Analysis: JJ Hardy

You did not have to delve too deep into the TwinsCentric Offseason GM Handbook to realize where the Twins had a surplus. In fact, we wrote it out in play English: “Two quality players overlapping playing time should suggest an area of excess.” Thanks to Heater Magazine’s supplied Playing Time Constellation chart, one can easily glean that Ron Gardenhire treated his center field situation with a duel banjo system. For a while, Carlos Gomez would get his solo before giving stage to Denard Span, then back-and-forth, back-and-forth. This dizzying medley of center fielders was bound to grind to a halt at some point.

On Friday, it did.

The Twins took advantage of this trade chip in center to secure what might be the unanimously accepted best shortstop available on either the trade or free market this offseason, nabbing a former All Star shortstop that is just entering the prime years of his career – also under club control for several more years at a presumed discounted rate. It would be hard to get enthused over the current at-large crop of free agent shortstops as the short list is headlined with Orlando Cabrera (35) and Marco Scutaro (33) reigning supreme. One is a player on the downslope of his career unable to sustain an OBP above .325 while declining defensively and the other had a late foray into the starting lineup, providing above-average defense but shrouded in doubt about his offensive capabilities. The former is probably seeking a two-year deal in the ballpark of $8-to-$10 million while the latter is primed for a three-year, $30 million deal. In theory, JJ Hardy, at 27 years old, can provide the Twins with both high-caliber offense and defense at a reasonable bargain for more than just a season or two; he can be an answer, not a temporary solution.

At face value, it is easy to part with a player who had compiled a 645 OPS in slightly under 1000 PAs in a Twins uniform. However, giving up perhaps one of the best defensive center fielder in the game not named Franklin Gutierrez, who is also several years away from peak playing years, is not as lopsided as many have reacted locally. The Twins pitching staff - one with baseball’s highest fly ball tendency (41 percent) - would have enjoyed a Verizon network-like coverage of Gomez and Span sharing the same outfield. Additionally, Gomez started to make improvements in his zone discipline and line drive rates so with playing time, which means he is probably several OPS points higher in 2010 and further away from his train wreckage. Nevertheless, the Twins, a team that is probably an 85-win baseline team, needs talent next year, not two-plus seasons from now. Hardy gives them an established player while the Brewers can now be tolerant as Gomez learns to slow the game down.

After averaging 25 home runs, 84 runs scored and a .280/.333/.470 batting line in 2007 and 2008, Hardy’s stats went to hell in 2009, hitting 11 home runs and producing a batting line of .229/.302/.357. What exactly did the Twins receive and what can be expected of JJ Hardy in 2010?

While some baseball analysts are citing Hardy’s below-league average BABIP (.263) as an indicator that his 2010 season will resemble his 2008 campaign, I am not completely sold on that might be the case. True, his average on line drives of .674 was well below the league average of .729 but Hardy only roped pitches on just 14% of total balls in play (19% is league average). For a significant BABIP rebound effect to occur, Hardy’s line drive rate would have to be closer to league average. In addition to that, Hardy’s experienced a nasty downturn in line drive annually since 2006 – dropping from 19 to 17 to 15 to the new career low of 14.

Furthermore, Hardy’s ability to make contact has dropped as well:

Contact #’s	Contact%	K%
2007	86.7	12.3
2008	83.3	17.2
2009	80.7	20.5

Interestingly enough, Hardy’s walk rate has grown each year, suggesting that he still exercises good zone judgment. He is simply failing to make the same kind of contact. Low line drive rates and dropping contact percentage suggests something larger at foot beyond the realm of “luck”.

More likely, it is Hardy’s continual adjustments in the batter’s box that has been dragging down his numbers. As Alex Eisenberg at Baseball-Intellect.com points out in a must-read scouting report on the new Twins shortstop, Hardy has opened his stance more since 2007 and has extended his arms out over the plate instead of back where they were in ‘07. The results of these adjustments have wreaked havoc on his ability to detonate left-handed pitching. For most of his career, Hardy has demonstrated a high competency of handling left-handed pitching only to see that skill vaporize in 2009:

Vs LHP	HR	SLG	K%
2007	9	.579	8.3
2008	10	.574	12.0
2009	1	.229	21.7

Hardy experienced a glaring hole in his swing on pitches away. True to Eisenberg’s hypothesis, left-handed pitchers had a field day working him away. Instead of driving the ball with power, Hardy was feebly beating the ball into the ground. Once an area that Hardy would punish became his biggest Achilles’ heel:

Vs LHP Away	HR	SLG	Fly Ball%
2007	6	.697	51.7
2008	6	.678	56.0
2009	1	.194	45.5

So Hardy’s 2009 season hit some physical (which as Eisenberg notes, turned into mental) flaws rather than hitting balls at defenders.

If Hardy works out the kinks this offseason, can we expect him to rebound to his 25 home run average? I am apprehensive about that as well. Over at hittrackeronline.com, the database of every dinger measurement (get your mind out of the gutter) and the ‘true’ home run distances, founder Greg Rybarczyk had diligently categorizes three types of home runs:

No Doubts - Which means the ball cleared the fence by at least 20 vertical feet and landed at least 50 feet past the fence. These are your majestic home runs by the prolific home run hitters.

Just Enough -Where the ball cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet, or that it landed less than one fence height past the fence. These home runs barely cleared.

Plenty - Everything in between.

According to Rybarczyk’s work, the average hitter typically hits 27 percent of their homers that categorize as Just Enough, 55 percent that qualify as Plenty and 18 percent as No Doubts. Similar to the BABIP effect, if a hitter winds up with a higher percent of Just Enoughs, they may have benefited from a sizeable amount of luck (and vice versa). In both 2007 and 2008, 40 percent of Hardy’s home runs fell under the category of Just Enoughs. If anything, Hardy’s home run total dip in 2009 should have been expected as some of those fly balls ricochets off of the wall instead of clearing.

Also mentioned above, there are some question marks with his stance, but Hardy has a solid foundation and it appears that fixing him would take several tweaks instead of complete overhauls. Do I expect 25 home runs? No, but flirting with 20 isn’t out of possibility. His 2010 season will likely resemble his career batting line (.263/.323/.423) and for a shortstop, that’s solid production. At the end of the day Hardy’s acquisition solves several problems for the Twins. First, it solidifies the shortstop position with an above-average defender. As noted above, the free market for shortstops was less than appetizing and most likely temporary. Internally, Nick Punto, while riding a very good September and October (base-running gaffs aside), is an unknown offensively and has seen his range diminish enough to be shifted down the defensive spectrum. Secondly, Hardy’s right-handed bat, when swinging properly, damages left-handed pitching beyond repair. With the exception of Michael Cuddyer, the Twins are deficient in this area.

One acquisition, two problems solved.

Cross Him Off Then (Iwamura Edition).

The first of several second base options is now off the market.

 

The embers of Pittsburgh’s 2008-2009 fire sale were still smoldering when on Tuesday, a day before Game 6 of the World Series, Pirates GM Neal Huntington poured out the last of his Busch Light on the pile and acquired the 30-year-old Akinori Iwamura in a deal with the Tampa Bay Rays.

 

The 2009 season splintered for Iwamura when the Marlins’ Chris Coghlan barreled into his planted foot at second base, resulting in a left knee injury that required surgery to repair.  Prior to a dust-up at second base Iwamura was hitting a robust .310/.377/.406 with 14 extra base hits in 176 PA.   Upon his return to the lineup in late August, Iwamura hit just .250/.310/.355 with 5 extra base hits in his final 84 PA as a Ray.  His keen zone judgment (17.2 career out-of-zone swing percent) and line drive tendencies led to his use as the Rays’ leadoff hitter (that, and lack of other candidates) to which Iwamura produced a slightly below league average 733 OPS in his 1,203 PA in three years.

 

Much like the use of defensive stats in general, Iwamura’s value at second can be contested.

 

Fangraphs.com’s UZR system suggests that he was the 13^th best second baseman in ’08 while Dewan’s Plus/Minus system places him several points lower at 19^th.  Meanwhile, human analysis over at the Fans Scouting Report generously placed him as the 8^th-highest ranked second baseman.   In truth, he falls somewhere in between those rankings – still a feat for someone who was adjusting to a new position on the opposite end of the defensive spectrum from where an aging player should be shifted.   At his natural position, third base, Iwamura impressed fans enough in 2007 to rank him ahead of Joe Crede and Nick Punto, two players who scored much better according to UZR and Plus/Minus.  For the Twins, having a guy that has the versatility to transition between positions would have been beneficial, particularly when injuries and ineffectiveness takes their toll.

 

While Iwamura easily embodies one of the top three second baseman available this offseason, Pittsburgh’s involvement is a curiosity.  As a team that is all but shackled to the cellar of the NL Central, unable to procure a winning record since 1992, the Pirates ventured into a rebuild mode that has outlasted three general managers (Ted Simmons 1992-1993, Cam Bonifay 1994-2001 and Dave Littlefield 2002-2007) and has been handed over to Huntington who has gone nuclear with the club.  Admittedly, Huntington’s vision for the future of the organization is solid.  By building a strong scouting department and acquiring prospect talent to replenish the bone dry system, Huntington is focused on the sustainable longevity rather than the immediate results – a boondoggle of a mistake many GMs find themselves in when trying to make a quick turnaround of a franchise.   Instead of overpaying for marginal veterans on the free market or swapping for the quick-fix trade (a la the Royals); Huntington has turned his attention on the foundation.

 

Which is why I do not understand obtaining Iwamura if you are helming the Pirate ship.

 

Iwamura’s one-year contract worth $4.50 million provides Pittsburgh with a stop-gap function in the infield.  Suddenly, Iwamura will be accounting for 10 percent of the Pirates payroll. At best, his addition will provide the Pirates with approximately 2 victories, raising their record from the futile 62-wins to 64.  In addition to absorbing the added payroll (which isn’t necessarily a problem since they have been under $50 million since 2004), they shipped a young relief arm in Jesse Chavez.   The 25-year-old Chavez’s fires a solid 94-mph fastball that was tattooed on occasion (9 of 11 HRs allowed) and has two very good out-pitches in his slider (35.9 chase pct, .333 WHIFF Avg) and changeup (27.1 chase, .264 WHIFF Avg).  With a lively arm, getting him to mix his pitches better seems to be his only impediment from being a stalwart contribution to a bullpen.  Is this the best allocation of resources?  Sending a good, young arm and adding 10 percent to your total payroll for a one-year player?

 

On the other hand for the Twins, this move would have made sense.  Iwamura’s 2 wins would help advance the Twins from an 87-win team to an 89-win team, his line drive ability projects well and his zone discipline would fit in nicely among the free-swingers’ club.  However, when you examine it more closely, would Iwamura’s acquisition really make that big of a difference?  On the roster, the Twins currently have Nick Punto who shares a myriad of commonalities with Iwamura despite being a year-and-a-half Iwamura’s senior.  They both are due $4.5 million in 2010, they have a very low chase percentage (Iwamura’s 17.2 versus 19.1), high line drive rates (20.2 for Iwamura, 20.4 for Punto) and both supplied roughly 2 WAR.  Iwamura holds an advantage in the power department but Punto’s defense is far superior.  If the Twins were to have made this move, it would have come at the expense of a B-quality prospect and the upgrade would have been minor. 

Ignoring Iwamura does not mean that the Twins have to stand pat either.

If you follow along Offseason GM Handbook, you’ll note that we highlighted plenty of viable options at second base.  Nick Nelson noted that it is an area of depth, more so than any other infield position.  Nelson encouraged the acquisition of Placido Polanco which would be a far better maneuver that trading for Iwamura.  In addition to providing the intangible “veteran” that is often cited as missing in the Twins organization, Polanco has provided Detroit with 3 or more WAR since 2007.  Likewise, in my blueprint, I encouraged the acquisition of Rickie Weeks, a young second baseman who had developed into a top-of-the-order threat in Milwaukee before a wrist injury ended his season.  Weeks is poised to return to a 3+ WAR player who is just entering their prime, but would necessitate a trade.

With Iwamura’s quasi-marquee name off the list this offseason the Twins probably avoided a lateral move, paying for the security of Iwamura’s track record rather then the unknown of Punto.  Nevertheless there are better ways to improve this team. 

2009 Pitching Appraisal: Carl Pavano

  

C. Pavano (33 Starts)
FIP | MLB Rank	4.00*	40th*
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.330	+10.0%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	6.13	+27.1%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score 50 or Greater:	11-3	3-1
Game Score 49 or Lower:	3-9	2-1
Average Game Score Per Start:	47
Season High/Low:	85 (6/5)	3 (4/9)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	1
Game Scores 70-79:	1
Game Scores 60-69:	7
Game Scores Below 40:	9
Record of Opposing Batters:	.294/.329/.466 (795 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Miguel Tejada

*NOTE: FIP not xFIP

 

Back when the Twins first acquired Carl Pavano, I detailed why this move was actually much better than it looked on the surface.  Pavano was a victim of a bad defense and a high portion of balls falling in uncovered areas of the field.  At the same time, he demonstrated the ability to throw consistently in the zone and miss bats.  Still, his arrival was met with skepticism due to a hefty home run allowed (1.36 HR/9 comparative to the average of 1.05) and bloated ERA (5.37).    

 

After relocating to the 612, Pavano finished the year 5-4 with a 4.44 ERA and an improved 7.21 K/9 in 12 starts.  In spite of converting fewer batted balls into outs in Minnesota (a .668 DER versus .673 in Cleveland), Pavano managed to pitch better (3.50 FIP versus 4.28 FIP in Cleveland).

 

Pavano made strides to improve his efforts against right-handed hitters – an inexplicable split mystery.  After beginning the year in upper Ohio being splattered by same-sided opponents, allowing 13 of his 19 home runs along with an eye-popping .547 slugging percentage against to righties, Pavano avoided major damage with the Twins.  One of his biggest overall differences upon the migration was his increased use of his slider to righties: 

 

Vs RHB	Slider Pct	Slider WHIFF Avg	Overall K%	Overall Slugging Pct
Cleveland	17	.320	12.1	.547
Minnesota	30	.315	15.3	.432

 

Whether this was a self-imposed correction or something Rick Anderson picked up, Pavano’s final months against righties were drastically better than his first few.

 

At 33 years old, Pavano’s stuff was not exactly electric – he was bringing the fastball at a pedestrian 90.4 miles per hour – but he worked ahead of hitters (his 67.7 percent first pitch strike led all of baseball) which provided the luxury of turning to his nasty breaking stuff in his slider, curve and splitter (those three had a combined WHIFF average of .304).  In addition to the pitches with hard break action, Pavano also had an above-average change – one that he threw for a strike 75 percent of the time and had opposing hitters chase nearly half of those offerings out of the zone. 

 

He has pitched well enough to earn a well-deserved raise, the question for the Twins, is it one that will price him out of the running for the rotation in 2010?  With his history of injury, age and the crooked-looking ERA, Pavano may not get anything more than two-years in the range of $5-to-$9 million per depending on how the free agent market unfolds.

2009 Pitching Appraisal: Kevin Slowey

 

K. SLOWEY (16 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.46	DNQ
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.349	+16.3%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	5.69	+18.1%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score Greater Than 50:	8-0	0-1
Game Score Less Than 50:	2-3	0-2
Average Game Score Per Start:	48
Season High/Low:	69 (4/25)	23 (4/13)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	0
Game Scores 60-69:	5
Game Scores Below 40:	7
Record of Opposing Batters:	.309/.340/.503 (843 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Matt Kemp

 

Even while pitching with bone spurs in his throwing wrist since the previous September, Slowey still managed to demonstrate why he will be a front-of-the-rotation starter with college-level velocity (88.9-mph fastball in ’09): his outright ownership of the strike zone. 

 

Prior to landing on the DL in July, Slowey was leading the league in first pitch strikes and overall zone presence.  This dominance of the space that resides from knees to letters and 17 inches across allowed the Twins righty to keep pace with some of the league’s already elite pitchers.  Among those that worked a minimum of 80 innings, Slowey’s 5.00 K/BB ratio was fourth behind Roy Halladay, Dan Haren and Javier Vazquez.  The man trailing him is the presumed AL Cy Young in Zack Greinke.  Slowey’s rise to the top of that list includes a solid 7.44 K/9 but is magnified by his ultra-stingy issuance of base on balls.  Only Joel Pineiro (1.14 BB/9) and Halladay (1.32 BB/9) relinquished fewer free passes than Slowey. 

 

In addition to his command, Slowey refined the use of his changeup in 2009.  The results showed more aptitude to getting empty swings – a long-standing criticism of his pitching style:  

CHG	Pct Thrown	Vel	WHIFF Avg
2008	7.8	82.8	.190
2009	9.2	82.7	.270

It was this improvement that provided Slowey with a much needed “out pitch”.  On the other hand, Slowey had multiple problems with his slider.  The wrist injury may have contributed to the evaporation of his vertical break and the elongation of the horizontal break rendering the pitch much more hittable:  

SLD	hBreak	vBreak	WHIFF Avg
2008	1.8	6.1	.227
2009	3.0	4.3	.160

 

If there are supporters in the clubhouse for keeping a Gomez/Span outfield in 2010, Slowey should be one of the most vocal.  As a largely contact-oriented pitcher, nearly 50 percent of balls in play were of the fly ball variety.  The rangier outfield would help ensure several more balls find leather rather than turf. 

 

The most important thing to take away from Slowey’s 2009 season is to disregard the 10-wins in 16 starts - it boils down to a product of his ridiculous amount of runs support (5.69 runs per start).  Do not attempt to extrapolate that winning percentage over 33 starts in 2010.  That would be just wishful thinking.  Nevertheless, he is one of the top three starters in the rotation when healthy and could make a run at a 15-win season provided the right mix of defense.