The Boof Breakdown

 

	MPH	Usage	WHIFF	Zone %
2007 - Fastball	91.9	58.3%	.071	63.4%
2008 - Fastball	91.7	58.1%	.100	68.1%

What is apparent is that Bonser still has very good control and decent velocity on his fastball.  As a matter of location, Bonser's control of his fastball was above the MLB average (64% MLB zone avg).  In terms of velocity though, Bonser's average on this pitch has dropped minimally in three straight seasons even though he does throw harder than his MPH indicates, hitting 93-94 regularly.  If he does maintain a full-time conversion to the bullpen in 2009, I would expect that his average velocity increases because he will no longer have to reserve gas as he would have as a starting pitcher.  He favored throwing it to lefties versus the right-handed counterparts (63% vs 52%) which will incite some to use that as a possible explanation why his success against left-handed batters has waned. 

 

	MPH	Usage	WHIFF	Zone %
2007 - Curveball	79.5	19.4%	.247	63.8%
2008 - Curveball	79.7	17.0%	.359	66.6%

Bonser's curveball went from a passable pitch in 2007 to a good pitch in 2008.  Nearly 35% of all swing put on his curve -- one that has a good -10 mph difference along with a large break -- missed.  The change in WHIFF may be due to the fact that he reduced the usage against left-handed batters from 2007 to 2008, which might be his key to success against those hitters. In 2006, he used his curveball 14% against lefties and they slugged .451 off of him.  In 2007, Bonser used his curveball 24% (350) of the time against left-handed batters.  That year, lefties slugged .563 off of him.  In 2008, he threw it less frequently, nearly 19% (177) and witnessed his left-handed slugging percentage drop to .486 this past year.  Conversely, he's thrown that pitch more excessive each year to righties:  In 2006, it was 10% of his pitches to them.  In 2007, 14%.  In 2008 he was throwing it nearly 20% of the time.  In those three seasons, his right-handed opponents' slugging went from .469 to .360 to .405. 

 

	MPH	Usage	WHIFF	Zone %
2007 - Slider	85.6	16.5%	.204	63.4%
2008 - Slider	85.9	18.2%	.168	53.9%

In 2007, Bonser used his slider as his go-to pitch against righties, employing it 31% of the time.  This past year, it was thrown 24% to them instead mixing in more curveballs.  On occasion, he threw the slider to left-handed opponents but it was his main weapon-of-choice against the same-sided opponents (as should be the case since the pitch tends to break into the wheelhouse of left-handed batters).  As I had previously mentioned, the slider might be the main culprit for Bonser's inability to retire right-handed batters in the first-half of the season.  Bonser's slider, when effective, has a sharp downward motion.  The 2008 version of the pitch seemed to lack that bite.  Certainly it wasn't a pitch that the was hit hard -- he gave up just two home runs on this pitch -- but it wasn't fear either as his ability to throw it for a strike dropped.  I would wager that opponents' scouting reports reflected this zone degradation and subsequently batters chased it less which led to a lower WHIFF average. 

 

	MPH	Usage	WHIFF	Zone %
2007 - Changeup	82.2	6.1%	.068	61.5%
2008 - Changeup	82.9	6.6%	.206	58.7%

This was a pitch that Bonser wanted to mix in to his game more, he told the press this past spring.  It may have not inspired enough confidence or it could have been since his curveball actually provided a bigger discrepancy in velocity he used it as an offspeed pitch instead.  Regardless of why he did not follow his game plan, his changeup improved in 2008 as indicated by the handful more chases (.206 WHIFF) that in 2007.  Despite this improvement on the pitch, when Bonser enters the season in the bullpen, I anticipate that he will ditch the changeup in the 2009 season as relievers typically employ a three-pitch arsenal. 

 

As Bonser begins to accept his destiny as a relief pitcher in 2009, we will see a higher rate of fastballs thrown (~65%) at a higher average velocity (~93-94).  If used correctly, Bonser will face 70% right-handed batters and just 30% left-handed next season.  Right-handed opponents should see a nice split of 50% fastballs, 30% curveballs and 15% sliders with the rare changeup mixed in.  Lefties will see a higher percentage of fastballs (65%) and an even 15% each of the changeup/slider. 

What About Boof?

Not long after Boof Bonser's sentence to the bullpen, I analyzed Boof's pitching through the use of pitch f/x.  My conclusion at the time was that his slider, a pitch he threw nearly a quarter of the time to righties, was flattening out at that time in the season, resulting in an unexpectedly high .288/.322/.441 batting line against righties as of June 14th.  Still, at the conclusion of the season, Bonser had improved his approach against the same-sided opponents, dropping his batting line against to .260/.295/.405, suggesting that he had regained his slider and his repertoire was playing well in the 'pen, a sign that he could be capable of assuming a meatier role in the 2009 bullpen. 

 

In addition to this in-season improvement, there are several other statistical indications that -- as the Counting Crows song so eloquently puts it -- this year could be better than the last.  For starters, his fielding independent metric of 4.51 was much better than his swollen 5.93 ERA.  Secondly, his left-on-base percentage of 57.9% and those with severely low LOB% sometimes rebound the following season.   Lastly, Bonser's candidacy as a solid bullpen contributor is buttressed by his minor league legacy.  Over the course of seven minor league seasons, Bonser has struck out 916 batters in 884.1 innings while walking just 398.  His last full season at AAA in 2005, Bonser led the International League in strikeouts. 

 

It is hard to refute those three cited examples as justifiable reasons for Bonser being anything but an excellent internal candidate for the vacant set-up role.  However, if you look closer at his numbers, there are two glaring problems with Bonser's game that supersedes his ability to be an effective reliever in high leverage situations: (1) He is useless against left-handed opponents and (2) He can't pitch from the stretch. 

 

The first is his approach against left-handed opponents. 

 

vs LHB	Bonser	RHP League-Average vs LHB
2006	.251/.305/.451	.279/.349/.446
2007	.349/.407/.563	.275/.349/.438
2008	.315/.378/.486	.269/.346/.430

 

Lefties are a demographic that had not given Bonser trouble in 2006 but were suddenly a blight on his landscape in 2007.  In his first year, Bonser had limited lefties to a .251/.305/.451 batting line.  In the subsequent season, it swelled to .349/.407/.563.  Prior to his demotion to the bullpen, Bonser had improved upon his 2007 numbers with a .297/.322/.441 line.  Unfortunately he regressed in the 'pen and at the 2008 season's end, lefties had hit a collective .315/.378/.486.  If you are looking for a silver-lining, it was a tad better than his 2007 numbers on the whole, however, the bulk of the destruction happened when Bonser was in relief.

 

More recently, in 12 starts in 2008, Bonser had thrown 66.1 innings with a 42/20 K/BB and high 7.08 RA but a low .267/.316/.418 opponent batting line.  Following his transition to the bullpen, Bonser threw 52 innings and compiled a 55/16 K/BB ratio but still posted a 6.02 RA as opponents batted .307/.353/.474 off of him.  As I mentioned above, Bonser's opponent average against right-handers DROPPED when converted to a reliever.  On the other hand, up until June 14th lefties were hitting .297/.322/.441.  At the end of the season, it rose to to a firm .315/.378/.486.  The inflated batting line as a reliever came in direct result of left-handed opponents. 

 

The second problem is that he is atrocious when pitching from the stretch (something that relievers are requested to frequently, often with the game on the line).  Similar to his left-handed struggles, pitching with runners on manifested itself after his rookie season. 

 

Runner On Base	Bonser	League-Average
2006	.267/.319/.466	.274/.348/.425
2007	.294/.367/.478	.277/.350/.430
2008	.322/.349/.467	.274/.348/.425

 

What seems to be given him the biggest problem is when runners are on first - more so than any other base path alignment. 

 

Runner On First	Bonser	League-Average
2006	.295/.313/.526	.277/.335/.435
2007	.360/.416/.640	.284/.342/.442
2008	.369/.411/.500	.277/.348/.425

 

In addition to the higher batting line, Bonser's stolen base rate skyrocketed too from 57% SB% in 2006 (4 in 7), 61% in 2007 (11 in 18) and 100% in 2008 (11 of 11).   Considering that limiting a baserunner from scoring may be more important in the later innings in a high leverage situation, Bonser appears to be a liability under these circumstances.  Clearly this is a bigger problem than his weight.  This is a mental issue. 

 

That said, the benefit about being a reliever is that you do have a manager that can use you at appropriate times as to not exacerbate your weaknesses.  Bonser can be inserted during times when three right-handed batters are due up.  Naturally, this leaves him susceptible to the occasional left-handed pinch hitter, but those are seldomly fearsome.  Where Bonser becomes an issue is when he allows one of those hypothetical batters to reach base and forces Gardenhire to select from allowing Bonser to continue to face Hafner, Martinez, Thome, etc. with a runner on first -- which, as we've seen above, is a recipe for disaster -- or bring in a left-handed situational reliever (Breslow/Mijares), if any are available.  That begs the question, how common is it that three right-handed batters are batting in succession without a leftie giving them reprieve?  How likely is it that Gardenhire will save Breslow or Mijares until after Bonser pitches?  In the end, a solid 8th Inning Guy, like a closer, should not need this much management.  Bonser is simply not that guy. 

Odds. Ends. (01.05.08)

 

• Traveshamockery or not?  The Indians' acquisition of Mark DeRosa was met with quasi-outrage by La Velle when he first reported on his blog.  Admittedly, I too was keen on DeRosa for several reasons.  For starters, in comparison to Adrian Beltre's $12 million, DeRosa was due only $5.5 million in 2009, a reasonable addition to the Twins' payroll.  Secondly, he had repeat back-to-back seasons in which his on-base percentage was above .370 along with a walk rate that increased from 7.8% to 10.4% to 12.0% over the past three years indicating that he is showing a mature plate approach in his early 30s.  Furthermore, he appears to be an intelligent baserunner.  In 2008, he swiped six bases and did not get caught once.  Finally, he has peppered the field with line drives - hitting 22% of batted balls in this manner since 2006 - an indication that his rather high .325 BABIP is not a fluke.  Though you might be able to dismiss his home run potential as being in the 10-15 range in 2009, you cannot overlook the fact that between his patience and method he would not have improved the Twins ballclub. 
• That Said...It is easy to say in retrospect the Twins should have scrounged up three borderline prospects to equal Cleveland's offer.  As La Velle outlined, the three prospects the Indians turned over were hardly bluechippers.  If DeRosa turns in a season that declines even slightly, he will be a likely candidate for a Type A or Type B free agent, netting Cleveland at least one draft pick to replenish the trio lost.  However, negotiations with one organization might not reflect ones with another.  For example, during the winter meetings the reports were that the Cubs wanted Jason Kubel in return.  It could be quite possible that the Cubs viewed this as equal value while the Twins scoffed at the idea.  A few weeks later, Chicago Tribune columnist Phil Rogers wrote that the Cubs might be interested in moving DeRosa if "they got a package of solid prospects, like outfielder Ben Revere and pitchers Jose Mijares, Jeff Manship and Andy Swarzak (sic)."  The Twins consider Mijares a potential suitor for the bullpen in the immediate future and Swarzak might also be a contributor as the season progresses.  Though I might consider Manship a viable trading chip, the other three should be used only on an acquisition of a player that would remain with the Twins for more than one season.  To dispell the organization's passive tendencies this offseason, GM Bill Smith told the PiPress's Charley Walters "We're trying; we're working hard at it, but a lot of deals that people have asked for, if we made them, people would really be mad at us. We've explored a lot; we've got a lot of people working on evaluations. But we haven't found a deal that makes us better without giving up our future, and we're not going to do that."
• Last word on DeRosa...I've seen on numerous message boards that DeRosa would have fit nicely in the number two spot -- and if I were a lineup consultant that is the recommendation I would have made too.  Putting a player that has the ability to produce a .370 on-base percentage is statistically sound -- which would get two players on base in front of Mauer and Morneau -- however, Ron Gardenhire seems to be of the mind that believes bat control and the ability to advance runners through sacrificing are the key attributes of a number two hitter.  Had DeRosa been at his disposal, I would be inclined to think he would have batted him sixth, seventh or eighth, similar to where he batted with the Cubs in 2008.  As I mentioned previously, the Harris-Buscher platoon hit .294/.346/.436 (.782 OPS) after June 14th when they became the regular third base tandum.  So even though DeRosa was not acquired, I believe the upgrade would have been marginal at best over the pair. 
• Knucking Things Up. When the Twins resigned R.A. Dickey for the second time in as many offseasons, it became clear that the organization was determined to follow through on allocating a knuckleball pitcher to throw in the climate-controlled Metrodome.  This to me, is fascinating for because this is a fairly progressive strategy for the Twins organization.  Of course, the knuckleball is far from a new idea -- as it was in vogue since the early 1900s -- sabermetrician and former Ranger employee, Craig R. Wright, who porposed the implementation of a knuckleball program in the 1980s.  His suggest never caught on at the time as most of baseball at the time saw the knuckleball not so much like the Metrodome's climate, but unpredictable and fell out of fashion in the developmental ranks.  Remember Bob Uecker's tip for catching them?  "You wait until it stops rolling and pick it up," quipped the former catcher and current Brewers radio announcer.  In 1989 Wright and former pitching coach Tom House co-authored "The Diamond Appraised" in efforts to provide both slants on highly debated topics and issues.  In one chapter, titled "The Knuckleball: Baseball's Most Underrated Pitch", Wright outlined a historical perspective of the pitch and why it fell to the wayside -- mostly out lack of young pitchers developing the pitch -- and it died out.  “Catchers hate it,” Jim Bouton, the author of “Ball Four: My Life and Hard Times Throwing the Knuckleball in the Big Leagues,” said to the New Yorker. “Nobody likes to warm up with you. Coaches don’t respect it. You can pitch seven good innings with a knuckleball, and as soon as you walk a guy they go, ‘See, there’s that damn knuckleball.’”  Wright's chapter set to work dispelling the myth that the knuckleball is inherently wild.  He cited the walk rate of a dozen knuckleballers, like Wilbur Wood, Charlie Hough, Phil Niekro and showed their walk rates were at or below league average at the time.  Wright concluded this by saying more organizations should take the opportunity to teach a pitch at a lower-level in the farm system. He suggested that five or six borderline prospects be identified to be candidates to convert to a knuckleball.  This is oddly close to what Ron Gardenhire has proposed -- maybe I've underestimated his thinking (or at least reading habits).  Now professional baseball has Tim Wakefield, Charlie Zink, Charlie Haeger (who Mankato Free Press's Ed Thoma thinks is worth a big league shot), Dickey and Lance Niekro, the former Giants first base prospect who is working his way up in the Braves organization using the flutterball.
• Turning Japanese.  The Toyko Times is reporting that there are three teams remaining in the bidding for former Dragons pitcher Kenshin Kawakami: the Orioles, Cardinals and the Twins.  Several different sources suggest that Kawakami is comparable to current Dodger Hiroki Kuroda, who finished his first year state side with a 9-10 record with a 3.73 ERA and 116-to-42 K-to-BB in 183 innings of work.  Back East, the Daily Yomuri Online took a look at the duo's Japan League career.  The author cited that Kawakami pitched in an extremely pitcher-friendly ballpark with a high scoring offense and a very solid bullpen.  Kuroda, on the other hand, played in the homer friendly Hiroshima Citizens Stadium with a poor defense.  When Kuroda reached the Majors, he was placed in the pitching-friendly Dodger Stadium where he thrived, going 6-2 with a 3.68 ERA. 
• Honest Work.  The New York Times had a refreshing story on the Arizona Diamondbacks' prospect, Clay Zavada, from Streator, Illinois.  The tale of Zavada is one of many of typical minor leaguer signed in the late rounds (Zavada was drafted in the 30th and received a bonus of $1,000) and have make little during the season (Zavada makes roughly $280 a week in the Midwest League).  “Not all of these guys are getting million-dollar bonuses,” said A. J. Hinch, the director of player development for the Diamondbacks. “I don’t know that everybody is quite aware of what these guys go through in order to give themselves a chance to make it.”

Adieu, 2008.

Now that the first complete calender year of Twins blogging at Over The Baggy is almost over, I want to take the opportunity to those out there that have made the visits -- over 35,000 stops in all in 2008.  Regularly or irregularly, I know you have umpteen Twins blogs to choose from and I appreciate you taking time out of your day to peruse the writings and jottings left up here.    

 

A special thanks goes out to the Twins Geek, John Bonnes, who was kind enough to let me pen some dribble for his GameDay magazine.  Blogging is one thing, but to have words written on dead trees that feels...well, kind of archaic by technological standards, but it is easier to read in the bathroom.  Jokes aside, it is a great periodical to procure when you are at the Dome and are looking for more indepth analysis of the Twins (and baseball in general) that is not offered by the publication sold inside the stadium.  Having visited nearly a dozen Major League stadiums over the summer that lack such an offering, I can say that it says a lot about (1) the academic nature of the fans and (2) entrepruenurialism of our local community that provides an alternative to progandaish in-house program.  I believe that Twins fans are some of the best educated in the country considering the amount of blogs dedicated to and the material offered within them.

 

I want to thank the Twins Blogger Extraordinaire, author of AaronGleeman.com, Aaron Gleeman, who connected me with a small smattering of blurbing for Rotoworld and also recommending me to Dave Gassko of The Hardball Times.  Because of this, Gassko contacted me to write the Twins section and players comments in the forthcoming The Hardball Times Season Preview 2009 -- Which, by the way, you can pre-order the book here for a mere $19.95.  Gleeman's site continues to mesmerize me by the sheer volume of work he uploads and the breadth of the topics.  In a way, Gleeman has become to the Twin Cities what Bill Simmons was to Boston (except less obnoxious about his homerism and not on the ESPN payroll -- yet) providing unending and uncompromising coverage of the hometown Twins and coupling that with entertaining Link-O-Ramas that diverge from sports at times to fill the doldrums of Friday mornings. 

Finally, Seth Stohs, of SethSpeaks.net, has been a great resource, allowing me a sneak preview of his Prospect Handbook 2009 in order to scribe a short review on the manuscript.  In addition to frequently linking to my site, he's been kind enough to have me on his Weekly Podcasts several times only to listen to me stammer and lose my train of thought miles before the conclusion station arrives.  Most recently in last night's podcast that included Twins prospects Kyle Waldrop and Jeff Manship.  Stohs's new venture to podcasting has allowed him to unveil what seems to be never-ending appearances by Twins prospects, providing fans with not just information, but a forum for dialogue to the future of the organization long before they call 34 Kirby Puckett Place home (most never will now, I suppose).  This sort of action would have blown my mind as a 12-year-old and yet, at times, I cannot fully believe how much the proliferation of the Internet has allowed us to connect with players that were once just a last name one day a week in the Star Tribune.  What a world we live in - and Stohs is helping making it a little bit smaller for Twins fans. 

 

There are plenty of other bloggers who I read daily myself (most of which are linked above but dozens of others that are not) and their writings continue to give me something to chew on or be entertained by day-in and day-out, they are deserving of my thanks and your patronage too.  I hope to continue to provide meaningful insight and analysis to fill a small corner of the Internet in 2009.  Please continue to visit in the coming year.  Here's shooting for 70,000 in 2009. 

 

Thanks again to all and have a happy and safe New Years! 

 

The Curious Case of Matthew Guerrier

In 2006, the Twins had Matt Guerrier supply 69.2 innings of low leverage relief work, performing adequately evident by his 3.77 Runs Allowed Average.  His overall season totals would have been much better had September been extracted.  In that month, Guerrier threw 23.1 innings (including one start) and allowed seven of his nine home runs along with an opponent slugging percentage of .549.  No matter, the following season Guerrier began like September of 2006 never happened.  In his first 15 innings, Guerrier limited opponents to a .122 BA.  Through June 24th of 2007, Guerrier held opponents to a .164 BA and had a decent 33-to-11 K-to-BB ratio.  This performance coupled with the losses of Dennys Reyes, Jesse Crain and Pat Neshek gave Guerrier the opportunity to pitch in high leverage situations.  In 2006, his leverage index was 0.50 but increased to 0.93 at the conclusion of 2007.  But with the added responsibility came the added challenges of retiring better hitters.  In the first half of the season, Guerrier had a 1.70 Runs Allowed Average supported by a .183/.246/.253 opponent batting line and surrendered just two home runs.  Following the All Star break, Guerrier's numbers were in flux.  His RAA ballooned to 3.34 from the 1.70 in the first half and opponents hit .272/.318/.463 while smacking seven home runs.   

 

Similar to 2007, the Twins were put in a situation without Neshek, this time early in the season.  Once again manager Ron Gardenhire turned to Guerrier and had him fill the majority of those high leverage situations (1.27 in 2008, up from 0.93).  In 51 innings in the first half of the season, Guerrier posted a 3.70 RAA with a 38-to-21 K-to-BB ratio.  In 217 plate appearances opponents hit .241/.315/.374.  Once again after the All Star break Guerrier found himself in another precarious situation where he was getting pummeled.  In the ensuing 25.1 innings, he held a 9.32 RAA and allowed seven home runs with a .336/.417/.582. 

 

This sort of drop-off in production was previously reserved for Juan Rincon.  So what are the factors behind the 29 year old's decline? 

 

Matt Guerrier is essentially a three-pitch pitcher, the first of which is the most common among relievers' arsenals, the fastball.   

 

Fastball	MPH	Usage	Zone	WHIFF	Batted Ball Outs %
2007	92.1	60.8%	63.1%	.185	66.1%
2008	92.4	67.%	42.8%	.048	67.5%

His fastball ranges from 90-94 but has averaged 92 the past two seasons. Though not predominantly an out-pitch, Guerrier's 2007 WHIFF of .185 was fairly decent by the fastball standards among relievers.  (For those unfamiliar with this metric, WHIFF average is the measurement of swing-and-misses on a particular pitch.  In this instance, the data is extracted from Josh Kalk's Pitch f/x database.)  What stands out in this comparison of his past two seasons, is the zone presences and his WHIFF effectiveness.  In 2007, Guerrier located the pitch within the zone 63% of the time, establishing an early strike.  One year later, Guerrier struggled to find the zone with his fastball in fewer than half of the times he threw it (42.8%).  It is no small wonder that in turn his WHIFF decreased to .048 and his walk rate spiked from 5.9% in 2007 to 10.7% in 2008.

   

Curveball	MPH	Usage	Zone	WHIFF	Batted Ball Outs %
2007	80.0	17.4%	51.4%	.348	60.0%
2008	80.6	10.1%	57.7%	.167	71.4%

 

Outside of his fastball, Guerrier implements a tight 12-to-6 curveball that is spun at a significantly slower rate, giving him an good off-speed breaking ball.  Averaging around a 12-mph difference in his two most used pitches, his curveball in 2007 was a very effective out-pitch, reflected in his .348 WHIFF rate.  This past season, Guerrier's use of his curveball was curtailed - most likely in response to being unable to find the strike zone with the fastball to properly set up the pitch - and with it his ability to induce misses dropped to .167.  That fact aside, the curveball was equally effective in that he was able to retire 71% of batters that put the pitch into play - a large boost from 2007. 

 

Slider	MPH	Usage	Zone	WHIFF	Batted Ball Outs %
2007	86.3	21.7%	67.8%	.364	60.0%
2008	86.6	20.9%	69.0%	.423	71.7%

 

To those that watch the Twins telecasts on FSN North, you would recall how much emphasis is placed on Guerrier's curveball.  Frequently overlooked by analysts, however, is the fact that Matt Guerrier's best pitch is his slider.  With a .423 WHIFF, his slider has one of the highest WHIFFs among the Twins' staff.  What makes this pitch exceedingly better is that he saves his deployment of the pitch for his right-handed counterparts.  The down-and-away spin action obtained numerous empty swings. 

For Guerrier to improve in 2009 he will have to refine the command of his fastball.  Being able to locate the fastball for a strike will do two things, (1) it will increase the amount of chases in Guerrier’s curveball from both sides of the plate and (2) it will cut down the number of total pitches leading to a more productive second-half. The success of his curveball, his secondary pitch against lefties, is directly correlated with his ability to throw the fastball for a strike consistently.  According to billjamesonline.net, in 2008 Guerrier relied on his fastball against the lefties (62% usage) and had a lowly 16-to-15 K-to-BB ratio.  Limited to two pitches against his left-handed counterparts, those opponents were able to coax walks and sit on hanging curveballs without having to answer to a 93-mph fastball cutting the plate in half at the knees. 

 

Another often cited explanation for Guerrier’s late season breakdown is that he has had a burdening workload in the past several years.  Though his appearances have risen steadily over the past four seasons, his increase has actually been a byproduct of his own doing.  In 2005 Guerrier faced 306 batters and used 1,094 pitches (3.58 per PA).  In 2006 Guerrier’s appearances decreased from 43 to 39 while his total batters faced actually decreased to 300 but used roughly the same amount of pitches (1,071 or 3.57 per PA).  With a depleted bullpen, Guerrier was asked to step up his use from 39 to 73 in 2007 but ultimately faced just 51 more batters -- a 17% increase to his prior workload –- and Guerrier needed approximately 3.69 pitches each plate appearance and threw 1,296 total.  This past season Guerrier needed a whopping 1,320 pitches against a pool of 344 leading to a grossly inefficient 3.83 pitches per plate appearances during his 76 outings.  By establishing his fastball consistently Guerrier would shave several pitches off each plate appearance and whittle down the total amount leading to late season success.