Guerrier's One-Year Deal is Suitable

The Twins agreed to terms with reliever Matt Guerrier, settling on a one-year, $1.475 contract.  But as Joe Christensen pointed out, the Twins were attempting to reach a multi-year agreement with Guerrier.  Anything more than the one season is an unnecessary commitment of future finances:  Guerrier, who will be 31-years-old in August, is under control by the Minnesota Twins through 2010 and has a lot to prove.  Opponents owned him in the final two months of 2008, swatting six home runs in 19.2 innings of work.  His 0-5 record and 10.07 ERA in August and September hardly inspired confidence in the reliever.  Why commit anything more?  

 

Including being grossly ineffective the second-half of the season, Guerrier is also a likely injury candidate.  Guerrier has been one of the most overworked relievers in the game the past two years.  Though his 149 appearances didn’t qualify him as the most-used reliever – the Nationals’ Saul Rivera was used over 161 times in 2007 and 2008 – his 164 innings led to 1.10 innings per outing average over the past two seasons, a significant amount of work.  This is on par with the experience of Scott Proctor.  The 31-year-old Proctor was run out to the mound while with the Yankees 83 times in 2006 to throw 102.1 innings.  In 2007, Proctor split the year between New York and the Dodgers and was once again trotted out 83 times but threw 86 innings total.  After 163 appearances and 188 innings (1.15 Inn/App), Proctor started 2008 ineffective, throwing 31.2 innings with a 6.82 ERA as opponents slugged .504 off of him, and complained about pain in his arm.  The righty spent 60 days on the DL in 2008 and witnessed his velocity drop (from 94.4 in 2006 to 92.8 last season) and control wane (2.9 BB/9 in 2006 to 5.59 BB/9 last year).  This offseason, the Florida Marlins obtained Proctor for $750,000.   

 

Like Proctor, Guerrier saw his command fail him too -- as evident by his BB/9 inflating from 2.15 in 2007 to 4.36 last year -- but Guerrier’s numbers show promise that his career could head in a different direction than Proctor’s.  Guerrier’s velocity stayed relatively the same (91.6 in 2007 and 91.4 in 2008), dispelling any immediate concerns of pitching in pain.  As I highlighted last month, Guerrier still has a very effective assortment of breaking pitches.  His slider is especially devastating, reflective in his .423 WHIFF average, and his strikeout rate has remained steady at 6.96 K/9.  Furthermore, Guerrier’s BABIP of .315 was significantly higher than both his career average of .291 and the league’s average of .295.  As an indicator of luck, Guerrier should see his BABIP regress closer to the league average in 2009.   

 

If the Twins manage to trim off 15-20 appearances in 2009, Guerrier’s likelihood of having a solid season increases.  Through his first 55 games in 2007, Guerrier held a 1.96 ERA, 49/15 K/BB ratio and an opponent average of .202.  In his first 50 games in 2008, Guerrier had a 3.23 ERA, a 44/23 K/BB ratio and an opponent average of .242.  Space out 50-60 appearances in lower leverage situations and he is likely to replicate his early season success from April until September.  If he responds well in these appearances, the Twins and Guerrier will once again exchange figures and the front office can look to secure Guerrier’s first season of free agent eligibility.  If he does not respond well to the lighter work load or it does surface that Guerrier has a tired arm, the Twins now have the option of replacing him in 2010 with several internal candidates at a less expensive rate.   

 

Either way Guerrier’s 2009 season plays out, in the end, avoiding signing him to a multi-year contract was a smart move.   

 

    

 

 

 

Did Tom Kelly Wreck Brad Radke's Career?

    When the 33-year-old Brad Radke retired following the 2006 season after 12 seasons with the Twins, many of those played with futile teams, he did so leaving behind a 148-139 record (.516 win pct) in 377 starts, a 4.22 ERA and 1467-to-445 strikeouts-to-walks ratio.  Yet it seems like an abrupt end to Radke's career.  Andy Pettite, who finished ahead of Radke for the 1995 Rookie of the Year award, is about to start his 16th season.  Why did Radke succumb to shoulder injuries that forced him to retire when some of his compatriots continue to pitch?  

 

 

    There were two parts to the problems that would lead to Radke's early retirement: timing and management.  The first, timing, came from personnel moves from the front office forced Radke to enter the starting rotation at a young age.  With the impending free agency of Kevin Tapani and the ineffectiveness of Scott Erickson, the Twins traded two members of the rotation that were heavily relied upon.  At 22 years old most pitching prospect are putting the final touches at AA and AAA, but Radke was about to receive a baptism by fire.  The second, and most important aspect that led to later a final rotator cuff injury, was game management.

 

    The best way to measure a pitcher's workload is by season is to use Rany Jazayerli's Pitcher Abuse Points system.  Between Craig Wright's "The Diamond Appraised" and Jazayerli's research, these sabermaticians found that it wasn't the amount of innings or pitches thrown that causes damage for pitchers, but rather it was pitching past the point of fatigue.  Jazayerli's analysis shows that the 100 pitch mark is about the threshold for the average starting pitcher and he devised a points-based system that assigns a value as the pitch count grows.   One point is assigned to every pitch from 101-110; Two points from every pitch from 111-120;  Three points for every pitch from 121-130 and so on.  According to his article, "These points are cumulative: a 115-pitch outing gets you 20 PAP's - 1 for each pitch from 101-110 (10 total), and 2 for each pitch from 111-115 (10 total). A 120-pitch outing is worth 30 PAP's, while a 140-pitch outing is worth 100 PAP's - more than 3 times as much. This seems fair; a pitcher doesn't get tired all at once, but fatigue sets on gradually, and with each pitch the danger of continuing to pitch grows."

 

    Below is a season-by-season look at Radke's Pitcher Abuse Points: 

 

	22 yrs	23 yrs	24 yrs	25 yrs	26 yrs	27 yrs	28 yrs	29 yrs	30 yrs	31 yrs	32 yrs	33 yrs
PAP	187	288	368	498	137	409	148	38	101	178	56	27

 

    The Kelly Years (22 yrs to 28 yrs)

 

    The 22-year-old Brad Radke was summoned to the Twins, unscathed by AAA experience, and the burden of the those lost innings  fell on to the young Radke's shoulders.  Manager Tom Kelly and pitching coach Dick Such rode Radke hard -- the young pitcher had accumulated 187 PAP in 1995.  In four of his starts, the Twins had Radke throw 111-to-120 pitches on four occasions and once he threw over 131 pitches.  The following season he would make 35 starts and work 232 innings at the tender age of 23, amassing 288 PAP - throwing over 121 pitches four times. It was obvious that Radke was trending upwards.  At age 24, Radke had what most agree was his best season.  In 35 starts, Radke went 20-10 with a 3.87 ERA while pitching 239.7 innings.  What was most impressive about this display was the fact that his 20 victories accounted for nearly 30% of the team's total (68 in all) and his strikeout rate was up to a career-high 17.6%.  Still, with success came additional workload and Radke's Pitching Abuse Points for the season was up to 368.  The next season, 1998, Radke tallied his highest PAP of his career to date with 498 with an ERA of 4.30 in 35 starts and 213 innings.  Interestingly enough, after two consecutive seasons with heavy workloads (368 and 498 PAP each) and high strikeout rates (17.6% and 16.1% respectively), Radke's strikeout totals diminished to 13% in 1999.  In just five starts he entered the 111-120 pitch range all year - mostly staying under 100 pitches - while still throwing well over 200 innings (218) and as a result the Twins received a low 3.75 ERA, a new career low.  This success could be attributed to the fact that in 33 starts, the 26 year old finished the season with his lowest PAP total (137) since his rookie campaign.  Nevertheless, Kelly and Such regressed to their old ways and allowed Radke to labor on the mound in 2000 as a 27 year old.  In four games, Radke threw more than 121 pitches and throw between 111-and-120 in seven more. Fresh off of his contract extension, Brad Radke would finish the year with 407 PAP while making 34 starts and throwing 226.7 innings with a 4.45 ERA.  In 2001, in what would be Tom Kelly and Dick Such's last season as the field managers, Radke made 33 starts and matched his 226 innings from the prior year.  In those 33 starts, Radke would rarely throw into the 111-to-120 pitch range (four) and threw more than 121 just once, resulting in a PAP of 148 while providing an ERA of 3.94.  Judging from his 1999 and 2001 seasons, it would seem that Radke would respond better to a less abusive pitch count. 

 

The Gardenhire Years (29 yrs to 33 yrs)

 

      When Ron Gardenhire and Rick Anderson assumed the roles of manager and pitching coach, the pair seemed to approach their positions differently then the previous regime.  On the pitching mound, no Twins starter broke the 200 inning barrier.  The starters as a group went from throwing nearly 70% of the total innings just 62% in 2002.  This slight adjustment helped the rotation's ERA go from 4.46 to 4.38, a small difference.  An early season strained groin would give Radke his lightest workload since his rookie year, avoiding the 200 inning mark (118) amounting to only 38 PAP in just 21 starts.  A year later, the 30 year old Radke would be ready to throw 200 innings once again and make 33 starts, finishing 14-10 with a 4.49 ERA, and a 101 PAP -- his lowest total in a full season yet.  In 2004, Radke would make 34 starts with a 11-8 record and a career-low 3.48 ERA in 219 innings.  He would also only reach 178 PAP that season as well.  It was after that season in which Radke faced a big decision.  Once again, he would be a free agent and following a year in which he had a 3.48 ERA, he would be a desired commodity.  The Red Sox supposedly offered a four-year, $27 million dollar contract but the Twins pitcher for life passed it over to remain with the team that drafted and developed him to a two-year, $18 million contract.  "We're comfortable in Minnesota," Radke told NY Times reporters. "I was looking for something fair. If the Twins didn't come up with a fair deal, I'd be playing for the Red Sox right now. I didn't know what to expect. Half of me thought I was going to go somewhere else; the other half thought it would work out. I'm glad it did. My family is happy. Plus we've been to the postseason the last three years. Why change?"

    Radke's fortunes, along with the rest of the team, would turn in 2005.  After three straight division championships, the Twins would sink to 3rd in the division as Radke would finish 9-12 in 31 starts, working 200 innings with an ERA of 4.04.  Gardenhire's game management added only 56 PAP to his now 32 year old arm that season, an arm that was hanging by a thread.  Radke made references to the pain in his shoulder after each start.  He would try to work through it in 2006, in what would ultimately be his last season.  In mid-August the pain would be unbareable and Radke would eventually sit the month and almost all of September out in hopes that the rest would offer repair.  That final season Radke would make 28 starts and toss 162 innings, end the year with a 12-9 record and a 4.32 ERA. 

 

	Starters	Innings	K%	ERA	PAP	PAP/Start
Kelly/Such	230	1535	14%	4.27	2037	8.85
Gardenhire/Anderson	147	911	13.8%	4.15	400	2.72

    In seven seasons managed by Tom Kelly, Brad Radke had 2,037 Pitcher Abuse Points on his arm, an average of 8.85 PAP per start.  In five seasons while managed by Ron Gardenhire, Radke put only 400 Pitching Abuse Points on his arm, an average of 2.72 PAP per start.  There are several theories as to why Kelly used Radke more liberally, while Gardenhire more conservatively.  Gardenhire had the luxury of pairing Radke with Johan Santana, Carlos Silva and Kyle Lohse.  These pitchers provided a level of reliance that Kelly never had with the likes of Frankie Rodriguez, Mike Trombley and Rich Robertson.  Secondly, the bullpens under Ron Gardenhire were far superior than what Kelly was forced to call upon in the mid-to-late 1990s -- milking out an additional inning from Radke keeps the relievers off the mound. 

 

    Still, whatever the logic behind it, either knowingly or unknowingly, Kelly was slowly doing damage to Radke's arm.  Think of Kelly's increased workload of Radke to that of a smoker.  A young smoker at the age of 22 might not think there is any damage incurring to their lungs when they inhale a pack a day, but as the years progress, their lung capacity is gone.   Even when Gardenhire began to curb his usage, the damage was already done.  Sure, the entire premise of this statement seems littered with blaspheme, accusing a two-time World Series winning manager of not being able to handle his young pitcher.  However, when we review the evidence above, we find that it is true.  Tom Kelly's mismanagement of Brad Radke cost him at least one or two seasons in his career. 

Did The Twins Screw Up By Signing Kubel?

    Both Dave Cameron (Fangraphs) and Rob Neyer (ESPN) seem flabbergasted that the Twins signed Jason Kubel to such a lucrative deal.  Cameron's solution would have been to cut Kubel loose and then sign 30-year-old Eric Hinske to a one-year, $1 million-to-$2 million dollar contract the Pittsburgh Pirates are soon to close with the former Rookie of the Year. 

 

Cameron writes "Compare that to Hinske (the guy who had to settle for a one year deal as a role player on a terrible team) - the offensive skillset is practically identical, but Hinske can actually play a competent 1B/OF. The offensive difference in their CHONE projections add up to 2-3 runs over a full season, but the defensive gap is clearly much larger. It’s hard to make a case that Kubel > Hinske."

 

Likewise, Neyer states "Hinske was worth around $9 million last year; Kubel was worth around $2 million. That difference is due largely to the fact that Hinske can play the outfield passably, while Kubel is (or should be) restricted exclusively to DH duties"

 

In the strict GMsian sense, both Cameron and Neyer have an argument.  They are analyzing this in a pure "cog-for-the-machine" sense of designing a roster.  Hinske is cheaper part and has the potential to provide similar output with the added caveat of defense if necessary.  The problem with the two writers' proposals as outsiders to the Twins organization is that the Twins are not interested in the defensive part of the equation.  Certainly a more enlightened franchise (Seattle, Boston) might weigh the added benefit of having a player on the roster that could stand in with serviceable defense but as it stands, the Twins have four outfielders ahead of anyone else on the outfield depth chart, so the focus revolves around the offense provided. 

 

Last year, the 30-year-old left-handed batting Hinske hit .247/.333/.465 with 20 home runs and 88-to-47 K-to-BB ratio in 432 plate appearances while playing corner outfield for the Rays.  Comparatively, the 26-year-old left-handed batting Jason Kubel hit .272/.335/.471 with 20 home runs and 91-to-47 K-to-BB ratio in 517 plate appearances while being used as a designated hitter.  Very similar, right?  On top of that, both have been treated like a platoon candidate over the duration of their careers.  Where Hinske has seen 78% of his plate appearances against right-handed pitchers (hitting .264/.347/.458), Kubel has seen 81% of his plate appearances against the right-handed variety (hitting .275/.327/.464). 

 

There should be consideration towards the trajectory of their 2008 season to put their final numbers into context.  Hinske opened the season white-hot, batting .292/.407/.639 with six home runs in 86 plate appearances with a solid 14 walks to 12 strikeouts.  From May 1st through September, Hinske hit .236/.315/.424 with 14 home runs in 346 plate appearances while walking just 33 more times and striking out 76 times.  His numbers were buttressed by a torid first month of the year.  In his initial month, Kubel hit .237/.257/.381 with four home runs and a putrid three walks to 20 strikeouts in 101 plate appearances.  As Kubel's season progressed and he was given a regular spot as the DH when Craig Monroe was released, Kubel hit a much sturdier .281/.353/.495 with 16 home runs in 416 plate appearances while walking 44 times and striking out 71 times.  If you use this as an indicator for future performance, Kubel's season shows progression while Hinske's shows wear. 

 

Furthermore, Kubel has made growth in proving that he can be used as an everyday player and not just a platoon partner.  The Twins gave Kubel more exposure to left-handed pitchers (22% of his at bats) and was somewhat useful hitting .232/.330/.374.  Hinske, on the other hand, was an extreme platoon player with only 12% of his plate appearances against lefties where he hit just .143/.263/.224.  There is value in having someone that kills a rally if a LOOGY is brought in.

  

The truth is that Kubel is just reaching his peak season and will be playing  his best baseball (in theory) in the next several years.  Meanwhile, at 31 in 2009, Hinske will see his numbers drop, both offensively and defensively, as he ages towards obscurity. 

 

 

Odds. Ends. (01.27.09)

• The Hardball Times 2009 Season Preview finally went to the printers this week and will begin shipping next week.  Editor David Gassko posted a nice run-down on what you will receive if you purchase the book, which I highly recommend and not just because I wrote the Twins section.  There are many great contributors that helped make this book possible and The Hardball Times is always one of the frontrunners when it comes to baseball analysis (and unlike some baseball websites, their content is always free of charge).  Order your copy today.     
  
• Fangraphs's Marc Hulet wrote a piece reflecting back on the Johan Santana trade.  Hulet's understated conclusion is that the trade hasn't gone as well as the Twins hoped it would have.  In general, trading one superstar player for a handful of players typically fails.  Bill James determined in his 1988 Abstract that "Talent in baseball is not normally distributed.  It is a pyramid.  For every player who is 10% above the average player, there are probably 20 players who are 10% below the average."  (There are the exceptions to that Jamesian rule: Giants GM Brian Sabean figured this out when he accepted A.J. Pierzynski for three players.)  Essentially, it is hard to replace the superstar that is Johan Santana, which is why none of the three pitchers (Humber, Mulvey and Guerra) will provide the type of innings that Santana did.  Most analysts tend to focus on Carlos Gomez when deciding the victor of this trade.  Gomez contains the largest likelihood for R.O.I.  Subtly, Gomez's presence in centerfield (+32) probably shaved off runs from Slowey (44% fb%) and Baker's (45.7% fb%) overall totals.  This should not be taken lightly, however, that isn't as easy to measure as say, a .657 OPS and therefore easier to deem it a bad trade.   An improvement in his offensive production in the next several seasons coupled with one of the three pitchers emerging as a significant contributer could swing the trade into the realm of acceptable.  What should be understood at this point is that none of the three will provide production on a Johan Santana scale. 

 

• Of all the manuvers Royals GM Dayton Moore made this offseason, signing Zack Greinke to a 4-year, $38M contract is head-and-shoulders the best.  Though known for mental issues that sidelined him in 2006 for the majority of the year, Greinke emerged in 2008 as one of the top young starters in the game.  The 25-year-old threw 202.1 innings while striking out 183 and walking just 56 for a FIP of 3.56.  The Royals have purchased Greinke's first two free agent years (2011, 2012) but all indications suggest that Greinke should be as effective at 28 and 29.  Even though the Royals called on Greinke at the tender age of 20, he rarely threw more than 100 pitches in a start.  This was also true in his 2005 season.  By taking the year off in 2006 and working mostly out of the bullpen in 2007, Greinke has protected his arm from the abuse that a lot of young pitchers on poor teams suffer (see: Radke, Brad).  Rany Jayazerli at Baseball Prospectus developed a system of monitoring "Pitcher Abuse Points" or PAP.  In short, going from research conducted by Craig Wright, Jayazerli expounded upon the notion that it is not the amount of pitches a pitcher throws that results in injuries, but rather it is throwing with a fatigued arm.  Consider Mark Prior, for example.  At age 22 in 2003, Prior would often throw more than 130 pitches in a game, averaging 113 pitches per start.  At age 21 in 2005, Greinke made 33 starts and only threw over 110 pitches twice (111) and averaged 93 pitches per start.  Because Greinke avoided both throwing all together and amassing a hefty pitch count at an early stage in his career, he is now a solid candidate to pitch well into his 30s while flameouts like Prior attempt to make a comeback with the Padres. 

 

• I received a spattering of emails (read: three) inquiring which side of the fence I actually stood when it came to signing Joe Crede in response to the article posted yesterday.  It may have been a bit ambiguous. I do believe that depending on the terms of the contract, Crede could wind up a bargain free agent.  What I do not believe is that Crede will replicate his totals if the Twins acquire him based upon the disadvantage that a right-handed batter has in the Metrodome.  Fans should put that into perspective.  Rondell White befell the same fate.  At Comerica, White found the seats every 24.4 at bats (7 HR in 171 AB at home).  Comerica's left field power alley is 10 feet closer to home than the Metrodome.  The Twins brought him in and White hit a home run every 34.4 at bats at the Dome (4 HR in 153 AB).  The Dome squelches the majority of right-handed power hitters.  That said, I highly respect Crede's glovework -- enough to compensate for his low on-base percentage -- and if the Twins think his back is healthy enough to play 130 games, I'm for it. 

 

• The Star Tribune's Jim Souhan recently took the time to solve the Twins' third base woes: move Michael Cuddyer back to third.  Number one, this resolves the vacancy at third at the same time it does alleviate the logjam of an outfield.  Souhan's argument involves not having to spend money or players in acquiring a working part that could play third.  On the surface, this proposition makes sense.  Cuddyer has a history of playing third base (after being drafted as a shortstop) and, all things considered, third base is only one position back up the Defensive Spectrum from right field (DS: 1B -- LF -- RF -- 3B -- CF -- 2b -- SS).  But the problem lies in that Cuddyer will be 30 in 2009, the defensive spectrum is not kind to outfielders that are converted back to third basemen.  Steven Goldleaf conducted a study that suggested nearly 75% of all attempts to reconvert outfielders to third basemen fail.  Cuddyer's age is pulling him to the left on on the spectrum -- accept that Jim. 

 

• TwinsFest sounds like a resounding success as the total number of patrons exceeded 31,000 -- the third-highest total behind 2007 which saw 35,000 visitors at the Dome following a miraculous comeback season and the second-highest in 1992's crowd of 32,000 following their second World Series title.  In today's economic and below zero climate, it is surprising that the Twins have been able to maintain such interest within a team in an offseason in which the resigning of Nick Punto was the hot stove headline.  Things could be worse, you could be a Pittsburgh Pirates fan.  This past weekend, PirateFest, celebrated their all-time attendance high of 15,000 visitors to the three-day event.  After going 488-644 since 2002 (.396 winning percentage), the Pirates front office rewarded the loyal fans by signing Craig Monroe and Ramon Vazquez.   

 

Crede Considerations.

There are a few points that we should consider when discussing the potential acquisition of Joe Crede.  On the surface, Crede has the makings of a bargain value free agent that the market ignored due to health issues and low on-base percentages.  The Twins are actively in pursuit of Crede, monitoring his workouts in Arizona and negotiating with Scott Boras on the terms of a contract.  Outside of his back and the length of his deal, there are a few other things the front office should review. 

 

His upper-cut swing has become more prevalent in the past several seasons (53.7% FB% in 2008) at the expense of line drives and grounders. In an environment like Chicago, this plays well.  Flyballs, as we will see, have the tendency to seek over the wall.  Grounders on the grass infield tend to be outs where as in the Metrodome they sneak through the infield and often run gaps.  US Cellular is 330 down the left field line and 375 to the power alley in left-center.  The Metrodome requests an addition 13 feet to clear the fence down the left field foul line (343) and another 10 to reach the power alley (385).  These dimensions at the Dome punish right handed flyball hitters seeking solace of the prevailing winds and rewards a line drive, gap hitter.  Crede still has a solid power swing - most likely will be trading those home runs in Chicago for doubles (or perhaps flyouts) in Minneapolis. 

 

From March 31st until July 21st in 2008, Crede hit 17 home runs in 312 at bats -- a home run every 18.3 at-bats.  This certainly screams power and by comparison, Justin Morneau, the Twins leading home run slugger, socked 11 in 292 at bats during that same stretch.  Morneau's was a pace of a home run every 26.5 at bats.

Before declaring Crede as the better power-hitter, consider the context.  Morneau played his home games at the Metrodome which favors left-handed batters but in general suppresses runs.  In 81 Dome games, Morneau hit 12 home runs in 301 at bats - pacing for a home run every 25.0 at bats.  Away from the Dome, Morneau played in 82 games and hit 11 home runs in 322 at bats - a slower pace of 29.2 at bats between home runs.  This is a slight difference but balanced for the most part.  Conversely, Crede's power performance was inflated by playing home games at US Cellular.  In 47 games at his home field, Crede hit 11 home runs in 162 at bats - a superhuman pace of a home run every 14.7 at bats.  In 50 games outside of US Cellular, Crede hit just six home runs in 173 at bats - a more earthly home run every 28.8 at bats.  The same is true over the entire duration of his career.  While playing at US Cellular, Crede has hit a home run every 19.3 at bats; away he hits them every 25.5 at bats.  Subtract his former ballpark from the equation and one would expect his home run total to deflate.  

 

In 2008, 131 home runs were hit at the Dome in 5,283 at bats resulting in an extreme muted home run pace of one every 40.3 at bats.  US Celluler, on the other hand, witnessed 206 home runs in 5,363 at bats resulting in a home run every 26.3 at bats.  Since the Major League average was a home run hit every 34.7 at bats, this means that the Dome suppressed home run totals by 16.1% and US Cellular increased home runs by 31.9%.  The difference between exchanging US Cellular for the Dome would, on average, decrease the home run rate by 34.7%.  Therefore, Crede's home run pace at the Cell of 14.7 HR/AB would drop to 19.8 HR/AB had he spent his season in Minnesota.

 

Admittedly, this transfer to the Dome with the applied formula above would have cost Crede a measly pair of home runs since his pace was so incredible.  The forgone conclusion here is that Crede is very unlikely to repeat the pace of 14.7 home runs per at bat in 2009 regardless of where he plays.  Assuming that his impressive 14.7 HR/AB regresses to his norm of 19.3 HR/AB in 2009, we can expect that his home run rate will increase to roughly 26.0 HR/AB while playing for the Twins.  On a wag, let us say that Crede gets the exact amount of at bats in 2009 has he did in 2008 due to various ailments and platoon situations.  Instead of the 11 home runs he had in Chicago, six or seven is a more reasonable expectation to hit at the Dome.

 

This is a roundabout, convoluted way of saying Crede's home run totals will drop in 2009 so the expectation of Crede in a Twins uniform should adjust accordingly.  

Supplanting the platoon of Brian Buscher and Brendan Harris with Joe Crede does not necessarily spell an increase in offense, either.  From June 14th on, after they were anointed the starting third basemen, the Twins duo hit a very respectable .294/.346/.436 (.782 OPS) in 95 games.  Crede, playing in just 97 games, hit .248/.314/.460 (.774 OPS).  With the combination of Buscher/Harris, the Twins would average 5.177 runs per game (according to the Baseball Musings Lineup Analyzer).  Substituting Crede and his 2008 numbers within the Analyzer and we find that the Twins would average only 5.126 runs per game - a 0.051 loss in runs generated per game.  This is far from an upgrade.  The upgrade would come in the form of defense provided. 

Signing Crede should be based upon his defense first and foremost.  When it comes to fielding his position, Joe Crede has been one of the bar none best defenders in the game.  Since 2006, Crede has converted 55 extra outs above what was expected among third basemen.  Last year he made 13 additional outs in 834 innings, fourth best among third basemen.  No platoon combination could replicate the potential glovework that a healthy Crede could supply.  The problem, as Phil Rogers notes in the Chicago Tribune, is how Crede's back will respond to playing on the artificial turf.