2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Francisco Liriano

 

 

 

F. LIRIANO (24 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.78	DNQ
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.323	+7.4%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	3.82	-20.6%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score Greater Than 50:	3-3	4-2
Game Score Less Than 50:	2-10	None
Average Game Score Per Start:	45
Season High/Low:	74 (8/12)	13 (8/17)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	1
Game Scores 60-69:	5
Game Scores Below 40:	11
Record of Opposing Batters:	.279/.361/.469 (830 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Carlos Lee

 

It is hard to harp on a thing like “run support” (which was 20 percent lower than the league average) when he served up more runs than most South of the Border eateries, but even so, Liriano was hosed out of four wins in 2009.  He could have been 9-13.  There.  That’s the end of the positivity for now.

 

In just under half of his 24 starts (11), Liriano made a huge-antic (a combination of huge and gigantic) mess out of the game, seemingly putting the Twins further in debt every time he chucked the ball towards home plate.  What gives?   Like the pitching version of Jason Lewis, righties simply loved him.  In his return to the mound in 2008, right-handed batters demonstrated little advantage over him (745 OPS).  One year later, the right-handed nation was launching moonshots off him, responsible for 20 of his 21 HR allowed and raising their OPS to 899.  

Back in June, I noted that he was pitching differently to hitters depending on which batter’s box they were in. The Twins' lefty slides down the rubber towards the third base line when facing right-handed batters in efforts to run the fastball inside, however, he releases it with less of a more vertical of an arm angle which results in a flatter pitch often finishing in the fat part of the zone, above the waist.  With the decrease in velocity from 2006 (from 94.6-mph down to 91-mph) Liriano's location combined with lack of movement (not to mention the regularity of being behind in the count) led to some hard hit balls off for right-handed bats. 

 

In general, his slider still had bite.  Over 40 percent of swings in '09 resulted in a miss (just down from 48 percent in '06) indicating that the is enough break to incite plenty of awkward swings - even after the Tommy John surgery.  However, like the fastball, it was thrown at a reduced velocity from his breakout year in '06.  Also like the fastball, Liriano demonstrated that he had trouble placing it within the strike zone this past season.  As opposed to '06 where he threw the slider in the zone almost half of the time, Liriano threw the slider in the zone less than 40 percent of the time, eroding the effectiveness of the break.  Hitters, particularly right-handed ones, eventually figured out he was unable to throw the slider for a strike and held back waiting for the fastball (NOW WITH 5% LESS HEAT!). 

 

The haphazard command led to better counts for opponents or a walk.  His control problems led to the AL's second highest walk rate (4.28 BB/9) trailing only the Yankees Joba Camberlain with pitchers who had thrown a minimum of 130 innings.  Even so, and this might be a hard pill to swallow in context to his 5-13 record, the heaping ton of walks and a 5.80 ERA but setting aside those facts, Liriano had a decent season when it comes to projecting talent:  

 

• Liriano's strikeout rate (8.03 K/9) was good enough for eighth in the AL - this is an unsurprising revelation given that his 20 percent swinging strike total was the highest in the league. 
• His .324 batting average on balls in play was the seventh highest in the AL and well above the league average of .300.  Where he suffered the most was on groundballs.  As the rest of the league's pitchers held Defensive Efficiency Ratio of .760 on grounders, Liriano was given a DER of .694 - meaning more bouncers slipped through the infield than the norm. 
• His 66.3 percent left-on-base rate was the well-below the average of 71.0 percent and sixth-highest in the AL.  As this equalizes next season, the ERA will drop with it.   

 

The injuries and slow-to-return control (always the last thing pitcher's regain after undergoing TJ) helped make an unfortunate season his worst, yet, there is plenty of evidence Liriano could be a boon to the rotation in 2010. 

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Scott Baker

S. BAKER (33 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.46	49th
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.277	-7.4%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	5.62	+17.9%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score Greater Than 50:	12-2	2-2
Game Score Less Than 50:	3-6	3-3
Average Game Score Per Start:	52
Season High/Low:	88 (8/14)	21 (4/22)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	1
Game Scores 70-79:	3
Game Scores 60-69:	7
Game Scores Below 40:	6
Record of Opposing Batters:	.247/.293/.416 (709 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Garret Anderson

Back in May I wrote, “The season did not start out the way Baker and the Twins envisioned after signing him to a long-term contract this past offseason.  Shoulder problems delayed the beginning of his 2009 season and when he returned, he began by allowing home runs at an absurd pace - in his first three starts he surrendered a home run every 10 plate appearances - while his 16 earned runs in just 14 innings of work resulted in a 9.82 ERA and a myriad of questions regarding his health and effectiveness.”  A dissection in his pitches showed that Baker struggled at gaining movement with his pitches, frequently leaving very hittable balls middle-up in the zone.  Things turned around quickly for the Twins’ veteran right-hander as his fifth season in Minnesota wore on.  In April and May, Baker went 2-6 allowing 14 home runs in his nine games resulting in a 6.32 ERA but from June until the end of the season, he went 13-3 with a 3.67 ERA in 24 games helping propel the Twins towards the division-leading Tigers.

According to his game scores, Baker, perhaps more than any other pitcher on the staff, gave the Twins the best opportunity to win games.  His 52 average in addition to 11 starts in which he held game scores of 60 or higher, supplying more than enough pitching to yield victories - especially given his 5.62 average run support. There is little evidence that suggests Baker's 15 victories were anything but earned, however, he did manage to come away with three wins that would otherwise have been losses had the offense not scored a high runs total.  Still, there are plenty of Twins followers that would hesitate to call Baker an "ace".  This came up with the TwinsCentric group as well.  While writing the Offseason GM Handbook 2009-2010, I was tasked with creating report cards.  At the time, I wagged the grades at the beginning September and Seth Stohs, Nick Nelson, John Bonnes and I opened those up for discussion.  A debated sparked regarding what I submitted on Baker and Nick Blackburn.  In my evaluation, I had Baker graded better (albeit slightly) than Blackburn.  In my own assessment, I noted that Baker's peripherals were better all-around while Blackburn was allowing more hits than Google.  It was by the grace of the baseball gods that Blackburn managed to keep such a tidy ERA.  This was not a knock on Blackburn, it was just that Baker had a better year.  After an extensive dialogue on what exactly what the grading scale should reflect, we ultimately decided to ordain them the exact same grade, much to my chagrin.  

This is not to say that I felt Blackburn deserved a bad grade, per se.  After all, his performance, while not dominating, resulted in a very good 4.03 ERA.  Of course, to most baseball analysts, ERA and victories do little to inform on the actual performance of a pitcher.  In the areas like K/9, WHIP, batting average allowed, Baker was a far superior pitcher. Outward demeanor could also be influencing the decision.  Whereas Blackburn gets credit for appearing confident in big starts, Baker seems to project this opposite.  Baker's mound demeanor could be what is most unnerving and less than inspirational.  Following periods of unbridled bashing from opponents, Baker assumes the deer-in-headlights look and appears to have a rapport of that of a father chewing out his son whenever pitching coach Rick Anderson trots out to the infield bump. 

While the rancid numbers from April and May are influencing people's decisions on Baker's overall performance, we should consider a few other factors:

• His 1.19 WHIP and his 3.38 K/BB was good enough for seventh in the American League.  These have much better predicative values than citing his 4.36 ERA (which was still several points better than the AL average of 4.46) that inflated from sub-4.00 a year ago.   
• His fastball was one of the best in the league as well.  At 1.03 wFB/C, his heater was behind that of the Royals' Zack Greinke in runs above average in the AL.  
• 31 percent of his plate appearance were of the 0-2 variety.  Only Detroit's Justin Verlander held a higher percentage of 0-2 counts.  This fact is huge considering MLB players managed to hit just .461 OPS once falling into an 0-2 deficit.  

These statistics puts Baker in an elite category that is share by Cy Young contenders.  Had he been able to erase his first nine starts where he was re-acclimating himself to pitching again after his shoulder problems, Baker may have encroached on 20 wins rather than his 15.  Signed through 2012 (but with a club option in 2013), the 27-year-old Baker will be just entering his 30's so the organization has bought out his prime years for a very reasonable $14.5 million.  What the Twins will receive in return is a starter capable of consuming 200 innings and providing Cy Young-caliber outings so long as those long fly balls stay within the field of play.   

2009 Pitcher Appraisal: Nick Blackburn

N. BLACKBURN (33 Starts)
xFIP | MLB Rank	4.78	65th
BABIP | +/- MLB Avg	.303	+1.3%
Runs Support | +/- MLB Avg	5.09	+9.43%
GAME SCORES	Decisions	No-Decisions
Game Score 50 or Greater:	10-3	3-4
Game Score 49 or Lower:	1-8	1-3
Average Game Score Per Start:	49
Season High/Low:	72 (5/10, 6/18 & 7/5)	12 (5/5)
Game Scores over 90:	0
Game Scores 80-89:	0
Game Scores 70-79:	3
Game Scores 60-69:	8
Game Scores Below 40:	9
Record of Opposing Batters:	.290/.324/.444 (768 OPS)
Offensive Equivalent:	Jose Lopez

You can say this: With Nick Blackburn pitching, you know what you are going to get.

If he finished with a game score of 50 or higher, the Twins typically won (.650 winning pct).  Conversely, if he finished his outing with a game score of 49 or below, the team typically lost (.153 winning pct).  Also working to his advantage was that the offense provided him an above-league average amount of runs support, however, this fact did not help him swing any “lucky wins” (victories obtained when game score was below 50) when he did not perform up to snuff (the Twins won just two of his 13 starts that were 49 or below).

As a control pitcher, he had plenty of peaks and valleys throughout the season, depending on his defense and fastball’s movement.  He started the season very strong.  Through his first 17 starts Blackburn posted a 2.94 ERA and a low 1.27 WHIP.  In June, I noted that both his home run-to-fly ball ratio (5.9 HR/FB at the time) and BABIP on groundballs (.205) were bound to regress closer to the mean as the season progressed.  True enough, Blackburn suffered through a stretch of bad baseball.  In his next nine starts, Blackburn turned in a 7.74 ERA along with a swollen 1.88 WHIP thanks to an increased amount of fly balls ricocheting off of the seats (10 HR).  In this time he strained to work ahead of hitters and received little movement on his fastballs, resulting in far more elevation of his pitches.  Nevertheless, in his final start in August, he made some adjustments that improved his approach and managed to hold a 3.07 ERA, a 1.09 WHIP and, most impressively, a 10.0 K/BB ratio in his last seven starts of the year. 

One of the biggest areas of improvement in his sophomore season was his pitching away from the Dome.  In 2008, Blackburn was 3-8 with a 4.97 ERA while opponents .311 outside of the 612 area code.  This season, the record still feels the same (4-7) but he had a far better 3.89 road ERA (better than his home ERA of 4.18) and kept opponents to a .285 batting average.

Blackburn’s ability to match his previous season’s production is uncanny.  Consider these two season’s of stats side-by-side: 

	GS	W-L	IP	ERA	WHIP	BAA	HR/9	FIP
2008	33	11-11	193.1	4.05	1.36	.291	1.07	4.40
2009	33	11-11	205.2	4.03	1.37	.293	1.09	4.37

This mirrored effect is downright scary but there is something that is uneasy about it as well.  It is as if there is this weird, perfectly balanced state that if anything in his environment changes, all hell could break loose.  It seems that the Twins have provided him with enough defense to keep every in this state.  If the Twins subtract some defense in 2010 in place of offense, particularly at the infield positions, Blackburn could see these numbers start to head north if fewer balls are converted to outs.  However, if the team opts to add defensive stalwarts at short, second or third, the combination of all of his starts on grass in Target Field with rangy infielders supporting him could push him to a 15-win pitcher. 

Essentially, he’s the pitching equivalent of Cub Foods.  There’s nothing flashy about him, but he’ll give you innings in bulk and is inexpensive.  

Planning for Next Year

In the midst of his capital improvement plan for the 2010 season, Star Tribune columnist Patrick Reusse submitted some very bold and very blunt proposal for the offseason.  The veteran scribe prods the Twins organization to making several transactions this winter – including sending Carlos Gomez to Rochester in 2010, presumably for horse tranquilizer to slow him down on the basepaths, trading closer Joe Nathan to save cash ($22.5 million to be exact) and playing Delmon Young everyday.  The problem, however, with being blunt is that it comes off as rash rather than calculated. 

 

While I am not going to expound too deep on the merits of the other items since I’ve outlined my 2010 blueprint in the Offseason GM Handbook, I will submit the abridged version on my reactions to several of Mr. Reusse’s statements: 

1.) Gomez to Rochester.

    Disagree.  Wholeheartedly. 

    Admittedly, the standard numbers (BA/OBP/SLG) definitely went in the wrong direction for Gomez in 2009 but when you evaluate him through other methods, you start to see how small steps were taken in the right direction.  The simplest is that his walk rate went up, while his strike out rate decreased.  He significantly reduced the number of bad pitches chases (from 37% in ’08 to 30% in ’09).  Also, when he did put the ball in play, he was behind the curve in obtaining base hits.  Considering how he was putting the ball in play (20% LD, 45% GB) in comparison to his batting average on balls in play .288, you realize that Gomez was slighted several hits over the course of the season.

    Above all, his defensive value alone supersedes his offensive malfeasances resulting in 0.6 WAR center fielder in 86 games played in 2009.  With flyball pitchers in Scott Baker, Kevin Slowey and Francisco Liriano on the staff, Gomez (partnered with Denard Span) creates the best defenders and will aid their ERA and you cannot allow your staff to suffer while one of the league’s best outfielder languishes in Rochester. 

2.) Trading Joe Nathan.

    Agree…to a certain extent.   

    On the surface, this appears to be a knee-jerk response to Alex Rodriguez’s disembowelment Nathan in the playoffs but in reality, this is should be considered.  Seriously.  At 35 years of age in 2010, there is no telling how long Nathan has remaining as a premium closer.  The Mariano Riveras and Trevor Hoffmans are exceptions rather than the rules when it comes to aging and coming off a season in which he held 0.93 WHIP and 11.67 K/9, Nathan’s value might not get any better. 

    In the past several years, Nathan has lost confidence in his fastball (one that has dropped from 94.8-mph to 93.6-mph in velocity) and as such, he’s thrown it far less frequently (58% in ’09 compared to 61% in ’08 and 65% in ’07).  Since 2006, Nathan has had more issues with his favorite secondary pitch – the slider.  That season, it was his best pitch (4.09 wSL/c) but since then it has seen a steady decline in effectiveness (2.52 to 2.03 to 1.36 this year).  In September, I documented some of the problems he was having staying on top of his release which was causing the slider to have more horizontal break as opposed to vertical break.  This lateral movement is far easily to hit when it stays on the same plane.  With a increased insecurity regarding his fastball and a higher dosage of breaking pitches, it is no small wonder that Nathan’s zone presence was the lowest in years (44% of pitches in zone). 

    Sure Nathan could provide above-average service as a closer in the next two years however the Twins should try to find out what the return on investment could be in the trade market.  As a student of Eric Walker’s (who had a great write-up at Deadspin, by the way) philosophy, the organization should consider trading all players by the age of 29 (or at least in the very early 30s).  This is when they have burned through prime playing years and still have maximum value.  At 35, Nathan probably does not have many dominate seasons left.  Furthermore, short of Danny Valencia, there are no major-league ready prospects within the system so a trade of Nathan, similar to the one that brought him to Minnesota, should be explored.  At the same time, if no team (like the Cubs) is willing to part with three major-league ready prospects, the Twins do not need to move Nathan.  In summary, it would be wise for the Twins to attempt to leverage Nathan but if the trade market is low, remember that you still have an elite closer at market-rate.

3.) Make Young an everyday player - cut him if he does not hit 25 HRs or 85 RBIs.

    Mixed emotions…but disagree.  The problem I have most with Reusse’s presentation, is his stipulation that Young has to drive in 85 runs or the Twins should outright cut him.  This again perpetuates the notion that the RBI is a controllable statistic.  RBIs, like robbery, is more about opportunity than anything else.  There have been terrible hitters than have achieved 100 RBIs only because they had been positioned well within a lineup of on-base men who may or may not run the bases particularly well.  This year alone, the Phillies Pedro Feliz drove in 82 men but held an unsightly 694 OPS.  In the AL, Aubrey Huff somehow finagled 85 ribbies while presenting a 690 OPS.  This is hardly the gold standard by which to judge talent.

    After getting past his all-hail-RBI screed, I set out to write a Pros list to figure out what value Young might present this team in 2010: 

• He should be reasonably priced in arbitration ($2M-ish). 
• He is a right-handed (quasi) power bat. 
• He is almost to the point where you can say he is a better option against lefties (88 OPS point difference LHP^RHP). 
• He has not yet entered his prime years. 
• Hit .340/.364/.544 with 12 extra base hits from September 1^st on. 

     Those are the only positive attributes I can come up.  Everything else you can use to evaluate a player’s progress is putrid for a professional.  His ability to work himself into favorable counts rescinded in 2009.  Strikeouts went up, walks went down.  His defense sucks.  His plate discipline sucks harder.  Overall, he was a -1.3 WAR player this year. 

    People will most likely reference that last bulletpoint – his final month’s performance – as the reason he should start and play everyday.  To this I direct everyone back a year, where in 2008, Young hit .330/.368/.455 and thought he would have a breakout season in 2009.  Young might simply be a warhead that never explodes. 

    Then again, I circle back to the two critical elements regarding Delmon which is that he is A) relatively cheap and B) young (literally).  As a right-handed stick, Young could alleviate Jason Kubel at DH when the Twins face a particularly nasty left-hander.  The words “everyday player” just does not fit Young’s current skill set. 

    Building a ballclub is like skinning a cat - there’s more than one way and it’s very satisfying.  That is, unless you are a Royals fan or a cat, I suppose.  Either way, these topics are some of many that we exhausted in the now available TwinsCentric Offseason GM Handbook, providing you with talking points to last all winter so - CLICK HERE FOR YOUR FREE SAMPLE.

The Bitter End.

 

    Viewers of the ALDS Game 3 watching from home were subjected to a bombardment of ads for the new TNT show Men of a Certain Age.  The comedy’s premise involves men in their forties coping with the realities (ear hair? Viagra? “going” problems?) of middle age.  Undoubtedly, this title could apply to Mariano Rivera as well.  Rivera, who is credited with being 39 years of age with the big birthday in November, apparently never got the message that life and your body is supposed to slow down as four decades tick away.  Since turning 35, Rivera had worked 361.2 innings, struck out 358 and posted an ERA of 1.89 while saving 190 games. 

Yet, there he was, bags accumulating under his eyes like Yankee championships he had helped cultivate in his 15 seasons in pinstripes, ready to terminate the Minnesota Twins 2009 season and with it, the lights of the Metrodome that glow upon the baseball field, once and for all. 

    But let’s come to one consensus about this: Mariano Rivera was not supposed to be here.  No, he was supposed to be pitching in Angel Stadium or Comerica Park.  Not the Metrodome.  He was mentally prepared to face the Angels or the Tigers and ready to spend some quality October time in Southern California or Detroit.  He certainly did not expect to be in Minneapolis, having the sub-40 degree wind slap him on the face on his way from MSP into the downtown luxury hotel.  Nobody expected him to be here.

    If we are being honest, let us admit that around September 6^th, when the Twins were seven games behind in the AL Central with 26 to go, we all decided they were done.  The local beat writers had already inked their offseason piece on how the team should approach Joe Mauer’s contract extension and called it a year.  Columnists had transfixed their gaze on Brett Favre who galloped into town and mesmerized the media like a Tiger Beat heartthrob.   For all intents and purposes, the team was declared dead.

    You know that seen in Monty Python’s Holy Grail when the peasant attempts to pass off what he insists is a dead body to the body collector who ambles through a plague-stricken village calls for the remains of all the deceased?  The peasant carts up a mangy looking excuse for a human being and demands that the body collector takes the pile on his cart.  A voice cries from in the cart stating that he, the mangy pile, is in fact not dead.  That he is very much alive and happy.  And also wants to go for a walk.  But for all of his persistence to the contrary, the peasant refused to accept the fact that the man was still alive.  That was the Twins in 2009.  Everybody assumed they were dead.  The Twins, meanwhile, insistent that they weren’t.            

    From September 7^th forward, the Twins had a creampuff schedule.  With multiple series against the lowly Indians and even lowlier Royals on the horizon, followed by games against the pace car that has suddenly sputtered to a crawl, the Detroit Tigers, where the Twins could directly influence their situation.  Which is precisely what they did: they won 18 of 26 games.  The offense hit .297 with 26 home runs and averaged 5.73 runs per game.  The pitching held a 3.90 ERA and limited opponents to 4.07 runs per game.   This was not a terminal team, but a team on the brink of surging.   Because of the mad dash to the finish line, it was the second time in as many years, an additional game to determine the winner of the AL Central would be needed.  In game 163, the Twins and Tigers turned in an epic battle that was equal parts gut-wretchingly bad and good.  Unbelievably, the team that was lacking 3/5^th of their original starting rotation (Slowey, Perkins, Liriano), their All-Star first baseman (Morneau) and starting third baseman (Crede), had somehow captured the division.

    Rested with as many hours of sleep as people have fingers on their hands (if you exclude the index, ring finger and thumb) – the Twins were tasked with the responsibility to topple a 103-win New York Yankees team.   As the Yankees trotted out 19-game winner and former Cy Young winner in CC Sabathia, the Twins countered with Brian Duesning – a fresh-faced kid from Marysville, Kansas that had not pitched in double-decker stadiums prior to this year nor even stepped foot in the city of New York.  Even before the first pitch the Twins’ starters’ neck was already sore from craning up to see the tall buildings.  Not surprising, Sabathia systematically dismantled the drowsy Twins lineup that flailed at his slider and retreated to the dugout to catch some winks prior to the next half inning.  Duesing last two innings before hitting the wall himself, allowing a Derek Jeter shot to tie the game at 2-2 before the billion dollar lineup rattled off five more unanswered runs. 

    By game two, the Twins had caught up on sleep.  Even though Nick Blackburn’s mound opponent, AJ Burnett, was making $16 million more in 2009, he provided an identical performance, matching one-run ball with Blackburn for 5-plus innings.  Burnett, however, would be rescued by a baserunning gaff by Carlos Gomez would ran past second to overzealously, fired two double-barrel shots into his foot and provided yet another example for the announcers to remind America how great Derek Jeter is when he called for the ball to tag out the tangled up Gomez before Delmon Young could cross the plate.  As Burnett would be picked up by his teammates Blackburn, on the other hand, would be let down by closer Joe Nathan who failed to maintain the Twins’ two-run lead.  Many will use umpire Phil Cuzzi’s miss call on Joe Mauer’s 10^th inning ground-rule double as a scapegoat, but the Twins would leave 17 runners on base while cleanup hitter, Jason Kubel, would whiff four times in six at-bats. 

    Back on Sunday night, on the mound stood the slight, yet imposing, Rivera.   In the eighth, Yankees manager Joe Girardi would summon Rivera to the mound to dispose of Joe Mauer, possibly the best the Twins had to offer.   Rivera has cold, dead eyes that seem to capture the souls of all of his past victims.  Since 1995, Rivera had collected a regular Hall of Fame list in the postseason alone – Ken Griffey Jr, Chipper Jones, Mike Piazza, Jason Giambi and so on.  It seems to keep him young.  After getting Mauer to spray the first offering, Jorge Posada set up low-and-inside, well off the plate, and called for another cut fastball that barrels into a left-handed hitter.  Rivera eviscerated the batting champ’s lumber, sending sawmill shards every which direction and the ball dribbling up the line to the awaiting Mark Teixeira at first for the final out of the inning. 

    If nothing else, that moment alone symbolized everything that transpired between the two teams in the post-season: their best simply overpowered our best.