rate rocketed to 12 percent.  In addition to his decline in control, Nathan was getting slapped around harder than any other stretch of time in the past three years as his slugging percentage rose to .459 from August onward. This may have been indication that he was wild within the zone, missing his intended target and leaving a pitch far too hittable.

This drop in his command is almost certainly connected to the elbow problem revelation at the end of last season, which I discussed at some length in the Maple Street Press Twins Annual 2010. After the season, Nathan admitted that he was having elbow issues and was throwing at less than 100%. This prompted him to consult Dr James Andrews who recommended removing some bone chips.

It should be noted that bone chips/spurs are sometimes generated from a loose UCL. Basically, bones spurs start to grow on the elbow in the body’s attempts to stabilize the area caused by the collision of bone due to the loose UCL. This can be an early indication that future problems with the UCL are forthcoming. Because of this, combined with the in-season performance issues, Nathan’s injury is far from a surprise.

Dr Andrews may have informed Nathan that there was a probability of having UCL problems in the future during the original examine, or even that there were signs of tears, but simply removing the bone chips and hoping the UCL would hold up was the best practice at this juncture in his career. As with many pitchers before him, some feel significantly better after rest but then ultimately tear the UCL when attempting to throw above a 75% capacity (which was probably the case in his spring training outing). Knowing that Tommy John is basically a death sentence for his career thus really had to proactively pursue in the immediate offseason, rest and rehab were the only realistic options. Because of these series of events, the Twins seemed to have taken the right approach with Nathan.  

Nick Blackburn and opportune groundballs

After tossing around 200 innings in each of the last two seasons, Nick Blackburn has been the organization’s most dependable starter, able to digest innings while other members of the rotation succumb to injury or ineffectiveness.  Even more impressive is how the 28-year-old has managed to produce a decent statistical line (22-22, 4.04 ERA) the past two years while allowing 464 hits, the second-most over that time frame, and missing bats on just a 12.7% of the total swings, the third-worst in baseball.

With this type of contact-fetish, most pitchers of that ilk rarely experience any sustained, long-term success. How has Blackburn skirted the punishment that most of his low-strikeout kinfolk suffer?

One of the simplest answers is well-timed groundballs.

While giving up the fourth-most hits in the AL (224) coupled with the 11^th highest slugging percentage against (.441), Blackburn averted disaster and completed the year with a better than average ERA (4.05) thanks to the second-most twin-killings (31) in ‘08. Within Blackburn’s batted ball splits that season, the data indicates that the righty was particularly adept at getting a groundball under double-play conditions – 10 percentage points higher than when no runners were on base: 

2008 Batted Ball Splits	GB%	OPS
Bases empty	43.2	.831
Runner (s) On, DP situation	53.2	.713

These double-plays helped erase 10% of his total amount of baserunners allowed in ’08.

This past season is another exemplary instance of how Blackburn tip-toed around near catastrophe. After allowing 240 hits (the most in baseball), one would expect a similar spike in runs scored. Once again, while striking out fewer than five batters per nine innings, Blackburn procured a 4.03 ERA. Unlike the previous year, the number of double-plays turned behind him shrank from 31 to 17, in part due to shoddier middle infield defense and the overall regression of his groundball numbers. Instead of an over 50% groundball rate in double-play opportunities like the prior season, Blackburn turned in a 43.2% groundball rate – reverting back towards his career norms.

Where his groundballs prospered in ’09 was with runners in scoring position. Under these conditions, Blackburn was able to increase his groundball rate, inciting a bouncer on 53.8% of balls in play – a stark contrast to his 44.9% when no runners were on or not in scoring position:

2009 Batted Ball Splits	GB%	OPS
Runner (s) in scoring position	53.8	.597
All other circumstances	44.9	.806

By keeping the ball on the ground, opponents slugged just .321 in scoring opportunities versus slugging .471 under the other circumstances. What’s more is that a vast majority of those groundballs hit with runners in scoring position resulted in outs.

There is little indication of why Blackburn’s groundball rates spiked in these samples. Pitch data does not reveal any trends that reveal him favoring a pitch or a location that would help explain the variance. In short, he was not doing anything differently under those conditions in either ’08 or ’09 and the likely scenario is that this will regress in 2010 resulting in more runs allowed.

At 28-years-old, Blackburn is on the fringe of exiting what is accepted as a pitcher’s peak years (25-29) so it is possible the Twins have already been recipients of his best seasons and subtle decline will happen as he progresses into his 30s. On top of that, there is perhaps only one right-handed starter that struck out fewer than five batters per nine innings that had a lengthy career (Bob Tewksbury). That said, he’s got little injury history, walks fewer than two batters per nine innings and will transition to a grass infield with a much improved middle infield defense. These factors could allow him to continue to churn out seasons replicating the previous two, in which case $3.5 million per season is a bargain. Just as every multi-billionaire should have a Honda Accord in the back of the garage in the event that the Aston Martin doesn’t start or the Lamborghini tears a rotator cuff, the Twins have secured their reliable vehicle in Blackburn for the next four years by buying out his arbitration years at a very modest cost.

Chase reduction, not weight reduction

In bartending terminology, a chaser usually follows a questionable offering. In the baseball world, the same basic principle applies.

Chasers are hitters that pursue pitches that are out of the strike zone. This often proves to be a fruitless endeavor as the average hitter batted .142 (.629 OPS) on those wayward pitches in ’09. From time to time, even the most disciplined hitters are fooled by a slider darting away or a changeup whose bottom is dropping out. This is why roughly a quarter of all pitches thrown out of the strike zone were swung at. Then there are those that swing regardless of a pitch’s eventual destination.

Some chasers are megalomaniacs who believe that they can hit anything tossed in their zip code. The Rangers’ Vladimir Guerrero fits into this mold. His pitch selection goes through the same rigorous quality-control process as many late-model Toyotas. Although the free-swinging Guerrero has hacked at 44.1 percent of all out-of-zone pitches, he made contact at a very high rate and managed to hit .208 (.655 OPS) on those pitches, in effect beating the house.

Just further down the chaser spectrum is Delmon Young. Like Guerrero, Young is also a member of Hacktastic’s Warehouse Club – swinging in bulk for large pitch count savings! In ‘09, Young took a cut at 37 percent of all out-of-zone pitches. What differentiates Young from Guerrero is that instead of being able to hit everything, Young misses the lion’s share of those out-of-zone pitches he swings at, making contact with a little over half.

Last year, the Twins left fielder strayed after non-fastball offerings at a very high frequency – chasing 46.5 percent of those types of pitches. The league standard in ’09 on non-fastballs was 29.8 percent. Comparatively, he was relatively selective when it comes to fastballs that are thrown out-of-zone (swung at just 35.3 percent) but still well above the league norms (19.3 percent).

Rather than having delusions of grandeur in his abilities like Guerrero, the more likely explanation for Young’s proclivity for chasing is pitch recognition (or lack thereof). As someone rushed through the minor leagues at a breakneck pace, Young never had time to establish his comprehension as the competition improved at each level. In the past three seasons, Young has shown little progress in this department at the major league level: 

Young’s Chase Percent:	Fastballs	Non-Fastballs	OPS on out-of-zone pitches
2009	35.3	46.5	.472
2008	38.8	45.5	.551
2007	32.2	46.8	.516

*All data provided by Inside Edge

In December, I reviewed video to explain a little more about Young’s late-season surge. Refining his mechanics at the plate from last season and throughout the year, Young was able to elevate the ball more during his hot streak. In terms of his overall offensive development, this is a significant milestone and bodes very well for his power potential in 2010. As his renovated mechanics led to better contact and a drastic improvement in his lift, Young was still falling into the habit of following pitches off of the plate even during this stretch of solid baseball.

Without question, a more vigilant pitch bias would do Delmon Young good. The reason for this is fairly straightforward: Implementing a more discriminatory approach will lead to more pitches in the zone – the type in which he has shown at the latter portion of the last year that he can drive. Furthermore, opting to forgo swinging on errant pitches will inevitably result in more walks and hopefully buoy his on-base percentage above the league-average level.

While much ballyhoo has been made about the 30-something pounds he lost this offseason (which should go a long ways towards improving his mobility in the field and on the bases), the real focus for Young in Florida should be chase reduction, not weight reduction.